Archive for the ‘04. Sefer Bamidbar’ Category

The pasuk tell us:

 וְלֹא תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם בָּהּ כִּי הַדָּם הוּא יַחֲנִיף אֶת הָאָרֶץ וְלָאָרֶץ לֹא יְכֻפַּר לַדָּם אֲשֶׁר שֻׁפַּךְ בָּהּ כִּי אִם בְּדַם שֹׁפְכוֹ – And you shall not deceive the land in which you live, for the blood corrupts the land, and the blood which is shed in the land cannot be atoned for except through the blood of the one who shed it. (35:34)

The word חניפה means flattery/deception/corruption/obfuscation. The expression seems highly odd in the context of the land.

R’ Moshe Feinstein draws a major distinction between the conventional wisdom of the world, and Jewish law. The world worries about peace and rights – if someone disturbs peace or rights, since the goal is peace, the person destroying it is therefore a target, as they are destroying the world as they see it. Countless wars are fought, with countless dead, because one nation has a claim to repairing and saving the world, or some other ideal.

For Jews, the Torah tells us “Do not murder.” – regardless of who – one may not kill another human being. Even someone who destroys the world is still taken care of by this.

What results from this is that someone who murders or wages war to ostensibly “save the world”, is יַחֲנִיף אֶת הָאָרֶץ – wherein the land takes precedence over a man. He is being murdered for the sake of preservation of the land, for peace!

The Torah tells us that the land is always secondary to the person – all land is worthless if the people on it aren’t upstanding individuals. חניפה is the disconnect between reality and an ideal – we must always know that we have to be real with ourselves, always trying to improve. This is what the pasuk means when it says וְלֹא תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם בָּהּ.

The pasuk teaches that a man who kills someone accidentally is forced to run to an עיר מקלט, a city of refuge, and he must remain there until either he or the Kohen Gadol die. A close family member of the dead man is appointed to chase the murderer, and if he catches up to him before he arrives at the עיר מקלט, is fully permitted to avenge his dead relative and kill his murderer. Gemara in Sanhedrin 45b adds that if no family member will set out to avenge the dead man, then the Beis Din themselves must appoint someone.

The Steipler Gaon explains that the purpose of the murderer fleeing to the עיר מקלט is two-fold – it saves and punishes at the same time. It saves the murderer from being murdered by the person who has set out to avenge his family member, but even in a situation where for some reason the avenger would definitely not kill him, he must still go to the עיר מקלט anyway. He needs to stay there until he dies, and is buried in the עיר מקלט – the avenger can’t kill him one he’s dead, but he still has this punishment there.

The city he runs to is meant to rehabilitate him – he runs to a city of the Levi’im – the teachers of Bnei Yisrael. The reason there needs to be an avenger appointed by the Beis Din is that we must always be responsible and accountable for our actions – this man cannot get away with it, and the Torah teaches us that he cannot bribe his way out – he stays until the end. There must always be justice in the world.

Hashem runs the world on mercy and strict judgment – with the two there is Creation, and there is justice in the world.

The daughters of Tzlafchad came to Moshe and said:

לָמָּה יִגָּרַע שֵׁם אָבִינוּ מִתּוֹךְ מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ כִּי אֵין לוֹ בֵּן תְּנָה לָּנוּ אֲחֻזָּה בְּתוֹךְ אֲחֵי אָבִינוּ – Why should our father’s name be eliminated from his family because he had no son? Give us a portion along with our father’s brothers. (27:4)

Rashi explains that this was not an emotional request, rather, a halachic one. אנו במקום בן עומדות, ואם אין הנקבות חשובות זרע, תתיבם אמנו ליבם – We stand in the place a son ought to be, if we do not inherit our father, then let our mother perform yibum – levirate marriage.

A woman does not perform yibum if she has children from her deceased husband – as the children carry on the name of their father. The daughters of Tzlafchad made the association between yibum and inheritance – if they were זרע, progeny enough for yibum, then they ought to inherit, and if they weren’t to inherit, then their mother ought to perform yibum.

Rashi further points out that הא אם היה לו בן לא היו תובעות כלום. מגיד שחכמניות היו – If there had been a brother, they would not have made a claim (and left the inheritance to him). This displayed their intelligence. 

What exactly is the intelligence they displayed?

R’ Yehoshua Hartman explains that they demonstrated their understanding of the function of inheritance. The conventional wisdom is that when the owner dies, his assets are passed on. It is a default process – assets cannot lie unclaimed.

The genuine, Torah, understanding of inheritance is that whatever Hashem blesses someone with becomes a part of who they are. A person’s name takes root in his house – that’s what ownership really is. That is not to say that this goes to the extent of society today where people are defined by how much money they have at the bank. But property does have a certain relationship with the owner, a sort of extension.

When the person dies, the re-allocation of his assets is only to perpetuate the name of the deceased, which his property bears the name of. The people who are the continuation of his legacy will, inherit, which is why children usually inherit, as they are the continuation of their father’s legacy.

The daughters said if we weren’t continuations of their father’s lineage regarding inheritance, then they ought not to be for yibum. They understood what the function of both is to continue the lineage of their father.

The association was so correct, that Hashem told Moshe that they were right, teaching a previously unknown halacha.

In Parshas Chukas, Moshe sent emissaries to Edom, requesting that Bnei Yisrael traverse through their land on their way to Canaan, which Edom decline. Throughout the parsha of sending emissaries, the pasuk alternates between Moshe and Bnei Yisrael as having sent them (21:21 and onwards).
Rashi there explains that the pasuk is demonstrating that the leader is like the entire nation - שמשה הוא ישראל, וישראל הם משה, לומר לך שנשיא הדור הוא ככל הדור.

The Maharal points out a difficulty here. Rashi in Yisro (Shemos 18:1) writes that Moshe is equal to the whole Yisrael.
If this is so, how can we then extrapolate from Moshe to all leaders, that they are like the entire nation, if he was by definition different and greater than they could ever hope to be?

R’ Yehoshua Hartman explains that Moshe being parallel to Yisrael isn’t literal. To illustrate: if he were to eat, they wouldn’t all have to bentch afterwards.

The leader is an emissary, a representative of his people. Moshe was more, in that his being equal meant his actions carried the same weight as the nation itself. Sending emissaries is an act of any leader as a representative, and it is in this regard that we can deduce from Moshe to other leaders.

There is an idea in Chazal that Moshe could have utilised “אָנֹכִי הֹ’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ” as a defence for Bnei Yisrael at the Golden Calf, in that it was only said to Moshe, in the second person singular, so  technically, Bnei Yisrael had not violated אָנֹכִי הֹ’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ.
How is this possible?

R’ Hartman explains that the Maharal says that the Patriarchs didn’t receive Torah because they had no nation to speak of. They were individuals, and individuals die. The Torah is eternal, so must be given to a nation, as nations do not fade and die e the way an individual does. An individual represents only potential, whereas a nation has actualised it.
So how could Moshe, an individual, say that he received it alone?

Moshe was a microcosm of Yisrael. There were the 600,000 people at Sinai, and then Moshe, who represented their essence.
Whatever made Yisrael into Yisrael at Sinai, Moshe already was. (This is why his grave is unknown). He was saying that the qualities of Yisrael at Sinai that he represented were not guilty of the Golden Calf, that the people were not the very selves that had accepted it, and as such only he could be said to have heard it, exonerating the Bnei Yisrael.
Moshe was the pinnacle of Yisrael, and represented all that was good in the people of those days. It was in that capacity that he received and delivered the Torah, and the people he represented were not the self-same people who were guilty of the Golden Calf, and thus, the people who succumbed at the Golden Calf ought not to be held guilty at all..

Earlier in sefer Bamidbar, a chunk of the people go to Moshe, and lament that they were impure at the time the korban Pesach was offered, and request inclusion in the mitzvah in the form of Pesach Sheni.
In Parshas Korach, it is clear that Korach too seeks more inclusion. Why are they paradigms of how to and how not to perform diplomacy, when the bottom line for both was the same?

There is a concept that all negative characteristics have a positive application. Rabbeinu Yona writes how a person can be jealous of a tzaddik or talmid chacham. Jealousy is an inherently bad trait – however, the jealousy fosters aspirations, and if they are realised, the person grows from it. In this way, מתוך שלו לשמה, בה לשמה – from which it began without the correct intentions, the actions nonetheless develop into something meaningful.

However, there is a caveat to this rule, that all misguided actions are fixed in the long term – one type of action will never become לשמה – a machlokes – an divide. The Mishna in Pirkei Avos 5:17 says: כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים, סופה להתקים. ושאינה לשם שמים, אין סופה להתקים.
איזו היא מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים? זו מחלוקת הלל ושמאי. ושאינה לשם שמים? זו מחלוקת קרח וכל עדתו – Any argument for the sake of Heaven, will endure in the end. One that is not for sake of Heaven, will not endure. What is the paradigm of an argument for the sake of heaven? Hillel and Shamai. What is the paradigm of an argument not the sake of Heaven? Korah and his congregation.

What are the paradigms, exactly? That an argument in Torah will endure, and that politics will not?

R’ Yaakov Minkus explains that there is more to it than that. Adding the mitzvah of Pesach Sheni was not a problem – the Torah was not closed canon yet. Korach however, was looking to destroy (a cursory reading of Rashi illustrates this).

Hillel and Shamai were looking to build halachos, and build a fabric for life. From one’s point of view, we understand the other better. We need both to build and consolidate.
Not so with Korach. His arguments and divisions were not constructive at all. His claims and goals were baseless and without foundation – this was the midd a k’negged midd a of the earth opening up beneath him – he was not fighting for anything or against anything real. The Mishna says as much. What was the paradigm of an argument not for the sake of heaven? “Korach and his congregation.”. If the parallel to Hilel And Shamai were correct, it ought to have said Korach and Moshe. R ‘ Yaakov Minkus uses this to prove that Korach wasn’t really fighting anyone at all – it was just about causing a stir and break down the system that existed.

This is what Rashi and the Targum mean when they say that ויקח קרח – “And Korach took” – What did he take? Himself, to one side (against the other side, of Moshe.)

It was never about Moshe.

“And they journeyed from the mountain of Hashem a three-day distance.” (Beha’aloscha 10:33)

The Gemara in Shabbos 116a says that this verse is an allusion to the fact that Klall Yisrael strayed from their relationship with Hashem. Rashi (there) writes that within the next three days they cultivated their craving for meat (as in 11:4). The Ramban writes that their attitude in leaving their encampment at Sinai was as “a child running out of school.” That is to say, they left Mount Sinai – the place where they learned Hashem’s holy Torah – in excitement that the “class” was over.

The Chasam Sofer brings all of this together. He explains that had Klall Yisrael not thrown off the yolk of Torah and fled “like a child running out of school,” they never would have developed their infamous craving for meat. As the Mishna (Avos 3:5) says: “Whoever throws off the yoke of Torah, they place the yoke of drech eretz upon him.” Derech eretz here can refer to physical desires.

This led to an unfortunate chain of events. Klal Yisrael was supposed to go straight from Matan Torah into Eretz Yisrael. Yet, because of the attitude with which they left Mount Sinai, they developed this craving for meat. Because of their craving for meat, they were delayed for 30 days while many fell dead. This delay allowed the opportunity for Miriam to speak lashon harah about Moshe Rabbeinu, causing a further delay of seven days while waiting for her purification. The episode of the meraglim, the spies, followed, due to which the fate of that generation was sealed. They were to die out over the course of the next 40 years, never to reach Eretz Yisrael. It was during that time that Moshe Rabbeinu himself was denied the opportunity to enter Eretz Yisrael because of the episode of the hitting of the rock. We know that had Moshe Rabbeinu entered Eretz Yisrael, there never would have been a churban, the destruction of our Holy Temple, and the exile that ensued.

What is clear from all of this is that Judaism is not only about learning Torah and doing mitzvos, irrelevant to one’s intentions and attitude. Chovos halevavos, duties of the heart, are certainly vital. This point is especially important to those of us who are learning in yeshiva in a “zman,” or semester, format. Usually around this time in the zman one’s mind can wander to his summer plans and the thought “When will this be over already?” can surface. We need to take this message which these parshios are teaching us to heart. It is because this very attitude that we live here in galus all these years later.

May we merit that through our effort to turn our thoughts and minds to true serving of Hashem, that we earn the privilege to greet Moshiach speedily in our days.

The book of Bamidbar is known as Sefer Pikudim, the Book of Numbers. It would seem odd that the book takes its name of numbers, given that the numbers of the census, the countings of the people, appear only in Parshas Bamidbar and Pinchas.

Sefer Vayikra, called Toras Kohanim, or Leviticus, deals with kohanim, their roles and duties throughout. Sefer Shemos, or Exodus, deals with the Exodus and what followed.

So what are the Pikudim after which the Sefer is named?

Bamidbar is not the Torah of numbers, of countings; rather, it is the Torah of logistics, or context. All the parshiyos discuss the formation and development of a society, the Machane, the encampment.

Parshas Naso begins with the Levi’im, Gershon, Kehas and Merari, and their respective roles. There are four interceding parshiyos until the logical continuation of forming the camp, wherein the nesi’im of each tribe bring the Korbanos for their tribe. The interceding mitzvos are about (1) how a tzarua and zav (certain types of zzzz) must leave the camp, (2) A convert who dies with no family, his possessions go to the kohanim, (3) Sotah and (4) Nazir.

What are these four mitzvos that they interrupt the establishment of society?

In truth, they aren’t. The laws of the tzarua and zav aren’t in Parshas Metzora, as in essence, the laws here aren’t regarding him, so much as they are ourselves, society. Our society, the Machane, is lacking while he is a part of it, and that is why he must leave.

Regarding the convert with no relatives, he poses a difficulty to a normal person. Jews have a serious community setup, on top of which, on a large enough family tree, everyone is interrelated. The convert has no one. His possessions are bequeathed to the kohen. But regarding our society, the setup would seem to be incomplete – he is foreign, how do we deal with him? – but he is still integrated, and this completes society.

The Sotah has deviated from soicety’s setup, for obvious reasons.

The Nazir, whilst admirable for his commitment, has deviated from what is normal too. Drinking wine and cutting hair are normal things to do. Not doing them is abnormal.

All these people are not normal. But the Torah tells us that they are all part of the setup, and the nesi’im were offering korbanos for them too, an imperfect but complete society.

Regarding the Korbanos, the question begs to be asked, why does the Torah repeat each nasi’s korban, given that they were all identical?

The of numbers in Sefer Bamidbar is that being part of a number generates a speciality.

Each set of korbanos ends with zeh. zeh has the numerical value of 12, the number of tribes. Elsewhere, a number is impersonal; but here, the underlying theme is that speciality lies in being a part of the number, so much so that deviating from it is bad. zeh is the klal. We are all part of the klal. The Torah tells us the total number of korbanos brought, but this seems unnecessary. Can’t we add up the figures ourselves? The answer is the same – the Torah  appreciates the community, wherein there total has greater speciality than the number of individuals.

There is a story told about a person taking an exam in a crowded classroom.The invigilator calls for time, and the exams end, and the invigilator collects a large stack of papers. The student refuses to hand his paper in, and remains behind and continues to write. After a while passes, the other students having long gone, the lone student left writing furiously, whilst the invigilator is at his desk working his way through a stack of papers, marking them. The student gets up nonchalantly, and strolls casually to the front to hand in his paper.

Looking up, noticing the student approaching, the invigilator exclaims, “You can’t hand that in now, the exam was over nearly an hour ago!”.

Leaning over the invigilators table, the student asks, with fervor, “Do you have any idea who I am?”

“No, and I could not care less!” replied the invigilator.

The student smiled, and says “Good!”, upon which, he thrusts his paper in the middle of the stack of unmarked papers. 

We see from this week’s parsha that the way to express individuality is from within the klal.

The same is true of Birchas Kohanim, also in this week’s parsha – the bracha is not originating from the kohen; it’s from Hashem. It is for the whole klal, but personalised.

The halacha is before the kohanim start they should clench their fists, and once they start they open. When the fists are clenched, they fist is flat – it is the same. But when the fingers protrude, they are all different, much as we all are.

There is a large debate regarding the Matza on Pesach. Is it because of the slavery, the poor man’s bread; or is it because of the freedom, that they left before they had time to bake bread properly?

The Sfas Emes explains that we cannot celebrate being freed from Egypt on it’s own; we must praise the fact we were enslaved as well. The reason the slavery must have been a good thing, is that if we were capable of being a nation that could serve Hashem in slavery, we weren’t in need of being saved, and the slavery itself would serve no purpose. So we must say that being enslaved in Egypt was a key part of the process through which we became Hashem’s people.

The simple explanation of this is that by being in crushing and devastating slavery, the people were pushed far beyond their comfort zones, and far beyond the extremes of what they thought they were capable of. This was a demonstration to the people that all the arrogance and haughtiness of man could be removed, and a person could devote his entire being to something. This was a key stage in becoming Hashem’s servants – the people knew that they were capable of giving their all, which they might not have been able to had they not been through the ravages of slavery.

The Sfas Emes explains that this is what all evils and bad things in life are for – they educate us about our limits, and more than that, they show us the opposite extremes to which we can aspire and attain. This is the only purpose they serve, just like Egypt. If they weren’t there to help us become closer to Hashem, they would have no function.

The Sfas Emes explains that this was the only moment in which the Jews could have accepted Hashem as their King properly, that  in the same way they had been entirely subjugated to Paroh, they could now subjugate themselves entirely to Hashem. This was the critical moment the Jews were born as a nation. However, the procedure and process started earlier. As we say in Shema every day: אשר הוצאתי אתכם מארץ מצרים להיות לכם לאלוקים – “That I took you out of Egypt to be for you a God” (Bamidbar 15:41). The implication is clear – we had to have been in Egypt before, in order to be taken out to become everything we were meant to be.

The Sfas Emes re-emphasises that being Hashem’s people hinged on the need to have removed the arrogance and haughtiness of man. This is what the pasuk means when it says that טוב אחרית הדבר מראשיתו – “the end is better than the beginning” (Koheles 7:8). It was not pleasant to be in Egypt, but what followed was receiving the Torah.

The Sfas Emes tells us that our celebration of leaving Egypt must hinge around the fact that we became better once we left – we accepted Hashem as our King and our God, and we received the Torah. The first thing we did on being freed was for Hashem – this is why there is a concept of firsts going to Hashem, for example the korban Omer (and Pidyon haBen, bikkurim etc).

This is what is so vital on Seder night, to relive the Exodus from Egypt. It is when we became God’s people.

The Sfas Emes answers that this is why Matza correlates to the slavery and poverty – it is devoid of the arrogance and haughtiness. But it also correlates to the freedom – the process of freedom started when we were slaves. It is how we became truly free to serve Hashem. Our freedom stems from having not been free once.

The opening pasuk in Parshas Vayakhel reads: “וַיַּקְהֵל מֹשֶׁה אֶת כָּל עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם’ – Moses gathered the whole community of the children of Israel to assemble, and he said to them: “These are the things that the Lord commanded to do” (35:1)

The Nesivos Shalom asks three questions.

This is the sole instance of וַיַּקְהֵל – an instruction to gather all the people together – in the entire Torah, where וַיַּקְהֵל is the first thing mentioned in the episode. What is so exceptional about this instruction of וַיַּקְהֵל, that makes it unique?

Secondly, the opening statement was “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do – the instructions are not to light fire, and not to work. How is not doing something called “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do?

Furthermore, this episode occurred directly after the Eigel (Golden Calf), as Rashi explains that Parshas Vayakhel occurred the morning after Yom Kippur, when Moshe returned with the second luchos. It seems obvious that his first public appearance upon his return would be a notable message to the people regarding the bridge between G-d’s wrath and appeasement. What was it that atoned for the sin of the Eigel? (more…)

ותאמר שתה אדני ותמהר ותורד כדה על ידה ותשקהו. ותכל להשקותו ותאמר גם לגמליך אשאב עד אם כלו לשתות.

“She [Rivka] said, ‘Drink, my lord,’ and quickly she lowered her jug to her hand and gave him [Eliezer] drink. When she finished giving him drink, she said, ‘I will draw water even for your camels, until they have finished drinking.’” (Chayei Sarah, 24:18, 19)

The pasuk in Devarim 11:15, says,  ונתתי עשב בשדך לבהמתך ואכלת ושבעת– “I shall provide grass in your field for your cattle, and you will eat, and you will be satisfied.” The Gemara in Brachos 40a learns from here that one must feed his animals before feeding himself.

What about drinking? Who comes first?

The Sefer Chassidim (531) learns from our pasukim in Chayei Sarah that humans come first. We see this from Rivka, who first gave Eliezer to drink, and only afterwards did she give the camels.

The Shulchan Aruch (O”C 167:6) is discussing a situation in which a person has already made a bracha on his food, and between that and eating, he discusses something that is of the interests of the meal. In such a case, one does not need to make a new bracha. One of the examples the Shulchan Aruch gives is that one asks someone else to feed his animals. This too is considered “tzaruchei seudah,” as the Gemara says, one must feed his animals before he feeds himself. The Magen Avraham (ibid 18), contrasts this with drinking. In such a situation, if one were to ask another to give his animals to drink, one might (see Machatzis HaShekel) have to make a new bracha. He bases this on the Sefer Chassidim’s limud from Rivka. According to the Sefer Chassidim, since humans come before animals regarding drinking, it would thereby not be tzarchei seudah to discuss giving them to drink first. The Mishna Brurah (ibid 40) brings this Magen Avraham as halacha l’meisah.

The Yad Ephraim (ibid) asks, surely there is a better proof to this Halacha (that regarding drinking humans come before animals), from the pasuk in Parshas Chukas (20:8),והוצאת להם מים מן הסלע והשקית את העדה ואת בעירם – “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” (It seems that his question stems from the fact that this pasuk is after Matan Torah, as opposed to the pasuk in Chayei Sarah. However, the Yad Ephraim obviously did not see the Sefer Chassidim inside, for the Sefer Chassidim does learn from that pasuk as well). He quotes the Ohr HaChaim (in Parshas Chukas and here in Chayei Sarah) who says that we cannot use either of these pasukim as proofs that man comes before animals with regard to drinking, since both are cases where man was in a situation of great thirst. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that one should give man to drink before animals. However, under normal circumstances there is no difference between food and drink; animals come first.

The Kli Chemda (Chayei Sara 4) writes that the Sefer Chassidim meant nothing different than the Ohr HaChaim, that animals always come first unless the human is specifically uncomfortable, be it hunger or thirst. He extracts this by the wording of the Sefer Chassidim: לענין צמאון אדם ובהמה יתנו לאדם תחילה ואח”כ לבהמה – “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we give to man first and afterward to animal.” The Sefer Chassidim does not say לענין שתייה – “regarding drink,” but rather “thirst.” If so, he means exactly as the Ohr HaChaim.

(According to the Kli Chemda a new halacha would appear. That is, specifically one who was not uncomfortably thirsty yet he wanted to have a drink, makes a bracha on his drink. But before taking a sip, he asks of a friend to quickly give his animals to drink. This would be considered tzarchei seuda according to the Kli Chemda’s interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim. One would thereby not be required to make a new bracha. However, for one who is thirsty, this would not be considered tzarchei seudah, and would require a new bracha. This is clearly not how the Magein Avraham and others understood the Sefer Chassidim.)

This suggestion of the Kli Chemda in interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim is difficult to accept, besides for the fact that many other Torah giants did not understand the Sefer Chassidim this way. Surely this is due to the contrast the Sefer Chassidim draws between drink and food. The Sefer Chassidim begins by saying, “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we must give to man first and afterward to animal,” and he continues by sourcing the pasukim in Chayei Sara and Chukas. He then contrasts this as follows: אבל באכילה הבהמה קודמת – “But as for eating, the animal is first,” and he carries on by citing the appropriate pasukim as proofs. Now, according to the Kli Chemda, why does the Sefer Chassidim contrast “thirst” with “eating”? A better contrast would have been “thirst” and “not thirsty,” or “hunger” and “not hungry.” Rather it certainly appears that clearly the Sefer Chassidim’s intention was to differentiate between food and drink, and that by “thirst” he meant “drink,” as all other Achronim understood him.

Other Achronim are bothered with the Sefer Chassidim’s halacha for a reason other than the Ohr HaChaim’s. How can we learn from Rivka who gave Eliezer before the camels if the camels were not her own. It seems clear from the Gemara in Brachos that this halacha to give to animals first is only if they are one’s own animals. There is no notion that one would have to feed every stray cat on the block before sitting down to lunch. If so, Rivka did not have any obligation whatsoever (not even tzar baalei chayim, see Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) to give the camels to drink. Naturally, she gave Eliezer first. And as part of her great altruistic characteristics, she gave the camels too. But how can one see from this story any proof to who comes first in drink between man and animal?

The Chasam Sofer (Toras Moshe, Chayei Sara) brings the Elya Raba who asks this question. The Chasam Sofer explains that really the halacha is not like the Sefer Chassidim, and that even for drink animals come first. He elucidates Rivka’s actions based on the Gemara Baba Metzia 49a, that one can be makneh a small gift just by saying so. There is no requirement for a physical transaction (maiseh kinyan). That is why she said “Drink, my lord,” and quickly gave him to drink even before mentioning giving to camels to drink. She had been makneh just enough water to him to quench his own thirst, but no more, in order to insure that he was not required to give to the camels. Had she said, “I will give you and your camels to drink,” Eliezer would have acquired from her enough water for himself and the camels, and would have had to give the camels first, despite his thirst. Rivka chose her words wisely in order to insure that Eliezer got before the camels.

The Ksav Sofer (Teshuvos, O”C 32) uses his father’s interpretation to illuminate the pasuk in Chukas. “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” He asks, why was it necessary for Hashem to tell Moshe Rabbeinu והשקית – “give drink” to the people? Would it not suffice to say, “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock”?  Once Moshe Rabbeinu had released water from the rock, the people would have been perfectly capable in getting the water themselves. The Ksav Sofer answers that had Hashem just said that, then every individual would have attained water from Hashem and would have been required to give to their animals first. In order to insure that the people themselves would quench their thirst first, Hashem specifically said to Moshe Rabbeinu that he was to give them to drink. Meaning that as the water left the rock it was given by Hashem into Moshe’s possession. Thereby it was not considered to be given to the people directly by Hashem, but rather from Moshe specifically enough for each individual. Thereby they were not required to give their animals first. After their thirst was quenched, they were allowed to have more for their animals. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer and the Ksav Sofer did not see the necessity to learn these pasukim as the Sefer Chassidim did.

In defense of the Sefer Chassidim, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) suggests that clearly Rivka was obligated to do tzedaka towards Eliezer. Inasmuch, her requirement was to do so in the form that Eliezer himself would have needed to do. Meaning, in the same way that had Eliezer had his own water he would have had to give the camels first due to his obligation of tzedaka toward the animals (if the halacha is the same by drink as it is by food, as those who oppose the Sefer Chassidim believe), so too when Rivka was to give water to Eliezer she was to give it to him in the same way that he would have distributed it. Her mitzvah of tzedaka toward Eliezer required her to do that which held preliminary status among his obligations. That is, to give to the camels first, albeit that they were not her own. Since we see that she rather gave to Eliezer first, the Sefer Chassidim learned from here that it must be because the halacha by drinking is that man comes before animal.

A question one might ask on this is, never mind that the camels were not Rivka’s, they weren’t Eliezer’s either! They belonged to Avraham Avinu, as did Eliezer who was his slave. Inasmuch as this halacha did not apply to him, how could Rivka be fulfilling her obligation via his obligation if he didn’t have such an obligation to begin with? The answer to this seems to be, that all these halachos of feeding animals are obligatory not to the monetary owner of the animal, but rather to the one who carries out the feedings (“mizonosav alecha,” see O”C 324:11 and Mishnah Berurah 29). Often, they can be the same person. But in the case of Eliezer, although he was not the monetary owner of the camels, they were given into his care. It was thereby his requirement toward the camels, and thus Rivka’s requirement to act according to Eliezer’s, as Rav Moshe writes. This same idea can be used to redefine the pasuk in Chukas. It was Moshe Rabbeinu’s obligation to give the Jews to drink according to their very own obligation towards their animals. Thus, since he carried this out by first giving the people to drink and only then to their animals, we see that when it comes to drinking, man comes before animals.

(See the Yad Ephraim who explains  על דרך דרושwhy there should be this discrepancy between food and drink.)

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Eikev 7:12, וְהָיָה עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן אֵת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים הָאֵלֶּה וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְשָׁמַר ה’ אֱלֹ-ךָ לְךָ אֶת הַבְּרִית וְאֶת הַחֶסֶד אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ: And it will be, because you will heed these ordinances and keep them and perform, that the Lord, your God, will keep for you the covenant and the kindness that He swore to your forefathers.

תִּשְׁמְעוּן (you will listen) is written in plural, but לְךָ (for you) is written in singular. Why does the subject of the pasuk (verse) change?

There is a famous story in Gemara Shabbos 31a. A gentile once approached Shamai and offered to convert if Shamai would teach him all of Torah while he (the gentile) was standing on one leg. Shamai threw a piece of rubble from a building at him, interpreting the gentile’s words as mockery. The gentile approached Hillel and put forward the same request. Hillel said “וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ”: you shall love your neighbor as yourself.

We need to understand the premise of the gentile’s question. Clearly, his request to learn Torah on one leg is an absurd request to ask of the greatest Rabbis alive. In addition, Hillel’s response also requires some explanation. How does his answer include all the mitzvos, such as Shabbos, tefillin, bris mila, mezuzah etc.?

Sefer Beis Shmuel quotes the Arizal, who states that every Jew must perform every single one of the 613 mitzvos, or their soul returns in another form (gilgul) to complete the missing mitzvos.

Bamidbar 22:28, וַיִּפְתַּח ה’ אֶת פִּי הָאָתוֹן וַתֹּאמֶר לְבִלְעָם מֶה עָשִׂיתִי לְךָ כִּי הִכִּיתַנִי זֶה שָׁלֹשׁ רְגָלִים: The Lord opened the mouth of the she-donkey, and she said to Bilam, “What have I done to you that you have struck me these three times?“ The key to our understanding lies in the word רְגָלִים. Although it is usually interpreted as ‘legs’, it is interpreted as ‘times’ in the verse above.

The aforementioned Arizal begs for an explanation. It is impossible to accomplish all 613 mitzvos; many are mutually exclusive (ie – specific to gender, age, kohanim (priests), levi’ites, kings, during the time of the Temple etc.). Does this mean that everyone comes back as a gilgul many, many times so that they could fulfill each and every mitzva in the Torah? No. This was precisely what the gentile was asking – teach me Torah on one רגל – in one lifetime, with no gilgul.

Shamai beat him with a part of a building as an allusion. A building has many floors. Unless it has many floors, it’s not called a building. Torah has many, many levels, and many, many mitzvos. Unless you accomplish them all, you haven’t fulfilled your role in this world. Shamai was telling the gentile that the Torah cannot be actualised in one lifetime; it is impossible to be able to fulfill each and every mitzva.

Hillel pushed the idea of achdus (literally, unity). His directive of וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ meant that once you have achdus, the rest of the Torah just details specific actions you need to carry out. By uniting into one, we become כאיש אחד בלב אחד – as one man with one heart. If one person performs a mitzva, the rest are included in his mitzva. (Just as when a man dons tefillin we don’t say that his arm or head is wearing tefillin, we say he is wearing tefilin – he is one entity.) In three simple words, Hillel explained to the gentile how to perform Torah instructions. Since we are all united, and our mitzvos are shared with the rest of Klal Yisroel, together, as a unit, we are able to fulfill all 613 mitzvos!

The pasuk says, וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם (keep them and perform) in the plural form, which we can understand to mean that we need to keep and perform the mitzvos in unity. וְשָׁמַר (will keep for you – singular) connotes that one cannot perform all of the mitzvos, but each person must keep what they can, and will be rewarded as such!

Sefer Divrei Shaul quotes a Gemara in Uktzin that says that the only receptacle for G-d’s blessing is peace, as it says in Tehillim 29:11, ה’ עֹז לְעַמּוֹ יִתֵּן ה’ יְבָרֵךְ אֶת-עַמּוֹ בַשָּׁלוֹם: The Lord shall grant strength to His people; the Lord shall bless His people with peace. עֹז (strength) is the Torah. We can ask our original question of how we can each person can fully perform the mitzvos of the Torah. The answer is as we said - through unity - and the only way to achieve true unity is through shalom (peace). Via shalom and achdus, we can come together and fulfill the Torah in it’s entirety.

This explains why it was necessary to be כאיש אחד בלב אחד at Har Sinai (Mount Sinai – the giving of the Torah); without the unity, there would be no point in receiving a Torah we could not fulfill.

In conclusion, we are all considered to have done all the mitzvos, but how are we rewarded? Reward for mitzvos is not given in this world, so where do we see this manifested? The only reward we get is according to the exertion that was put into performing the mitzva.

According to what we now know, we have a great answer. עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן is plural, as performance of mitzvos is collective when we are united. The subject changes to singular - לְךָ – to refer to the reward that is personal, based on the effort and exertion you personally put in when fulfilling mitzvos.

Rav Dessler refers to beis Shamai (lit. house of Shamai – his school of thought) as din (judgement), and beis Hillel as rachamim (mercy).  Rav Zevin refers to them as potential vs actual, while others bring the idea of shomayim (heaven) and oretz (earth). Most of the machlokes (disputes) between Hillel and Shammai are along a fixed criterion. Shammai ruled on how things ought to be l’chatchila (in Heavenly ideal), and Hillel ruled based on metzius (what we have before us). Shamai was saying that l’chatchila, each of us must perform all 613 mitzvos, and return numerous times in a gilgul. Hillel said that one can get around this l’chatchila with the b’dieved of achdus!

Disclaimer – this is not a license to do as we please with the mindset of,  ’we love Jews, so therefore we have achdus so I can do what I like and technically be fulfilling all the mitzvos still!’ This is wrong. This concept only applies to mitzvos that are impossible for us to fulfill personally (mutual exclusivity as opposed to “I don’t feel like it”).

וַיְדַבֵּר ה’ אֶל מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר נְקֹם נִקְמַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֵת הַמִּדְיָנִים אַחַר תֵּאָסֵף אֶל עַמֶּיךָ וַיְדַבֵּר מֹשֶׁה אֶל הָעָם לֵאמֹר הֵחָלְצוּ מֵאִתְּכֶם אֲנָשִׁים לַצָּבָא וְיִהְיוּ עַל מִדְיָן לָתֵת נִקְמַת ה’ בְּמִדְיָן (Matos 31:1, 31:2, 31:3)

God spoke to Moshe saying,”Take revenge for the children of Israel against the Midianites; afterwards you will be gathered to your people.” So Moshe spoke to the people, saying, “Arm from among you men for the army, that they can be against Midian, and carry out the revenge of God against Midian.”

Rashi says, וידבר משה וגו’: אף על פי ששמע שמיתתו תלויה בדבר עשה בשמחה ולא איחר: Moshe spoke: Although he heard that his death depended on the matter, he did it joyfully, without delay.
The Chanukas Hatorah explores this Rashi further. He explains that Hashem told Moshe to avenge the Jews against the Midianites, after which he would pass on. When Moshe spoke to the people, he told them to avenge God against Midian. The Midianites needed to be punished for desecrating the Jews and heaven by causing the Jews to sin. However, Moshe changed the wording of Hashem’s statement because if he were to tell them to avenge themselves, they would forgive Midian in an effort to keep Moshe alive. Moshe purposely told them to avenge Hashem; we can’t forgive on His behalf, so they would have to attack Midian and through that, cause Moshe to die as he was supposed to.

Matos, 31:14 says, וַיִּקְצֹף מֹשֶׁה עַל פְּקוּדֵי הֶחָיִל שָׂרֵי הָאֲלָפִים וְשָׂרֵי הַמֵּאוֹת הַבָּאִים מִצְּבָא הַמִּלְחָמָה: Moshe became angry with the officers of the army, the commanders of thousands and the commanders of hundreds, who had returned from war. The following verse continues, וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵיהֶם מֹשֶׁה הַחִיִּיתֶם כָּל נְקֵבָה: Moshe said to them, “Did you allow all the females to live?

From the first verse, we know that Moshe is angry and it is therefore logical for us to assume that he would be the one speaking the the next verse? Why specify that it was Moshe who spoke?

Rav Zalman Sorotzkin tells us that if one is angry, he should refrain from speaking until the anger settles. The long pause between vayiktzof and vayomer indicate a different/new person (as it were) due to break.

Rav Elya Lopian would never punish a talmid (student) at the time of an incident. He once waited two weeks to deal with a particular incident.

The Alter of Kelm had an “angry suit” that he would change into each time he was angry, delaying reaction and allowing himself to calm down

The Peleh Yoietz tells us that keeping quiet when angry is like pouring water on the base of a fire. It extinguishes the flame at its source.

Rav Yechiel Meir of Zlotchov had special tefillin (phylacteries) from his father. People wanted to buy these special tefillin from him, and bid huge amounts of money to have the the merit of possessing them. One Succos there were no esrogim (citrus fruit used as one of the four kinds) to be found in their town. After searching desperately, he heard that a man in another town had a spare esrog. He sold his tefillin and bought the esrog. When he returned home and told his wife what had happened, she became furious and as a result, she broke the esrog. Rav Yechiel Meir stayed calm. When asked how he was able to stay calm, he replied, “I lost my tefillin and I lost my esrog; I will not lose my shalom bayis (marital harmony) as well.” That night, his father appeared to him in a dream and told him that in shomayim (the heavenly spheres), his shalom bayis was worth much, much more than the tefillin or the esrog.

A childless couple once came to Rav Chaim Kanievsky begging for a brocha (blessing) for children. They had been childless for many years and there was no other solution except Divine Intervention. Rav Chaim told them that he couldn’t bless them. Devastated, they asked what else they could do. Rav Chaim told them to get a brocha from someone who had been publicly embarrassed and did not respond. Many months passed and they were still not successful in tracking such a person down. Two years later they attended a wedding. At the wedding, the host started shouting at a guest invited by other side, in middle of the crowded hall. Seeing their chance, the couple ran over to the person being shamed and begged him to keep quiet. When things calmed down, the couple broke down in tears and begged the shamed person to bless them with children. Nine months later, twenty four years after their marriage, this couple was blessed with a child.

Controlling ones temper is an extremely crucial tool that is a life-long struggle for most. Still, one must never give up; each time he succeedes in controlling his temper and holds back from retorting, it makes it easier for him the next time around, not to mention the mountain of reward he will reap, both in this world and the next.

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Pinchas 25:11, פִּינְחָס בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן אַהֲרֹן הַכֹּהֵן הֵשִׁיב אֶת חֲמָתִי מֵעַל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּקַנְאוֹ אֶת קִנְאָתִי בְּתוֹכָם וְלֹא כִלִּיתִי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּקִנְאָתִי: Pinchas the son of Elazar the son of Aaron the kohen has turned My anger away from the children of Israel by his zealously avenging Me among them, so that I did not destroy the children of Israel because of My zeal.

Rashi comments, פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן: לפי שהיו השבטים מבזים אותו, הראיתם בן פוטי זה שפיטם אבי אמו עגלים לעבודה זרה והרג נשיא שבט מישראל, לפיכך בא הכתוב ויחסו אחר אהרן: Pinchas the son of Elazar the son of Aaron the kohen: Since the tribes were disparaging him, saying, Have you seen the son of Puti, whose mother’s father [Jethro] fattened (פִּטֵּם) calves for idols (See Rashi, Exod. 6:25), and who killed a chieftain of an Israelite tribe? For this reason, Scripture traces his pedigree to Aaron.

Rav Yonasan Eibshutz raises a question on this Rashi. Why were they making fun of him? Weren’t they aware that Zimri was, in fact, chayav misah (deserving of death)?

He answers that they accepted that Zimri was chayav misah, but the reason they had not gone ahead and killed him themselves, was because they said, “If a great man kills him, then there’s no kiddush Hashem (sactification of God’s name); we’re great and you’re not, so we let you kill him”. The Torah disagrees with them and tells us that he actually was great. The Torah goes on to say that they were just using it as an excuse and after 120, they will have nothing to say.

Yirmiyahu 1:6, 1:7 states, וָאֹמַר אֲהָהּ ה’ הִנֵּה לֹא-יָדַעְתִּי דַּבֵּר כִּי-נַעַר אָנֹכִי: And I said, “Alas, O Lord God! Behold, I know not to speak for I am a youth. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֵלַי אַל-תֹּאמַר נַעַר אָנֹכִי  כִּי עַל-כָּל-אֲשֶׁר אֶשְׁלָחֲךָ תֵּלֵךְ וְאֵת כָּל-אֲשֶׁר אֲצַוְּךָ תְּדַבֵּר- And the Lord said to me; Say not, “I am a youth,” for wherever I send you, you shall go, and whatever I command you, you shall speak.

R Nosson Vachtvogel comments, “How many gedolei hador (Torah giants) have we lost, how many tzadikkim (righteous people) have we forfeited, because they didn’t hear al tomar naar onochi.”

We need to remember the concept of ‘bishvili nivra ha’olam’. Each person should think that the world was created just for him and all the other people, and everything around him, was created for the sole purpose of populating his world.

Gemara Gittin, 56 says, Reb Zecharia Ben Avkulos’ humility caused the destruction of second temple. Bar Kamtza, looking for revenge against the Jewish people, told the ceasar that if he (the ceasar) sent an animal to the Jews as a gift, they would refuse to bring it as a korban (offering to God). The ceasar, skeptical, sent an animal as a gift to the Jews, and told them to bring it as a korban. Bar Kamtza damaged the lip of the animal so that it would be invalid to be brought as an korban, and Reb Zecharia refused to bring the imperfect animal as a korban. They couldn’t kill Bar Kamtza even though he would tell the ceasar that the Jews rejected his offering. The Rabbis didnt step up and give orders to accept the offering or reject it and have Bar Kamtza killed. The quiet ‘sitting back, doing nothing’ caused the destruction.

There is a time and place for everything. There is a time to be humble and keep your opinion to youself, and there is a time to stand up and be counted.

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Shimon and Levi single-handedly killed out an entire city because of immorality against Dinah, their sister. This illustrates their character of anger. Later, Pinchas (a descendant of Levi) followed in his father’s footsteps and killed Zimri who was also engaged in an act of immorality; he used his anger in a postive way. The problem is, that the person he killed was Shimon’s descendant.

How did this happen? They were both cursed by Yaakov for their anger, yet Levi developed positively; Pinchas took revenge on the Sin and the other took part in the Sin. What caused this extreme parting of ways?

Reb Yaakov Kamenetsky in the Emes Le’Yaakov answers that to understand, we have to see how history developed.  While most of Klal Yisroel (the Jews) were slaves in Mitzrayim (Egypt), Levi was free to learn Torah. It was the Torah values that allowed the Leviim (Leviites) to channel their zealousness in the proper way. By stark contrast, Shevet Shimon (the tribe of Shimon) never got to learn Torah. Therefore, their zealousness had no Torah values and it expressed itself in forbidden ways. Rav Yaakov says: “When zealousness is guided and bound by the limits of the Torah then it will succeed…. But without guidance, boundaries, and the hanhagas haTorah (behaviours of the Torah) it [zealousness] does not have the power to succeed and ultimately will remove the kanai (zealot) from the world.

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Rashi says that we don’t want Bilam‘s blessing, as we don’t want the bee’s sting or it’s honey. Rashi asks where the leap is from realizing it would be fruitless to curse them, to actually wanting to bless them.  The question makes it difficult to understand the parable; if you don’t get stung, of course you want the honey!
R’ Yosef Shwartz (the Giznei Yosef) explains that the reason behind the fact that Rivka’s family had blessed her, and she became barren. From here its clear that an evil person’s blessings are not fulfilled and in this case, it was, to the degree that the blessing was, in effect, a curse.
This was Bilam‘s intention. He would NOT be miskayem (fulfilling) the blessing, as was the case with Rivka! Clearly this blessing (honey) has the sting in the tail! Therefore, Rashi’s nimshal (explanation of the connection of the story to the matter at hand) is very apt indeed!
The difference is that Rivka’s family blessed her and this is the source that an evil person’s blessing is not mekuyam (fulfilled), to the degree that she became barren. But the Jews were already blessed by Hashem, so Bilam‘s “blessing” couldn’t not be  fulfilled as it was after the fact they were chosen and blessed! That’s why it says, “I (God) have blessed them” – so your “blessing” can’t have an effect one way or another!

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In Bamidbar 24:5 it say, מַה טֹּבוּ אֹהָלֶיךָ יַעֲקֹב מִשְׁכְּנֹתֶיךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל- How great are your tents, Jacob. Rashi explains, מה טובו אהליך: על שראה פתחיהם שאינן מכוונין זה מול זה- How great are your tents: For he saw that the entrances were not facing each other. The general understand in Rashi is that there was a tremendous zechus (merit) for the Jews because they were careful with each others privacy. This trait of tznius (modesty) compelled Bilam (of course, with Divine Intervention) to bless the Jews.
Rabbi Meir Shapiro explains this in a different vein, ‘rooh sheayn pischeyhen mechuvanot ze keneged zeh’. Pesach can be translated as an entrance or as an opening. The Gemara tells us that God is extremely generous towards the Jews. He offers us a deal-come towards Me (with repentance and good deeds) and I will come towards you; open an opening for Me the breadth of a needle head, and I will come towards you with an opening the size of a ballroom. God asks us to do just one small thing for Him and He will shower us with abundance.
Rabbi Meir Shapiro explains that Bilam wanted to curse the Jews. He saw that their openings were not opposite each other, simply meaning they only have to do a little amount and God pays them with exponential growth. Hence, he understood the way in which God love His children and realized that there was no point in cursing them. In fact, he may as well bless them!

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The Torah seems to make a big deal about the Ananei Hakavod (clouds of glory) and commands us to commemorate them with the holiday of Succos. There seems to be no big deal about the manna or Be’er  Miriam (well of Miriam). Why are the Ananei Hakavod given more ‘attention’ than the manna or Be’er Miriam, which were also great miracles?
There are three answers given to the above question:

1. Food and water are the barest of necessities for survival. Hashem took us out to a desert; of course He would feed us! Shelter is not crucial for survival and could therefore be classified as ‘lifnim meshuras hadin’ (above and beyond the measure of the law).

2. The clouds were exclusive. They were a special gift from Hashem to His Chosen nation, but only those who were worthy, benefitted. (The Erev Rav and people inflicted with tzora’as (leprosy)did not benefit)

3. The clouds, the manna, and the water from Be’er Miriam were all given as free gifts. The Jews complained and made requests regarding the water and food (ie-slav) but they never complained about the clouds. The clouds were the perfect gift.

The Chida says that these three answers are hinted to in Parshas Emor 23:43: לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי הֹ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:  In order that your ensuing generations should know that I had the children of Israel live in booths when I took them out of the land of Egypt. I am the Lord, your God.

לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתי – I, (Hashem) gave it to you as a gift.
אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל- I gave it to the Jews (not the Erev Rav).
בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי ה’ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם- I took you out of Egypt, so I was obligated to feed you.

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Rashi 19:22 explains in the name of Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan,  ויקחו אליך-משלהם כשם שהם פרקו נזמי הזהב לעגל משלהם כך יביאו זו לכפרה משלהם- And have them take for you: From their own possessions; just as they removed their own golden earrings for the golden calf, so shall they bring this cow from their own possessions in atonement. It is clear that Parah Adumah (the red heifer) is an atonement for the sin of eigel (the golden calf).

Another Rashi in 19:22 explains this concept further: פרה אדמה: משל לבן שפחה שטינף פלטין של מלך. אמרו תבא אמו ותקנח הצואה, כך תבא פרה ותכפר על העגל - A red cow: This can be compared to the son of a maidservant who soiled the king’s palace. They said, “Let his mother come and clean up the mess.” Similarly, let the cow come and atone for the calf.

The first answer seems to be clear and valid; why did Rashi feel the need to add the example as further elucidation?

The problem with the first explanation is that Parah Adumah was one of the few mitzvos that were given to us before the actual giving of the Torah. We were commanded in Moroh (as mentioned in tractate Sanhedrin), and the sin of the eigel occurred after the giving of the Torah.

One of the most famous philosophical questions in the Jewish religion is understanding bechira and yedia. In a nutshell: if God knows every move a human being is going to make, then how can we explain that every person has a choice between good and evil? If God knows in advance what’s going to happen, it would seem that the choice has been taken away from the person.

When addressing this query in his book, Moreh Nevuchim (guide for the perplexed), the Rambam says there definitely is an answer to this question. However, no paper in the world will suffice to adequately answer it. Therefore, we’ve got to have a blind faith that we still have a choice in choosing between right and wrong, despite God’s knowledge in advance of what we plan on doing.

The other Rishonim (e.g the Ramban) agree with the assessment of the Rambam and disagree on minor points concerning the explanation. (There is not enough space here to go into the explanation!) However, the common theme is that this is the most complex philosophical question concerning the Jewish religion.

Therefore, we can perhaps suggest that the question was how God could command us to do the mitzvah of Parah Adumah before we actually sinned with the golden calf. There should have been nothing to atone for yet, if we do indeed have our own choice of choosing not to sin. The answer is that this is a chok (a commandment which we don’t understand), since this truly is the most difficult concept in Judaism. Shlomo Hamelech (King Solomon) said, in regard to this mitzvah, ”Omarti echkama vehi rechoika mimeni“ (I wanted to understand but it was distant from me: I couldn’t understand).

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In Parshas Chukas, 19:2, it says: זֹאת חֻקַּת הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְ־הֹוָ־ה לֵאמֹר דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִקְחוּ אֵלֶיךָ פָרָה אֲדֻמָּה תְּמִימָה אֲשֶׁר אֵין בָּהּ מוּם אֲשֶׁר לֹא עָלָה עָלֶיהָ עֹל - This is the statute of the Torah which the Lord commanded, saying, Speak to the children of Israel and have them take for you a perfectly red unblemished cow, upon which no yoke was laid.

Rashi states, זאת חקת התורה: לפי שהשטן ואומות העולם מונין את ישראל לומר מה המצוה הזאת ומה טעם יש בה, לפיכך כתב בה חקה, גזירה היא מלפני ואין לך רשות להרהר אחריה-  This is the statute of the Torah: Because the Satan and the nations of the world will taunt the Jews and ask the Jews about their commandments and subsequent purposes.  Therefore, the Torah uses the term decree. I have decreed it; you have no right to challenge it.

This answer seems to imply that there is no reason for this commandment of Parah Admuah; we simply keep it out of blind faith. Rashi 19:22 states in the name of Rabbi Moshe HaDarshan that it atones for the sin of eigel (the golden calf). We are left with a question; is it a chok or to atone for eigel?

The Bikurei Avraham and Kehilas Yitzchak answer that all the different explanations for Parah Adumah (the red heifer) conclude that it atones for eigel, precisely because Parah Adumah has no reason. The sin of eigel was that the Jews threw off the yoke of heaven, so the equal and opposite would be to accept the yoke of heaven despite not knowing the reason.  Thus, both answers ring true - we don’t know the reason for Parah Adumah, and that’s why it atones for eigel.

The Panim Yafos says that the Gemara (Brachos 55a) writes that recalling a previous sin reopens the investigation and it comes under scrutiny again to some degree. This is what the nations of the world and the Satan accomplish when they ask whats the Parah Adumah is for. They know its because of the eigel; therefore we say it’s a chok.
R’ Chaim of Alexander writes that the pasuk says “leimor” (saying) twice-  וַיְדַבֵּר הֹ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר (And Hashem said to Moshe and Ahron saying) and זֹאת חֻקַּת הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה הֹ לֵאמֹר (These are the decrees of the Torah that Hashem commanded, saying).  He explains that it is so because of the two answers. If the nations of the world and the Satan ask, its a chok. If Rabbi Moshe Hadarshan is asking, then we have a great reason.

Based on a shiur by R’ Yehoshua Hartman

זִכָּרוֹן לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִקְרַב אִישׁ זָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן הוּא לְהַקְטִיר קְטֹרֶת לִפְנֵי הֹ’ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה כְקֹרַח וְכַעֲדָתוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר ה’ בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה לוֹ – As a reminder for the children of Israel, so that no outsider, who is not of the seed of Aaron, shall approach to burn incense before the Lord, so as not to be like Korach and his company, as the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe. (17:5)

Rashi says: כאשר דבר ה’ ביד משה לו: ומהו ביד משה ולא כתב אל משה, רמז לחולקים על הכהונה שלוקין בצרעת, כמו שלקה משה בידו שנאמר (שמות ד, ו) ויוציאה והנה ידו מצורעת כשלג, ועל כן לקה עוזיה בצרעת – As the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe: So what is the meaning of “by the hand of Moshe”? Why not just simply “to Moshe”? It alludes to those who rebel against the kehunah. They are stricken with tzara’as , as it says, “and he took it out, and behold, his hand was ‘leprous,’ like snow” (Exod. 4:6). For this reason, Uzziah was stricken with tzara’as. — [Midrash Tanchuma Tzav 11]

Hashem said to put pans on the altar to remind us not to be like Korach. Hashem instructs ‘by the hand of Moshe’. Rashi points that this is literal – one who argues with kehuna suffers tzara’as like Moshe did on his hand, and he adds that Uzziah Hamelech offered up spices and got tzara’as too.

Why did Moshe get it? He had spoken Loshon Hora and said the Jews wouldn’t listen. But what’s the comparison? He didn’t get it for rebelling against the kehuna… So why is Moshe’s example mentioned here?… It should have been compared to Miriam’s tzara’as which was the sidra before Korach, not to Moshe’s instance that occurred in Shemos.

So where’s the Midah Kneged Midah?

Rashi (17:1) says on וַיִּקַּח קֹרַח that he seperated himself to argue. The Maharal asks why doesn’t it say וַיִּקַּח at every argument then, if this is it’s actual meaning?

The Maharal says a regular machlokes is one man against another man, but they are equal, are there is no distinct separation between the two. But kehuna, the priesthood, has the entire nation reliant on it. The kehuna do our korbanos, birchas Kohanim, so if one goes against them, they’re really seperating themselves from the nation, as the nation be definition identify with the priesthood.

TheMaharal explains that the method for dealing with tzara’as is to be sent chutz lamachaneh – excommunication. The afflicted is on one side, everyone else on the other (in the camp). Moshe didn’t get tzaraas for arguing against kehuna, but for complaining about the entire Jewish nation and therefore this is the same formula as one who argues against the priesthood! So Moshe is a good source for tzara’as as a punishment for arguing against kehuna!

But what about Uzziah Hamelech, who got tzara’as on his forehead (see Divrei Hayamim). Where’s the midah kneged midah there?

The Maharal says that if all the Jews were one body, the king would be the heart, Sanhedrin the eyes, and the kehuna would be the forehead that has the brain behind it, the Tzitz on it, and soul on it. He brought incense when it wasn’t his place to, thereby challenging the authority of the kohanim – and he got tzara’as, the punishment for this sin, and the place was afflicted was his forehead – the part of the body that correlates to the kehuna!

In Kodshim (the entire topic of spirituality, sacrifices, priesthood etc) there is a concept called “avodoson mechanchosom”, – that an item’s initial use in a service makes it holy and fit to use for that very service.

The First Temple had the shemen Hamishcha – anointing oil – to use on the instruments, thereby making them holy, and subsequently fit for service.

The Second Temple however, did not have the shemen Hamishcha, so the Gemara in Menachos queries how exactly they used items in the service if they hadn’t been sanctified by the oil, and it answers that avodoson mechanchosom – that their use as holy items intrinsically made them holy.

In our sidra, Ahron, Korach and his cohorts (inc. 250 of the greatest Jews of the generation) are commanded to take brand new pans, put on the same ketores - incense – and Hashem would choose which to accept. Ahron’s was accepted, and Korach, Dasan and Aviram are sucked into the earth on which they stood, and the 250 men are consumed by a fire. And what of the pans used? Korach and co.’s were sucked into the earth, as all their possessions went down with their owners. But the pans of the 250 great men, who did not have evil intentions, but wanted all Jews to have access to the spirituality of the service:
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After the story of Korach, God commanded Moshe to take all the pans that were used to bring the incense and use them as a cover for the altar.  The Torah finishes off with a statement: ‘velo yihye kekorach veadosoi’ (and you should not be like Korach and his congregation). Rashi learns that this should be a reminder to us not to be involved in a machloikes (argument).  However, other Rishonim say it’s a lav (a negative commandment in the Torah) that commands us not to have conflict amongst klal yisroel. The Yereim mentions this mitzva in the category of ra lamokom veaino ra labriyos, which means it’s evil to God, but not to mankind. We know however, that machloikes is definitely under the criteria of animosity between man and his friend, so how can we reconcile these two, seemingly opposing ideas?

The Chinuch brings down that a levi that does the avoida (work) of a kohen in the Beis Hamikdash is chayav misah (deserves to be punished by death). The Sefer HaChinuch adds that if a kohen does the avoida of a levi, which is of a lower sanctity then a priests work, the kohen is punishable by death. Moreover, if a levi who’s been designated to guard the gates leaves his post and starts doing the singing which is also part of a levi’s services, he is also punished by death since this wasn’t his designated service.
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In the beginning of the parsha, Rashi asks why the parsha of the spies is juxtaposed with that of Miriam speaking against Moshe. He answers that the spies saw what had happened with Miriam and didn’t learn the lessons of speaking loshon hora.

This answer may seem a little problematic. Why would they learn mussar from Miriam, who was speaking against her brother? After all, they were speaking against the insentient, inanimate land.
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אֵלֶּה שְׁמוֹת הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר שָׁלַח מֹשֶׁה לָתוּר אֶת הָאָרֶץ וַיִּקְרָא מֹשֶׁה לְהוֹשֵׁעַ בִּן נוּן יְהוֹשֻׁעַ – These are the names of the men Moses sent to scout the Land, and Moses called Hoshea the son of Nun, Joshua. (13:16)

The incident of the Meraglim occured on their return from Canaan on the 9th of Av, and was the precursor for all Jewish tragedies on that day, as the Gemara in Taanis (29a) explains that when the Jews began to cry at the “reports”, Hashem pledged “Since you cried for no reason, I will designate this day as a day of crying for all generations”. All tragedies that occured on 9th Av are resultant from this episode.

Moshe sensed that they would return bearing a bad report, and changed his disciple Hoshea’s name to Yehoshua, and prated for him.

The Zohar reveals to us that what caused the Meraglim (who were the nesi’im, princes of their respective Tribes) to sin, was their fear of losing their positions of influence and leadership on entry into Israel. The perceived threat to their authority distorted their vision of Israel, and everything they saw was misinterpreted and fell under the shadow of their negativity.

This Zohar leads us to a difficult question. We read in Parshas Behaloscha that when Eldad and Medad started prophesying, Yehoshua exclaimed that they should be imprisoned – he was distraught at the mere suggestion that he was worthy enough of being the leader.
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There is a famous jewish proverb that we come across quite often in the Gemara – “מילי בסלע, שתיקותא בתרי” – literal translation; “words are worth a sela (gold coin, or sometimes meaning a rock), [but] silence is worth two”. The Vilna Gaon famous for his remazim says this proverb is directly connected to this week’s parsha.

Eldad and Meidad prophecised that Moshe was going to die and Joshua would bring them into the promised land of Israel. “משה מת, יהושע מכניס“, explains the Vilna Gaon, Moshe was punished to remain in the desert and not bring them to israel for the sin of hitting the rock and not speaking to it! מילי בסלע; if Moshe would have spoken to the rock, then שתיקותא בתרי; the two [Eldad and Meidad] would have remained silent with their prophesy concerning Moshe’s downfall!

Towards the end of the sedra (11:25-29), we find a puzzling story. The elders are prophesying when the ‘spirit of Hashem rests on them’. Two men in particular continue to prophesy after the others stop. A lad (Gershom, according to the commentaries) runs to Moshe to tell him that ‘אלדד ומידד מתנבאים במחנה‘ – ‘Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp’. Yehoshua speaks up and says to Moshe – ‘imprison them!’ Moshe retorts that he wishes everyone would be a prophet like that. End of episode.

Leaving aside the issue of the significance of it’s being in the middle of the quail story, why the big deal about Eldad and Medad? Indeed, Moshe’s reply is a no-brainer, is it not? What is wrong with prophesying? And why the extra word במחנה - where else would they be?

Rashi furnishes us with the first part of the answer, by quoting the Gemara in Sanhedrin that they were saying משה מת,יהושע מכניס – Moshe will die and Yehoshua will take them into Israel. At this point, Yehoshua – quite rightly – takes great umbrage at this outrageous statement. Moshe calms him by pointing out the prophetic nature of their words.

But where does the Gemara get the idea that these were the words of Eldad and Medad?

A beautiful idea is brought down by the Maharil Diskin which hints at the source. Let’s take a look at Moshe’s beginning to find a hint at the potential end of his life. When Moshe is born Pharaoh’s daughter names him as Moshe – ‘כי מן המים משיתהו‘ – for I drew him out of the water. Surely to get the name משה, it wasn’t specific on the water, but rather on the fact that she drew from water in general. In other words, it could have said ממים משיתהו – ‘I drew him out from water’. We have an extra נ and ה as a result.

Looking again at our parsha, we see that Eldad and Medad were prophesying במחנה - meaning ‘with מח נה‘ or ‘rub out the נה‘. “So what?” you may ask. But if we leave out those two letters, we are left with ממים…which stands for משה מת יהושע מכניס

[N.B. - I just wonder whether it may also explain the refence to Yehoshua in our parsha as 'serving Moshe from his youth' - i.e. the fact that he got this very message!]

Based on a shiur by R’ Yehoshua Hartman

Avraham is blessed by Hashem after the Akeida at Mt. Moriah:
כִּי בָרֵךְ אֲבָרֶכְךָ וְהַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה אֶת זַרְעֲךָ כְּכוֹכְבֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם וְכַחוֹל אֲשֶׁר עַל שְׂפַת הַיָּם וְיִרַשׁ זַרְעֲךָ אֵת שַׁעַר אֹיְבָיו - That I will surely bless you, and I will greatly multiply your seed as the stars of the heavens and as the sand that is on the seashore, and your descendants will inherit the cities of their enemies. (Bereishis 22:17)

Lavan blesses Rivka as she leaves to marry Yitzchak:

וַיְבָרֲכוּ אֶת רִבְקָה וַיֹּאמְרוּ לָהּ אֲחֹתֵנוּ אַתְּ הֲיִי לְאַלְפֵי רְבָבָה וְיִירַשׁ זַרְעֵךְ אֵת שַׁעַר שֹׂנְאָיו – And they blessed Rebecca and said to her, “Our sister, may you become thousands of myriads, and may your seed inherit the cities of those who hate you.” (24:60)

Rashi informs us that Lavan is paraphrasing Avraham’s bracha.

If Lavan is paraphrasing, why is the terminology different, and if there is a difference between the two blessings, what is the difference between אֹיְבָיו/enemies and שֹׂנְאָיו/those who hate you?

Our parsha says:

וַיְהִי בִּנְסֹעַ הָאָרֹן וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה קוּמָה ה’ וְיָפֻצוּ אֹיְבֶיךָ וְיָנֻסוּ מְשַׂנְאֶיךָ מִפָּנֶיךָ – So it was, whenever the ark set out, Moses would say, Arise, O Lord, may Your enemies be scattered and may those who hate You flee from You.

Rashi says: ויפוצו אויביך: המכונסין – May Your enemies be scattered: Those [enemies] who are assembled [for battle].

וינסו משנאיך: אלו הרודפים - (may) Those who hate You flee:  These are pursuers.

We can draw a distinction between an enemy and one who hates you now. The word אויב is is similar in root to the word אוהב - to love. Both verbs are a result of being together.  A שונא however, is someone who hates someone even when they are nowhere near them, and will pursue them.

This is hinted to by Rashi, where he writes אלו - these, ie they are close enough to be pointed out.

Eisav is referred to as Soneh Yisrael, and Yishmael is referred to as Oyev Yisrael.

Our situation with the Arabs reflects this – if we’d been in Uganda, there would be no problems, and vice versa – the situation is a result of being together. Conversely, Hitler and the Nazis had little or nothing to with Jews, and yet they hated us, and hunted us down across the globe, truly the definition of a רודף – but the terminology used in the Torah reflects the sad reality of our situation today.

To be really Geshmack: we asked why Rivka and Avraham received different brachos. At Mt. Moriah, the bracha was to Avraham, so the bracha was for Yitzchak, regarding his other son Yishmael – and Yishmael is an אויב, therefore the pasuk says שַׁעַר אֹיְבָיו. In contrast, Rivka received a bracha that was for Yakov regarding Esav, and Esav is a שונא, and therefore the pasuk says שַׁעַר שֹׂנְאָיו!

Interestingly:

-Ramban points out that at Avrahams bracha that was the first time there was a promise of Moshiach

-Baal Haturimpoints out that the final mention of Yishmael is עַל פְּנֵי כָל אֶחָיו נָפָל – right at the end of Chayei Sara (25:18). The following pasuk is the beginning of Toldos - וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת יִצְחָק בֶּן אַבְרָהָם - Baal Haturim writes that the ultimate rise of Moshiach is tied to the fall of Yishmael.

Targum Yonasan (7:79) states that the silver bowl (ka’aroh) had “Gidloh Smich“, which are thin walls.  The silver basin (mizrok) had “Gidloh Klush“, which are thick walls. How does he know this?

The Gra (Vilna Gaon) comments on Maseches Yumoh 62b. The word ‘shnei’ (two) always means the two are equal, like the two goats on Yom Kippur that had to be exactly the same.  Since ‘shnei’ is written three times, we know that they were the same in appearance, height, and value.

Similarly, the Gemara in Bereshis (1:16) explains that the sun and the moon were once the same size, but then the moon complained that it was impossible for there to be two kings (the sun and the moon) with one crown, and therefore, he was made smaller. The Gemara learns this from the fact that at  first, its written that the sun and moon were ‘gedolim’ (plural for big), but later on, its written that one was ’gadol‘ (big) and one was ‘katon‘ (small). Tosfos asks how we can assume that the moon became smaller; perhaps both the sun and the moon were big, but one was bigger than the other, in which case, the moon never became smaller.

Tosfos answers that the passuk says “shnei hamo’oros” (both of the luminaries). Based on the previous paragraph we know that ‘shnei’ connotes equality, so we know that they must have been the same size originally. Thus, the answer of the Gemara is validated.

Knowing these concepts, we can understand the Targum Yonason. ’Shneihem’, implys that they were the same size, but surely this can’t be true; the bowl weighed 130, whilst the basin weighed 70. Rather, the two utensils must have had the same capacity, as it says ‘shneihem melayim’ (the two of them were filled to their capacities). We also know that ‘shnei’ connotes equality, so we know that they must have been the same size. How could this be? The bowl had thick walls , whilst the basin had thin walls, so they both could hold the same capacity.

A very short Dvar Torah for Parshas Naso:

וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מַיִם קְדֹשִׁים בִּכְלִי חָרֶשׂ וּמִן הֶעָפָר אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בְּקַרְקַע הַמִּשְׁכָּן יִקַּח הַכֹּהֵן וְנָתַן אֶל הַמָּיִם - The kohen shall take holy water in an earthen vessel, and some earth from the Mishkan floor, the kohen shall take and put it into the water. (5:17)

וְכָתַב אֶת הָאָלֹת הָאֵלֶּה הַכֹּהֵן בַּסֵּפֶר וּמָחָה אֶל מֵי הַמָּרִים – Then the kohen shall write these curses (containing G-d’s name) on a scroll and erase it in the bitter water. (5:23)

The ingredients to the concoction the Sotah is made to drink are: 1. Water, 2. Earth, 3. G-d’s name (- Rashi points out that the paper with G-d’s name is inserted into the water so it dissolves in the water is so that since she may confess before needing to drink it, we should wait until the last moment to avoid erasing G-d’s name in vain). What is the meaning and significance of these three ingredients?

The Mishna in Avos (3:1) says: עקביה בן מהללאל אומר, הסתכל בשלושה דברים, ואין אתה בא לידי עבירה–דע מאיין באת, ולאיין אתה הולך, ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון:  מאיין באת, מליחה סרוחה.  ולאיין אתה הולך, למקום רימה ותולעה.  ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון, לפני מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא – Akavia the son of Mahalalel would say: Reflect upon three things and you will not come to the hands of transgression. Know from where you came, where you are going, and before whom you are destined to give a judgement and accounting. From where you came–from a putrid drop of liquid (correlates to water); where you are going–to a place of dust, maggots and worms (correlates to earth); and before whom you are destined to give a judgement and accounting–before the supreme King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He. (G-d’s name).

Timeless lesson – never forget the mishna!

Geshmack short Dvar Torah or what? :)

ראש חודש ניסן

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