With korbanos, the sacrifices, there is a concept within certain categories of korban called olah v’yored – where the animal offered will vary, dependent on the person’s status. For example, Parshas Tazria deals with a woman who gives birth – olah v’yored applies, and as such, a woman from a wealthy family offers a חטאת and עולה of sheep, and a woman from a poor family offers a חטאת and עולה of doves.

But what if a poor person decides to save up, and instead of bringing the doves, he chooses to offer a wealthy man’s offering of sheep/cows? In other words; are people confined to their social status?

The halacha according to all is that if a wealthy man were to bring a poor man’s offering of doves, he has definitely not fulfilled his obligation. So the, olah v’yored applies to the animals, and it applies to the supplicant if he attempts to downgrade his responsibility. So the question becomes: can a person upgrade their responsibility?

The Sefer Hachinuch says that a poor person who upgrades his sacrifice from the birds to the cows has not fulfilled his obligation. The Rambam disputes this, and says that he has.

What is the basis of the dispute?

There is a story told about R’ Meir Schapira, at a gathering of all the pre-war Gedolim. He presented this very question, and asked how the Sefer HaChinuch could suggest he hadn’t fulfilled his obligation, possibly contradicting various Gemaras.

Present at the gathering, was the Imrei Emes, the Gerrer Rebbe. He simply muttered, “there is a missing korban”. Those gathered were puzzled what the Rebbe had meant. Among his attending disciples was R’ Menachem Zemba of Warsaw, a renowned genius, who took the floor. “Let us analyse where the Sefer HaChinuch says his halacha. There are 6 applications of the concept of olah v’yored:”

1. A ritually impure person who enters the area of the Beis haMikdash

2. A ritually impure person who eats kodshim (produce set aside for kohanim)

4. A person who falsely swears he did not witness an event, thereby avoiding needing to testify

5. A woman who gives birth

6. A person stricken with tzara’as (a metzora)

“5+6 are different. The wealthy person brings one animal, as does the poor person. Not so in 1-4, delineated in Parshas Vayikra, wherein the wealthy person only bring the חטאת , and no עולה , thereby only needing one animal. The Gemara that the Sefer HaChinuch seemed to go against, that a poor person who brings a rich mans offering has indeed fulfilled his obligation, was regarding 5+6, where there were two animals, brought by both the rich and poor.”

“However, in Parshas Vayikra, where the pasuk discusses cases 1-4, it is insufficient for a poor person to bring a wealthy man’s offering – he’s missing an animal!”

“The Ibn Ezra discusses the possible causes for the discrepancy in how many animals a person would bring, based on his social standing.”

“1. A poor man would by definition be unhappy with his standing in life, and he would bear a grudge against Heaven for his misfortune. This necessitates an additional animal.”

“2. A wealthy person’s offering has a large enough portion to burn on the Mizbeach by itself, a cow is a very large animal. Not so with a bird, with a woefully small portion to burn. It is disrespectful to offer such a miniscule portion, and this necessitates a whole new animal to satisfice the demands of the Mizbeach.”

The genius continued; “So the Sefer HaChinuch would agree with the first possibility. It doesn’t help for a poor person, who must bring the second to atone for his grudge against Heaven, to bring one animal. He has not addressed this feeling within, and as the Rebbe said, there is a korban missing.”

However, the Rambam would hold with the second option, that the second animal is not brought because of the person, but rather, by the nature of the animal being offered. If he were to bring a cow, there would be no need for a second animal, and he would indeed have fulfilled his responsibility!

The Torah charges the Temple with a duty of having an eternal flame on the Mizbeach:

אֵשׁ תָּמִיד תּוּקַד עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לֹא תִכְבֶּה – A continuous fire shall burn upon the altar; it shall not go out. (Vayikra 6:6)

עשרה ניסים נעשו בבית המקדש (…) ולא כבו הגשמים את עצי המערכה – Ten miracles occurred in the Temple: (…), and the rains did not extinguish the logs on the fire (of the Mizbeach). (Avos 5:5)

It is that the miracle is supernatural. Miracles are meant to be as natural as possible, and it would have been simpler to manipulate nature, such as rain not falling on the Mizbeach at all, rather than have rain fall on the fire but not extinguish it. What is the purpose of the miracle being deliberately more complicated than necessary?

R’ Chaim Volozhin suggests that there is a very powerful message we can learn from this.

Sometimes we wish that the circumstances around us would just change, that our “rain” would just stop. But it is evident from the Mishna that the circumstances won’t just change to suit our individual needs; just as אֵשׁ תָּמִיד תּוּקַד עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ – the fire burnt on the Mizbeach continuously – even in the pouring rain, it would not go out.

We can have all the excuses in the world to stop and falter from our dutiess. But we have a case study in how to conduct ourselves in the Mizbeach. Instead of shying away from our responsibilities, we need to persevere. People pray for miracles, when they don’t see that they need to expend hishtadlus – effort. This hishtadlus is the part we play in solving our problems, and thus our problem’s solution is in our own hands. If we keep at what we’re meant to, we will be our own miracles. Our miracles won’t come on their own.

The fire on the Mizbeach was not allowed to be in a state of not being lit. if this was miraculously facilitated, why give instruction not to extinguish it?

Perhaps we can similarly explain that the fire wasn’t “magic”. It didn’t burn on it’s own with nothing there. It required constant fuel, stoking and replacing logs of wood, and over hundreds of years, did not go out. The pasuk says as much: אֵשׁ תָּמִיד תּוּקַד – it never stopped. This is a further indication we need do our part to see G-d’s hand. It won’t play itself.

We can further say that the Kohen Gadol went into the Kodesh Kadashim once per year, on Yom Kippur. He performed the service, and said one prayer. The sole prayer that as ever said in the Kodesh Kadashim was this. That Hashem ignore the travellers and tourists, that it should rain as much as possible. Through rain we see the hand of G-d, and this further shows the importance of “letting it rain” and working around it, rather than having it not rain at all.

It’s a very basic question, and there are many approaches to take. The Ramban on Vayikra 1:9 discusses various approaches we will analyse, and is widely considered one of the fundamental parts of the Ramban’s commentary on the Chumash.

The Ramban quotes the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim as the first approach. The Rambam writes there that the idea of Jews using animal sacrifice was necessary for the people as they needed a physical method of worship, having been a part of the pagan culture in Egypt and other such places. To battle and rectify the idol worship in the world, the Jews would do the same action for a sacred purpose.

The Ramban disagrees strongly with this on many facets. If we base an entire method of service to Hashem on the actions of fools and sinners, why would Hashem gain anything from it at all? Vayikra 1:9 says that the korban creates אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה – Hashem “enjoys” the fact that we bring korbanos. The implication of the Rambam is that the korbanos are more for man than Hashem, but  if the korbanos were for man, why would Hashem enjoy it? We must find a suitable explanation for bringing korbanos that also explains why Hashem instructs it of us, rather than why why we ought to do it.

The Ramban points out that if the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is correct, that Jewish animal sacrifice only exists to battle idol worship, then we would not find instances of korbanos before an instance of idol worship. But this is not so – Adam was the first human – there were obviously no other people around to worship idols – yet he brought korbanos nonetheless, and so too with Noach; his family were the sole survivors of the Flood – so again, there could be no idol worshippers – and we find that nonetheless he did bring korbanos. How would the Rambam explain these instances where there was no idol worship to fight?

He further asks why the solution to idol worship would be to do the same thing in a different way – this seems to lend credibility to the idolatry the korbanos are trying to fight, chas v’shalom. It would seem that it would be better to just eat animals and not have sacrifices at all if we were indeed trying to fight the credibility of idol worship, as eating them shows we don’t consider them to be worthy of special attention.

R’ Yakov Minkus explains the solution to this issue. The Rambam in his magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Me’ila 8:8) writes explicitly that the yesod – the distilled, fundamental, reason to bring korbanos is a חוק – there is no reason to do it other than the fact we were told to. The Moreh Nevuchim explains the inverse of this – once the mitzva exists, there is a spillover effect that we can relate to more, but the underlying reasoning remains a חוק. With this knowledge at hand, of course Noach could bring a korban, and the question about the non-existence of idol-worship falls away. Battling idol worship isn’t why there are korbanos as a starting point, rather, it helps explain it after the fact.

With this knowledge of the Rambam’s true approach to korbanos, we can suggest an answer to the question of why the countering of idol worship would take a similar form, rather than denigrating it, by simply eating all animals regularly, without any sacrifices at all.

Korbanos have their blood sprinkled on the Mizbeach, by a kohen, in the Beis Hamikdash. The Korban Pesach had none of these key functions, so why is it called a korban at all? R’ Moshe Shapiro explains that the key to understanding this issue is that idol worship is not nothing. Paganism and idol worship have a כח הטומאה – they usurp and corrupt spirituality. Eating an animal doesn’t battle the the negative of idol worship, it just nullifies it. The nullification does not require the Beis Hamikdash, or sprinkling of blood by the kohen.  This is why the Pesach could be brought publicly in Egypt. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim was saying that all korbanos have this nullifying the negative aspect to which we can relate, but we now see this isn’t the full spectrum of his opinion.

The Ramban then offers a second approach. There is an intrinsic good on man’s part in having korbanos. The idea of a korban is that a person should see the animal as being his substitute, and really, he ought to be sacrificed. The animal takes his place and atones for his sins, and this is the reason to have korbanos.

There is a mighty flaw with this approach too however. Most korbanos are donated, rather than obligated of people, so the Ramban’s approach doesn’t explain the existence of donated korbanos at all.

The Ramban offers a third solution, that is beyond the scope of this site to explain properly. The word קרבן, the root of which is the word קרב, means “closeness”. Offering a korban engenders closeness with Hashem. This is a difficult concept to explain, let alone understand, but to illustrate: we perform mitzvos to emulate Hashem’s ways, but we are not emulating Hashem by bringing korbanos – we are doing something else: we are interacting with Hashem. We are provoking a reaction in Hashem, as the pasuk says; “אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה” – on which Rashi remarks “נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני”. This is difficult to illustrate, but there is a difference between doing Hashem’s will, and making it. When we bring a korban, we bring more of Hashem’s will into the world. One could suggest there is an element of creation here.

The Ramban brings a proof from Isaiah 60:7 that says: יַעֲלוּ עַל רָצוֹן מִזְבְּחִי וּבֵית תִּפְאַרְתִּי אֲפָאֵר – the Mizbeach is the expression of Hashem’s will.

So in bringing a korban, a person intentions are going to correlate to how they have extended G-d’s will in the world. This is why there is a concept of pigul, (a lengthy concept regarding what happens in the event that all the actions of a korban were carried out correctly, but someone in the porcess was thinking about something mundane, like the weather. Around 40 pages of Meseches Zevachim are devoted to this) – because the physical animal isn’t what matters – there is a transfer of spirituality here, from potential/theoretical to physical in this world. It’s a very big deal. The improper thoughts mean one can’t interact with what he’s trying to, and the korban has served it’s purpose, as the whole idea is not the physical at all.

So in answer to why we bring korbanos: there is the simple Moreh Nevuchim approach that we are counteracting paganism, the Ramban’s simple approach that we can atone our sins, and the Ramban’s esoteric Kabbalistic approach. We can suggest though, that perhaps the חוק aspect that the Rambam referred to was this third approach, and perhaps all the opinions harmonise together. Admittedly, this doesn’t answer why we bring korbanos, but it does explain what the function of the korban is.

The Pasuk says:

וְשִׁלַּם אֹתוֹ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ וַחֲמִשִׁתָיו יֹסֵף עָלָיו – ….he shall pay its main, adding its fifths to it… (5:24)

Chazal teach us that all expenses are calculated and apportioned from Rosh Hashanah to Rosh Hashanah, with the the exceptions of monies allocated for: – Shabbos, –Yom Tov, –teaching Torah to one’s children, and the Medrash Rabbah adds Rosh Chodesh to the list as well.

The Tzemach Tzvi says that this is alluded to in this Pasuk.  וְשִׁלַּם אֹתוֹ- all his money, whatever he pays and whatever he earns, is earmarked בְּרֹאשׁוֹ – on Rosh Hashanah – וַחֲמִשִׁתָיו יֹסֵף עָלָיו – and his fifths will be added to him. What are these חֲמִשִׁתָיו of which which we speak? חוץ מהוצאות שבת, תורה, יו”ט, ור”ח – with the exception of expenses for Shabbos, Torah, Yom Tov and Rosh Chodesh. These will be יֹסֵף עָלָיו – added to him as the year goes on, subject to his actions.

(This is my addition, feel free to disagree)

It is worth pointing out that the וְ of ור”ח is used as part of the initials, rather than the ר of Rosh chodesh, and the end result is that the initials are a perfect reflection of the way (diyuk) the Medrash Rabba explained this concept, that Rosh Chodesh too is part of the list.

(end of my addition)

There is a story told about the Pnei Menachem, who once sent his son to school with an envelope for his Rebbe. The Rebbe refused to accept the envelope, as he did not feel he could take money from the Pnei Menachem. A few nights later, the Pnei Menachem called up his son’s Rebbe, and said that he was obliged to accept it, as זה נהנה וזה לא חסר , (literally, this one gains, and the other does not lose) a mechanism that enables someone to use something that the owner is not using and had no use for, for free. He explained with this Dvar Torah that this money was not normal money and could come into reckoning, as money spent on teaching your son Torah is not included in your “annual salary”. Presumably, the Rebbe accepted the envelope.

 

The Torah says in Vayikra how sacrifices work:

וְהִקְטִיר הַכֹּהֵן אֶת הַכֹּל הַמִּזְבֵּחָה עֹלָה אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחוֹחַ לה – The Kohen will offer the animal in smoke on the altar, a burnt offering, with a pleasant aroma to the Lord. (1:9)

Rashi explains that Hashem instructs us to perform this mitzva, and when we carry it out, this generates “a pleasant aroma” (lit. שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני – “That I said, and they did as I wished”).

But all mitzvos are Hashem’s Will – the word “mitzva” is a construct of the word “command”. Do all mitzvos have this formula resulting in “a pleasant aroma”? What is it about sacrifices that distinguishes them?

More to the point, the sacrifice under discussion is not actually commanded at all – it is voluntary! If the formula resulting in a pleasant aroma requires doing as Hashem commands, why would a voluntary sacrifice generate this result at all? There are other examples of this – when Noah offered sacrifices after the Flood, his offerings were called רֵיחַ נִיחוֹחַ לה, yet he wasn’t commanded to bring sacrifices either.

Tangentially; why is the formula for the pleasant aroma inconsistent? It ought to say שרציתי ונעשה רצוני or שאמרתי ונעשה אמרי – “I wanted and My will was done” or “I spoke and what I said was done”. What is the implication of the change?

To understand what the pleasant aroma is, we need to explore the nature of the Will – the רצון. Every morning, women recite the blessing “שעשני כרצונו – who made me according to His will”. But everything exists because G-d wants it to – God perpetually sustains existence just by willing it. R’ Tzadok Hakohen points out that the words for “thing” in Hebrew – דבר and חפץ – translate as “say” and “desire” respectively – in Hebrew, things reflect their essence; in this instance things exist because Hashem desires them to and because He says so.

The Taz explains that this blessing praises the positive aspects of being a woman. But what specific aspects of being a woman is the blessing referencing as being more “virtuous” than other aspects of being a woman?

R’ Moshe Shapiro tells us that from the Patriarchs, we have חסד, אמת, וגבורה – characteristics highly influential in Judaism. But what of their wives?

Sarah saw that her son was being negatively influenced by Yishmael, and she insisted that her husband send Yishmael and his mother back to the land she came from. Rivka was weary of Esav, and made sure that he did not receive the blessings from Isaac, and assisted Yakov in getting them instead. Rachel and Leah both told Yakov it was time to return to Israel after years in Lavan’s house.

The consistent theme is that the women stand up for the way things ought to be.

We see this when Hashem created the first woman: וַיֹּאמֶרְ הֹ’ אֱלֹהִים לֹא טוֹב הֱיוֹת הָאָדָם לְבַדּוֹ אֶעֱשֶׂה לּוֹ עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ – And the Lord God said, “It is not good that man is alone; I will make him a helpmate opposite him.”

Rashi explains the dual meaning of עֵזֶר כְּנֶגְדּוֹ. If her husband is righteous, he will find her to be an עֵזֶר – a helper. If he is evil, she will be כְּנֶגְדּוֹ – opposite him, to return him to justice.

This means that Eve was created to prevent a state of things not being good, ie the way they ought to be.

If Adam had no significant other, it could could be said G-d was not the only unique being, Adam was also one of a kind! So he needed a mate to demonstrate he was “human”; so tongue in cheek, but literally, our wives remind us we are not G-d! The Chiddushei Harim writes that the only two un-bluff-ables are G-d, and one’s wife.

The Creation was God’s Will being actualised, culminating in the Torah being given to mankind. The supervisors for the job are women; created to preserve His רצון, literally, שעשני כרצונו , “I was created to preserve His will”.

Since this is what רצון means, it is clear how the formula for the pleasant aroma is ונעשה רצוני. G-d created the world by saying it should be. By doing His will, the world becomes a place to serve Hashem – מקום עבודת ה. This is the purpose of Creation, to draw creation closer to Creator. But this implies that only by bringing sacrifices can we say it is a pleasing fragrance to Hashem, as the only thing called עבודה is the Korbanos! This explains why a voluntary sacrifice is also included, and therefore Noah’s too!