Torah and Rehab
Jewish law is often misrepresented as being focused on retribution and having an almost sadistic desire for violent punishment: nothing could be further from the truth. It does, in fact, demonstrate many ways to be acquitted as well as ways of rehabilitation for the offender. The essence of rehabilitation is clearly seen in this weeks parsha. Note the following:
כִּי-יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים, וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם; וְהִצְדִּיקוּ, אֶת-הַצַּדִּיק, וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ, אֶת-הָרָשָׁע. וְהָיָה אִם-בִּן הַכּוֹת, הָרָשָׁע–וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו, כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּראַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ, לֹא יֹסִיף: פֶּן-יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל-אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה, וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ
If there is a quarrel between men, and they approach the tribunal, and they [the judges] judge them, and they acquit the innocent one and condemn the guilty one. and it shall be, if the guilty one has incurred [the penalty of] lashes, that the judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him, commensurate with his crime, in number. He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed, lest he give him a much more severe flogging than these [forty lashes], and your brother will be degraded before your eyes. (Deut. 25: 1-3)
For a number of reasons there are many Halachic discussions of these verses; but for now we can look at the change of name of the offender. The verses start by calling the accused הָרָשָׁע-the evil one then quite quickly use the friendly name of אָחִיךָ-your brother. The Sifri on this pasuk understands this apparent misnomer to be teaching us a moral lesson. Namely, that once the Offender has accepted punishment he is once again part of our people, connected by Ahavas Yisroel.
Practically speaking in halachah, while someone is considered a רָשָׁע they are excommunicated. That is, they are forbidden from taking part in religious ceremonies and also from civil law (for example giving testimony in court). Yet when the person has undergone the prescribed punishment his religious and civil rights and obligations are reinstated as a full member of Am Yisroel. This led to a specific enactment by the sages, known as “takkanat ha-shavim”, a rule designed to remove any obstacles to repentance.
An example of this is found in massechet Gittin (5:5): “If a beam which was acquired by robbery has been built into a building, restitution for it may be made in money so as not to put obstacles in the way of penitents.” The rule is, that in a case of robbery, the guilty party must return what he has taken to the rightful owner (Lev. 5:23). This makes obvious sense. If a thief were merely allowed to make a monetary compensation rather than return the stolen object, the law would, in effect, allow someone to acquire an object – albeit at a price – through unlawful means. That is clearly morally wrong, even to an atheist. Yet this rule was suspended for cases where returning the stolen object would cause the thief to incur a massive loss. This is the case in the Mishnah in Gittin; in order to restore the actual beam to its rightful owner the thief would have to demolish his own house. Although the sense of guilt at the original crime might induce remorse in the thief and an effort to return stolen goods; Nonetheless, if this would involve disproportionate loss the thief might decide that restitution was too dear and decide against giving the object back. “So what?”, even a fairly reasonable man might say. “Surely the thief, by breaking the law, has forfeited any claim on the courts’ clemency. What matters is the right of the original owner of the beam- not the rights of the thief”. Yet Jewish law ruled otherwise. To be sure, the owner must be compensated for his loss, for without this he would have suffered an injustice. But we must have concern for the offender too, and must remove obstacles to becoming a law-abiding person.
Our sages went further still. In Massechet Bava Kama (94b) we find a remarkable principle: “if robbers or usurers [repent, and of their own accord] are prepared to restore what they have wrongly taken, it is not right to accept it from them, and one who does so is not acting with the approval of the sages.” This does not apply to a convicted criminal – only a person who has, without any prompting other than a guilty conscience, has decided to confess and make amends. This is “brought down” by Rambam (Hilchot Gezelah 1:13): “Even though robbing someone is like taking their life…we must help [a thief who repents on his own accord] and pardon him in order to bring him to the right path.
There are other principles articulated by the sages which help an ‘offender’ to atone for his misdeeds and feel fully accepted back by Klal Yisroel (not referring to his criminal past to take one example). These teachings were ahead of their times as justice in ancient times was not tempered with mercy, but like so many of the moral truths given to our forefathers on Har Sinai, they are radical and eternal. Jewish law is concerned not only to protect the rights of those who have been wronged, but also to help the offenders rebuild their lives. Only acts are forever wicked, never a person; and we put this into practice by welcoming the penitent back as our brother and equal
