Archive for the ‘Depth of Infinite Detail’ Category

Upon meeting Pharoh for the first time, Yakov and Pharoh have this conversation:

וַיֹּאמֶר פַּרְעֹה, אֶל-יַעֲקֹב: כַּמָּה, יְמֵי שְׁנֵי חַיֶּיךָ. וַיֹּאמֶר יַעֲקֹב, אֶל-פַּרְעֹה, יְמֵי שְׁנֵי מְגוּרַי, שְׁלֹשִׁים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה: מְעַט וְרָעִים, הָיוּ יְמֵי שְׁנֵי חַיַּי, וְלֹא הִשִּׂיגוּ אֶת-יְמֵי שְׁנֵי חַיֵּי אֲבֹתַי, בִּימֵי מְגוּרֵיהֶם – And Pharaoh said to Yakov, “How many have been the days, the years of your life?” And Yakov said to Pharaoh, “The days of the years of my sojournings are one hundred thirty years. The days of the years of my life have been few and miserable, and they have not reached the days of the years of the lives of my forefathers, in the days of their journeys.” (47:8-9)

Yakov lived a tremendously difficult life. He had fled his family to live in hiding from his brother; been cheated and overworked by his father in law; been denied marriage to the love of his youth, been betrayed by his firstborn son; seen the rape of his daughter; seen his sons bickering result in Yosef’s disappearance and presumed death for 22 years; and seen Rachel die in childbirth. This was not the future he had sought to create for the Jewish people.

Mishlei 3:2 advises that תורתי אל תשכח….. כי אורך ימים ושנות חיים – my son, don’t forget the Torah… Because it lengthens days and years of life. Life is lived through peace, wholeness and Torah – pain and suffering are not true living. It therefore stands to reason that Yakov says מְעַט וְרָעִים, הָיוּ יְמֵי שְׁנֵי חַיַּי – “The days of the years of my life have been few and miserable,”.

However, the opening of Parshas Vayechi, which addresses the conclusion of Yakov’s life, states:

וַיְחִי יַעֲקֹב בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, שְׁבַע עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה; וַיְהִי יְמֵי-יַעֲקֹב, שְׁנֵי חַיָּיו–שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים, וְאַרְבָּעִים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה – And Yakov lived in Egypt for seventeen years, and Yakov’s days; the years of his life; were a hundred and forty seven years. (47:28)

The Torah asserts that at this juncture, just 17 years after “few and miserable”, that וַיְחִי – Yakov truly lived, “living” being the thing he had lacked his whole life, what with all his suffering.

This marks a significant change. Before reuniting his family, he felt his life had been a failure. Now they were together, living in harmony, fulfilling Yakov’s ambitions for creating a nation, יְמֵי-יַעֲקֹב, שְׁנֵי חַיָּיו – Yakov’s days and years became years of life, to the extent that שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים, וְאַרְבָּעִים וּמְאַת שָׁנָה – he could look back, and his entire life had been worth it in the end, having achieved the harmony he sought his whole life.

The Midrash and Gemara in Shabbos say that a real exile begins in chains and handcuffs; Yakov was spared this in his exile because of his merits. The Nesivos Shalom explains how the brothers could attempt to murder Yosef and then sell him, whilst seeming incredibly evil, was actually their bodies expressing what Hashem wanted, that they eventually wind up in Egypt. The people Yosef was sold to we’re traditionally salesmen of foul scented products, but Yosef was “fortunate” that they were carrying sweet smelling spices on that day.

But it was not just “fortune”, and it was the same with Yakov

There had to be an exile to Egypt. Everything had been calculated precisely. Yakov recognised at the end of his life, that every event in his life had led him to where he was.

Having recognised that all his negative experiences brought him to where he was, he was finally content, satisfied and fulfilled.

We find that Yosef has two vivid dreams, that had trappings of prophecy:

וַיַּחֲלֹם יוֹסֵף חֲלוֹם, וַיַּגֵּד לְאֶחָיו; וַיּוֹסִפוּ עוֹד, שְׂנֹא אֹתוֹ. וַיֹּאמֶר, אֲלֵיהֶם: שִׁמְעוּ-נָא, הַחֲלוֹם הַזֶּה אֲשֶׁר חָלָמְתִּי. וְהִנֵּה אֲנַחְנוּ מְאַלְּמִים אֲלֻמִּים, בְּתוֹךְ הַשָּׂדֶה, וְהִנֵּה קָמָה אֲלֻמָּתִי, וְגַם-נִצָּבָה; וְהִנֵּה תְסֻבֶּינָה אֲלֻמֹּתֵיכֶם, וַתִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶיןָ לַאֲלֻמָּתִי. וַיֹּאמְרוּ לוֹ, אֶחָיו, הֲמָלֹךְ תִּמְלֹךְ עָלֵינוּ, אִם-מָשׁוֹל תִּמְשֹׁל בָּנוּ; וַיּוֹסִפוּ עוֹד שְׂנֹא אֹתוֹ, עַל-חֲלֹמֹתָיו וְעַל-דְּבָרָיו. וַיַּחֲלֹם עוֹד חֲלוֹם אַחֵר, וַיְסַפֵּר אֹתוֹ לְאֶחָיו; וַיֹּאמֶר, הִנֵּה חָלַמְתִּי חֲלוֹם עוֹד, וְהִנֵּה הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ וְהַיָּרֵחַ וְאַחַד עָשָׂר כּוֹכָבִים, מִשְׁתַּחֲוִים לִי. וַיְסַפֵּר אֶל-אָבִיו, וְאֶל-אֶחָיו, וַיִּגְעַר-בּוֹ אָבִיו, וַיֹּאמֶר לוֹ מָה הַחֲלוֹם הַזֶּה אֲשֶׁר חָלָמְתָּ: הֲבוֹא נָבוֹא, אֲנִי וְאִמְּךָ וְאַחֶיךָ, לְהִשְׁתַּחֲו‍ֹת לְךָ, אָרְצָה. וַיְקַנְאוּ-בוֹ, אֶחָיו …

And Yosef dreamt a dream, and told it to his brothers, and they continued to hate him. And he said to them, “Listen to this dream I dreamt! We were binding bundles in the field, and my bundle arose, and also stood upright, and then your bundles encircled and prostrated themselves to my bundle.” So his brothers said to him, “Will you reign over us, or will you govern us!?” And they continued to hate him for his dreams and for his words.

And he dreamed another dream, and he related it to his brothers, and he said, “I have dreamed another dream; the sun, the moon, and eleven stars were prostrating themselves to me.” And he told [it] to his father and to his brothers; and his father told him off and said to him, “What is this dream that you have dreamed? Will we come; I, your mother, and your brothers, to prostrate ourselves to you to the ground?” And his brothers envied him… (37:5-11)

The dreams were not empty visions – they were prophecies.

The Beis Halevi explains how the bundled grain dream related to the physical; Yosef’s incredible future rise to governor of Egypt, future owner of all the grain stores in the empire, and subsequently, his vast amounts of wealth. The dream about the stars and heavenly bodies correlated to spirituality – Yosef is called Yosef HaTzaddik, the righteous, the foundation of the universe.

R Ezra Hartman explains how this differentiated his brothers reactions to each dream. Wealth is external to a person; it does not define him, is not a part of him. This is related very subtly, where they did not bow to him, but to his bundle – אֲלֻמֹּתֵיכֶם, וַתִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶיןָ לַאֲלֻמָּתִי. Perhaps this is why they hated him, that they misunderstood him and though that somehow great wealth would mean he ought to rule them – אִם-מָשׁוֹל תִּמְשֹׁל בָּנוּ. The dream about the bundles engendered hatred – וַיּוֹסִפוּ עוֹד שְׂנֹא אֹתוֹ.

But with the stars, they did not bow to a representation of Yosef, but rather, כּוֹכָבִים, מִשְׁתַּחֲוִים לִי – they bowed to him, himself. This dream about the stars, hinting to his holiness and the spiritual attainments he would achieve, engendered jealousy – וַיְקַנְאוּ-בוֹ, אֶחָיו.

It seems that the dream about wealth did not engender jealousy, only hatred, perhaps as described above. The dreams about spirituality were not something to hate him for – they could use their jealousy as a motivational tool. But regarding his immense wealth, there was nothing to be jealous of – wealth doesn’t make someone better, hence their retort.

There was no such retort to the dream about spirituality. Bettering oneself is the only currency that counts, and they knew it.

The parsha opens with:

ויאמר ד׳ אל אברם לך לך מארצך וממולדתך ומבית אביך אל הארץ אשר אראך – And Hashem said to Avraham, “Go for yourself, from your land, your homeland, and the house of your father, to the land which I will show you”.

This pasuk is loaded with inferences. Rashi points out that Hashem was telling Avraham that this journey would be לך – for his own benefit and growth, which seems difficult to understand. Did Avraham need a personal gain to do what Hashem had instructed?

Further, the pasuk uses an expression of leaving from, rather than exiting to, which seems odd, if the actual goal was to arrive at the land Hashem would show him.

Lastly, the requirement to go “from your land, your birthplace, and the house of your father, to the land which I will show you”, seems redundant – the goal is אל הארץ אשר אראך, the land he would be shown. Why include where he was leaving from at all?

Avraham is commanded to go first from his country, then his homeland, and lastly, his father’s house. Shouldn’t the sequence be reversed? When travelling internationally, you leave the house first, then the area and then the country. So why is the command in this order?

The Nesivos Shalom explains that Hashem was telling Avraham to leave his negative traits which he acquired in these locations. Our environment is instrumental to developing who we are as people. The more localised the environment, the greater the affect it can have.

As such, a home environment is more persuasive than a homeland, which in turn is more influential than a country. The command is brought to greater light; Hashem was telling Avraham to leave, abandon even, the negative influence he picked up from his country, homeland and father’s house. The order is listing in ascending difficulty.

This further bring to light that לך לך means “Go fro yourself”. Avaham understood that ultimate happiness is becoming close to Hashem, echoing the Mesilas Yesharim, that the supreme joy in this world is the joy of serving Hashem; acknowledging one’s purpose in life and fulfilling it. Hashem told him that in order to grow further, he needed to totally separate himself from the negative culture he’d lived his whole life in – מארצך וממולדתך ומבית אביך.

It’s not enough for a person to try to be the best they can be, where they are. To reach full potential, he also has to remove himself from the bad midos of his environment because they still have an affect on him.

Once Avraham abandoned his past, he could achieve אל הארץ אשר אראך.

This further answers why the command was to “go” from somewhere, not just to somewhere. He had to leave where he was to get where he was going.

The entire incident of the Mabul seems perplexing. Humanity had started populating the world, and initially fulfilled Gods mission, until suddenly, things came to a bottleneck, and society degenerated to a point where God decided to “start over” from Noach. But why?

The Malbim observes that the pasuk writes:

צֵא, מִן-הַתֵּבָה–אַתָּה… כָּל-הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר-אִתְּךָ מִכָּל-בָּשָׂר, בָּעוֹף וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל-הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל-הָאָרֶץ–הוצא (הַיְצֵא) אִתָּךְ; וְשָׁרְצוּ בָאָרֶץ, וּפָרוּ וְרָבוּ עַל-הָאָרֶץ – Leave the Ark – you… Every living creature with you. Every creature, bird, animal and insect that creeps on the earth, should leave with you, and they will multiply and infest the earth. (8:16-17)

Malbim explains that the salvation of life on earth was through Noach, and the psukim say as much, by emphasising כָּל-הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר-אִתְּךָ – he was the instrument through which they were saved, because they were “with him”.

The Malbim explains the undercurrent in the sequence of events that led to the Mabul, and what it repaired. When Adam was created, he had the potential of all Creation within him. Every possible characteristic, including the animals, was included in his makeup. The way he behaved, nature reacted, and we see this somewhat today, watered down, in how pets reflect characteristics of their owners.

The generation of the Flood squandered and destroyed their potential to be good, and had no good characteristics. Nature reacted accordingly, and animals became evil too, with all species mingling with others, to a point where the Torah (6:12) writes כִּי-הִשְׁחִית כָּל-בָּשָׂר אֶת-דַּרְכּוֹ, עַל-הָאָרֶץ – that every living creature had lost its way.

Noach reclaimed decency, and “humanity” – in the true sense of the word, by being honest and good. He reclaimed the potential to be good. He was the sole being that had not corrupted itself, and as such existence was perpetuated solely for his sake. This is why he was chosen of all men – existence owed itself to him.

צֵא, מִן-הַתֵּבָה–אַתָּה… כָּל-הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר-אִתְּךָ מִכָּל-בָּשָׂר, בָּעוֹף וּבַבְּהֵמָה וּבְכָל-הָרֶמֶשׂ הָרֹמֵשׂ עַל-הָאָרֶץ–הוצא (הַיְצֵא) אִתָּךְ; וְשָׁרְצוּ בָאָרֶץ, וּפָרוּ וְרָבוּ עַל-הָאָרֶץ – Leave the Ark – you… Every living creature with you. Every creature, bird, animal and insect that creeps on the earth, should leave with you, and they will multiply and infest the earth. (8:16-17)

Perhaps we can suggest that since humanity restarted from him, humanity inherited this debt that nature owed, and in the beginning of the next chapter, God permits man to eat meat for the very first time.

When the Bnei Yisrael assembled on Har Grizim and Har Eival for the blessings and curses, different tribes ascended the different mountains as instructed by Moshe. The people on each peak all spoke in unison to the other peak, in a kind of very loud conversations spanning mountains.

The pasuk tells us that:

אֵלֶּה יַעַמְדוּ לְבָרֵךְ אֶת-הָעָם, עַל-הַר גְּרִזִים, בְּעָבְרְכֶם, אֶת-הַיַּרְדֵּן: שִׁמְעוֹן וְלֵוִי וִיהוּדָה, וְיִשָּׂשכָר וְיוֹסֵף וּבִנְיָמִן. וְאֵלֶּה יַעַמְדוּ עַל-הַקְּלָלָה, בְּהַר עֵיבָל: רְאוּבֵן גָּד וְאָשֵׁר, וּזְבוּלֻן דָּן וְנַפְתָּלִי – These tribes will ascend to bless the people, from Har Grizim, (…), and these are the tribes that will ascend for the curse, on Har Eival (…). (27:12-13)

From the above translation, it is evident that the construct of the commands is subtly different, wherein the people on Har Grizim were actually going to bless everyone, whereas the people on Har Eival were going to be passive, to be there “for the curse”.

Why the disparity?

The Kli Yakar explains that curses only come due to an individuals actions, that cause Hashem to distance himself from a person. The people went up the mountain weren’t going up to affirm that Hashem would curse, as an action, but rather, to affirm that without Hashem’s blessings, that is a curse. But these curses are not fixed.

In Moshe’s opening to the people at the mountains, he says:

הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ מְצַוְּךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת-הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה–וְאֶת-הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים; וְשָׁמַרְתָּ וְעָשִׂיתָ אוֹתָם, בְּכָל-לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל-נַפְשֶׁךָ – On this day, Hashem your God has commanded you to keep these statutes and laws, and you will guard them and perform them, with all your heart and soul. (26:16)

This pasuk is monumental in its context, but equally to all of us today. Rashi points out that this is written in the present tense, that we have the same obligations every day as when we accepted the Torah and mitzvos.

In the past, we may not have been all we could have been. But we can always draw a line, and start afresh, and say הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה, today is a new day. There is always an opportunity to do become a better person and do Teshuva, most apt as we approach Rosh Hashanah.

The pasuk tells us with a double statement that:

עשר תעשר – you shall tithe (14:22)

Gemara in Taanis 9a derives from this pasuk that עשר בשביל שתתעשר – one who gives ma’aser, the tithes, will become wealthier. This applies to all other forms of tzedaka, charity, too.

The Vilna Gaon explains that this highly unusual affirmation from the Gemara is due to a difficulty. The standard explanation of a double statement is that it means “to surely” do it, an unlimited amount of times. The difficulty is that the Gemara in Kesubos 50a states that a person is not allowed to give away more than 20% of his income. This would seem to indicate a flaw that a double statement cannot mean to do something with no limit, as it does not apply here – a person is not allowed to give an unlimited amount of money away.

The Vilna Gaon therefore teaches us that this still applies, even to giving charity, wherein a person will have more than he did prior to giving tzedaka, that he will be able to keep giving more, and never give an amount that he wasn’t allowed to. The reward for giving charity is the ability to give more, and it won’t hinder the giver, because we learn that עשר בשביל שתתעשר – a person will be able to keep giving charity.

The daughters of Tzlafchad came to Moshe and said:

לָמָּה יִגָּרַע שֵׁם אָבִינוּ מִתּוֹךְ מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ כִּי אֵין לוֹ בֵּן תְּנָה לָּנוּ אֲחֻזָּה בְּתוֹךְ אֲחֵי אָבִינוּ – Why should our father’s name be eliminated from his family because he had no son? Give us a portion along with our father’s brothers. (27:4)

Rashi explains that this was not an emotional request, rather, a halachic one. אנו במקום בן עומדות, ואם אין הנקבות חשובות זרע, תתיבם אמנו ליבם – We stand in the place a son ought to be, if we do not inherit our father, then let our mother perform yibum – levirate marriage.

A woman does not perform yibum if she has children from her deceased husband – as the children carry on the name of their father. The daughters of Tzlafchad made the association between yibum and inheritance – if they were זרע, progeny enough for yibum, then they ought to inherit, and if they weren’t to inherit, then their mother ought to perform yibum.

Rashi further points out that הא אם היה לו בן לא היו תובעות כלום. מגיד שחכמניות היו – If there had been a brother, they would not have made a claim (and left the inheritance to him). This displayed their intelligence. 

What exactly is the intelligence they displayed?

R’ Yehoshua Hartman explains that they demonstrated their understanding of the function of inheritance. The conventional wisdom is that when the owner dies, his assets are passed on. It is a default process – assets cannot lie unclaimed.

The genuine, Torah, understanding of inheritance is that whatever Hashem blesses someone with becomes a part of who they are. A person’s name takes root in his house – that’s what ownership really is. That is not to say that this goes to the extent of society today where people are defined by how much money they have at the bank. But property does have a certain relationship with the owner, a sort of extension.

When the person dies, the re-allocation of his assets is only to perpetuate the name of the deceased, which his property bears the name of. The people who are the continuation of his legacy will, inherit, which is why children usually inherit, as they are the continuation of their father’s legacy.

The daughters said if we weren’t continuations of their father’s lineage regarding inheritance, then they ought not to be for yibum. They understood what the function of both is to continue the lineage of their father.

The association was so correct, that Hashem told Moshe that they were right, teaching a previously unknown halacha.

The parsha opens with אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ וְאֶת מִצְוֹתַי תִּשְׁמְרוּ וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם – If you follow My statutes and observe My commandments and perform them (26:3)

Rav Shach quotes a pasuk from Neviim, Chabakuk 3:6 that הליכות עולם לו – that the ways of the world are Hashems. We say this when we say korbanos at the end of davening, and we quote the ma’amar Chazal that expounds אל תקרי הליכות אלא הלכות – Read it not as ways, but as laws. The הלכות, the Torah, that we bring in to the world, dictates the הליכות, the ways, of Hashem’s world.

Our performance of mitzvos has a very real effect on the world – the mitzvos dictate (more…)

With korbanos, the sacrifices, there is a concept within certain categories of korban called olah v’yored – where the animal offered will vary, dependent on the person’s status. For example, Parshas Tazria deals with a woman who gives birth – olah v’yored applies, and as such, a woman from a wealthy family offers a חטאת and עולה of sheep, and a woman from a poor family offers a חטאת and עולה of doves.

But what if a poor person decides to save up, and instead of bringing the doves, he chooses to offer a wealthy man’s offering of sheep/cows? In other words; are people confined to their social status?

The halacha according to all is that if a wealthy man were to bring a poor man’s offering of doves, he has definitely not fulfilled his obligation. So the, olah v’yored applies to the animals, and it applies to the supplicant if he attempts to downgrade his responsibility. So the question becomes: can a person upgrade their responsibility?

The Sefer Hachinuch says that a poor person who upgrades his sacrifice from the birds to the cows has not fulfilled his obligation. The Rambam disputes this, and says that he has.

What is the basis of the dispute?

There is a story told about R’ Meir Schapira, at a gathering of all the pre-war Gedolim. He presented this very question, and asked how the Sefer HaChinuch could suggest he hadn’t fulfilled his obligation, possibly contradicting various Gemaras.

Present at the gathering, was the Imrei Emes, the Gerrer Rebbe. He simply muttered, “there is a missing korban”. Those gathered were puzzled what the Rebbe had meant. Among his attending disciples was R’ Menachem Zemba of Warsaw, a renowned genius, who took the floor. “Let us analyse where the Sefer HaChinuch says his halacha. There are 6 applications of the concept of olah v’yored:”

1. A ritually impure person who enters the area of the Beis haMikdash

2. A ritually impure person who eats kodshim (produce set aside for kohanim)

4. A person who falsely swears he did not witness an event, thereby avoiding needing to testify

5. A woman who gives birth

6. A person stricken with tzara’as (a metzora)

“5+6 are different. The wealthy person brings one animal, as does the poor person. Not so in 1-4, delineated in Parshas Vayikra, wherein the wealthy person only bring the חטאת , and no עולה , thereby only needing one animal. The Gemara that the Sefer HaChinuch seemed to go against, that a poor person who brings a rich mans offering has indeed fulfilled his obligation, was regarding 5+6, where there were two animals, brought by both the rich and poor.”

“However, in Parshas Vayikra, where the pasuk discusses cases 1-4, it is insufficient for a poor person to bring a wealthy man’s offering – he’s missing an animal!”

“The Ibn Ezra discusses the possible causes for the discrepancy in how many animals a person would bring, based on his social standing.”

“1. A poor man would by definition be unhappy with his standing in life, and he would bear a grudge against Heaven for his misfortune. This necessitates an additional animal.”

“2. A wealthy person’s offering has a large enough portion to burn on the Mizbeach by itself, a cow is a very large animal. Not so with a bird, with a woefully small portion to burn. It is disrespectful to offer such a miniscule portion, and this necessitates a whole new animal to satisfice the demands of the Mizbeach.”

The genius continued; “So the Sefer HaChinuch would agree with the first possibility. It doesn’t help for a poor person, who must bring the second to atone for his grudge against Heaven, to bring one animal. He has not addressed this feeling within, and as the Rebbe said, there is a korban missing.”

However, the Rambam would hold with the second option, that the second animal is not brought because of the person, but rather, by the nature of the animal being offered. If he were to bring a cow, there would be no need for a second animal, and he would indeed have fulfilled his responsibility!

The parsha begins, “Eleh pekudei hamishkan, mishkan haedus asher pukad al pi Moshe…”. The Medrash refers this pasuk to the pasuk in Mishlei (28:20) “Ish emunos rav brachos”. The Sfas Emes explains that the Ish emunos is Moshe Rabbeinu and what the Medrash is telling us is that although counting something is not a siman brocha when the counting is done by an Ish emunos then brocha will be bestowed on the counted subjects.

The Kli Yakar in the beginning of parshas ki sisa explains the idea behind why one should not count and why counting brings ayin raah. When one counts something he is in essence giving this object its own individual importance, thereby creating additional awareness of it in shamayim. This awakens the debate as to the rights of the object, and all the relevant zechuyos and chovos are judged.

The Sfas Emes this week expounds this idea and with it beautifully explains the Medrash. All the good bestowed upon this world comes from a single higher source and as you distance from the source the good is diminished. From this shoresh hayachid hashmeymi branches out big then smaller and smaller branches, and the smallest furthest branch profits the least from the goodness supplied by those roots. When somebody counts something the individuality and importance that he applies to it separates it further from the source as it now has its own new identity. It is a new branch of its own. Before it was counted it was a part of the bigger branch, closer to the roots. This is why counting usually brings less brocha.

In many places the Sfas Emes explains that the root of the word emunah means connecting the subject back to its real true source. With this the medrash becomes beautifully clear. The medrash is explaining the pasuk as follows. Why does the pasuk mention that the counting was done by Moshe? (more…)

In Parsha Pikudei, the phrase “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה” appears 18 times, at the end of nearly every set of instructions. It would seem obvious that the construction of the Mishkan would take place as commanded, as the preceding parshiyos make painstakingly clear; so why the additional stress on how the work was carried out?

The Beis Halevi explains that the Mishkan was only required as a tikkun for the Eigel HaZahav (Golden Calf) – it was not required prior to then. If the Mishkan was to restore the status quo, it would have to be the polar opposite of the problem it was intended to solve. The Beis Halevi explains that what caused the Eigel was the people’s own ideas about how best to serve Hashem, and this led them to the conclusion they reached, which was decidedly not as they were commanded. As such, at every suitable juncture, the Torah sees fit to emphasise “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה“, – the reason the people did everything they did was for no reason whatsoever – other than that Hashem had instructed them.

The Ohr HaChayim asks a similar question to the Beis Halevi – the pasuk says “כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה” – rather than the regular “כַּאֲשֶׁר” in the other psukim – in three contexts ie 38:22, 39:42 and 40:16. What is the significance of this specific phrase, that the Torah differentiates between the standard “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה“?

He explains that the people’s spontaneous actions at the Eigel, there were three problematic issues: the thought, speech, and actions, without which the incident would not have occurred. In transgressing just one of the three, a person was responsible for denying the entire Torah, let alone all three. The antidote to the Eigel would have to be a fusion of thought, speech and action together, which the Mishkan was.

If I may be so bold, I would like to suggest a thought I had after learning the Ohr HaChayim’s pshat.

The phrase כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה appears in three contexts – with regard to the planners, the workers, and Moshe:

-וּבְצַלְאֵל בֶּן אוּרִי בֶן חוּר לְמַטֵּה יְהוּדָה עָשָׂה אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה – Bezalel, son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah, had made all that the Lord had commanded Moshe (38:22)

-כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת כָּל הָעֲבֹדָה – In accordance with all that the Lord had commanded Moshe, so did the children of Israel do all the work. (39:42)

-וַיַּעַשׂ מֹשֶׁה כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֹתוֹ כֵּן עָשָׂה – Thus Moshe did; according to all that the Lord had commanded him, so he did. (40:16)

I was bothered by the Ohr HaChayim’s explanation that the Mishkan counteracted the thought, speech and action that led to the Eigel. The pasuk would have to reflect it, and it appears not to – all the above psukim simply refer to actions – וַיַּעַשׂ , כֵּן עָשׂוּ , עָשָׂה . This is problematic as how can we explain now that these psukim reflect a counteraction of the components of the Eigel? Where is thought and speech reflected?

The thought behind the Eigel would be atoned for by ignoring the underlying wisdom of the work done (possibly the Beis Halevi’s pshat). The plans and architecture of the Mishkan were drawn up by Bezalel – about whom Chazal attribute the ability to see the construct of the entire creation down to the Aleph-Beis that composes it. He understood the plans of the Mishkan – but he did not do it because he understood it to be correct, he did it because Hashem told Moshe.

The action behind the Eigel can also be counteracted. The wholde idea of Parshas Shekalim, as the Nesivos Shalom explains, is that in donating to the Mishkan (the Machatzis HaShekel, rare metals and precious stones), they collectively bought into the project as a whole, thus atoning for the actions behind the Eigel.

We must now somehow say that the speech that led to the Eigel would be atoned for by Moshe’s speech for this to work. If we analyse the portion of the Torah portion in which 40:16 appears, we will find:

וַיְדַבֵּר ה’ אֶל מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר – And the Lord said to Moshe, to say. (40:1)

בְּיוֹם הַחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ תָּקִים אֶת מִשְׁכַּן אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד – “On the day of the first month, on the first of the month, you shall set up the Mishkan of the Tent of Meeting.” (40:2)

This fits beautifully. The speech of the Eigel was the speech that initiated the incident. This is counteracted by Moshe speaking to initiate the construction of the Mishkan!

The opening pasuk in Parshas Vayakhel reads: “וַיַּקְהֵל מֹשֶׁה אֶת כָּל עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם’ – Moses gathered the whole community of the children of Israel to assemble, and he said to them: “These are the things that the Lord commanded to do” (35:1)

The Nesivos Shalom asks three questions.

This is the sole instance of וַיַּקְהֵל – an instruction to gather all the people together – in the entire Torah, where וַיַּקְהֵל is the first thing mentioned in the episode. What is so exceptional about this instruction of וַיַּקְהֵל, that makes it unique?

Secondly, the opening statement was “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do – the instructions are not to light fire, and not to work. How is not doing something called “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do?

Furthermore, this episode occurred directly after the Eigel (Golden Calf), as Rashi explains that Parshas Vayakhel occurred the morning after Yom Kippur, when Moshe returned with the second luchos. It seems obvious that his first public appearance upon his return would be a notable message to the people regarding the bridge between G-d’s wrath and appeasement. What was it that atoned for the sin of the Eigel? (more…)

Parshas Tetzaveh is an anomaly in the Torah. It is the only parsha in the narrative of the Jews of that time in which Moshe Rabbeinu’s name does not appear at all, from his birth until the end of the Torah (barring certain parts of Devarim, where he was the person speaking).

The Ba’al HaTurim comments on the first pasuk in Tetzaveh (27:20) that in Parshas Ki Sisa, after seeing the Golden Calf and subsequently Hashem’s wrath through the plague, Moshe pleaded that “ וְעַתָּה אִם תִּשָּׂא חַטָּאתָם וְאִם אַיִן מְחֵנִי נָא מִסִּפְרְךָ אֲשֶׁר כָּתָבְתָּ – And now, if You forgive their sin But if not, erase me now from Your book, which You have written.” (32:32). The Ba’al HaTurim explains that although Hashem did indeed refrain from destroying the nation, a tzaddik’s word is always fulfilled.

The parsha in which Moshe’s name does not appear is about the kehuna, the priesthood, which was given to Ahron. R’ Yakov Minkus explains that there are 2 ways for Torah (representing Heaven) and mankind (representing Earth) to intersect:

1. The first way is that the Torah descends from Heaven. Moshe embodied this, as exemplified when he brought down the luchos from the mountain to the people.
2. The second is that we elevate become elevated ourselves. Ahron embodied this, as the ultimate “people’s person”. He was אוהב שלום ורודף שלום – a lover and pursuer of peace. The entire priesthood was based on helping the people interact with Hashem through the services.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin concludes that there are two ways to settle litigation, through din emes (an actual judgement), or a pshara (a compromise). The fact that both are valid settlements shows that both are equally powerful at achieving their goal, settling a dispute.

The role of the kohen is to play the arbiter, the middle man. As a man of the people, he is meant to feel their emotions, guide them through the services in the Beis HaMikdash, and follow the path that Ahron set.

If we are to say that this way of getting to the intersection of people and Torah is equally valid, Moshe almost had to be left out, to show that here is another, equally valid way.

There are various incidents in the Torah where Ahron and Moshe are mentioned, with Ahron preceding Moshe, as opposed to the usual Moshe first, and Ahron second. This is meant to show their equality. But as pointed out in many places, Moshe was the greatest man to have ever lived, without equal, so to what ends can we suggest their equality?

Knowing what we now know, the answer is simple. Their equality was not as people, as indeed Moshe was without equal, but rather, their equality was in the validity of their approaches in how to get the Torah to the people.

There were four keilim that were kept inside the Mishkan – the Shulchan (table), the Aron (Ark), the Mizbeach (altar) and the Menora.

וְצִפִּיתָ אֹתוֹ זָהָב טָהוֹר מִבַּיִת וּמִחוּץ תְּצַפֶּנּוּ וְעָשִׂיתָ עָלָיו זֵר זָהָב סָבִיב – And you shall overlay it with pure gold; from inside and from outside you shall overlay it, and you shall make upon it a golden crown all around. (25:11) – Aron

וְצִפִּיתָ אֹתוֹ זָהָב טָהוֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ לּוֹ זֵר זָהָב סָבִיב – And you shall overlay it with pure gold, and you shall make for it a golden crown all around. (25:24) – Shulchan

וְצִפִּיתָ אֹתוֹ זָהָב טָהוֹר אֶת גַּגּוֹ וְאֶת קִירֹתָיו סָבִיב וְאֶת קַרְנֹתָיו וְעָשִׂיתָ לּוֹ זֵר זָהָב סָבִיב - You shall overlay it with pure gold, its top, its walls all around, and its horns; and you shall make for it a golden crown all around. (30:3) – Mizbeach

The  Aron, Shulchan, and Mizbeach all had “crowns”, a gold design that bordered their edges, whereas the Menora is the odd one out, it had no crowns. What is the cause of this discrepancy? (more…)

In Parshas Teruma we are instructed regarding the construction of the Aron (Ark). The Torah tells us that it should be covered from inside and out with gold ‘מבית ומחוץ תצפנו’ Rashi on the pasuk (25:11) explains, in accordance with the Gemara, that three separate boxes were made – a central wooden box, and inner and outer golden boxes. Rashi says that they put the wooden box into the larger golden box and then the smaller golden box inside of it.

The pasuk says they covered the inside of the box first, and only then the outside, whereas Rashi first says that they covered the outside first, and worked their way inwards. Why does Rashi change the order of the pasuk? (more…)

Why does Parshas Mishpatim begin with the laws of an עֶבֶד עִבְרִי – a Hebrew servant? What is the significance of this topic that marks it out as the first of the laws after receiving the Torah?

The Gemara in Bava Metzia 10a introduces a key concept to Jewish law; that a hired worker can stop in the middle of the job for whatever reason he chooses, so long as he compensates the lost labour, ensures a replacement etc. He cannot be made to work. This is in contrast to an עֶבֶד  who is a slave, and is bound to his work.

The psukim say: כִּי תִקְנֶה עֶבֶד עִבְרִי שֵׁשׁ שָׁנִים יַעֲבֹד וּבַשְּׁבִעִת יֵצֵא לַחָפְשִׁי חִנָּם - Should you buy a Hebrew servant, he shall work [for] six years, and in the seventh [year], he shall go out to freedom without charge. (21:2)

וְאִם אָמֹר יֹאמַר הָעֶבֶד אָהַבְתִּי אֶת אֲדֹנִי אֶת אִשְׁתִּי וְאֶת בָּנָי לֹא אֵצֵא חָפְשִׁי – But if the slave says, “I love my master, my wife, and my children. I will not go free,” (2:5)

וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֲדֹנָיו אֶל הָאֱ־לֹהִים וְהִגִּישׁוֹ אֶל הַדֶּלֶת אוֹ אֶל הַמְּזוּזָה וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ וַעֲבָדוֹ לְעֹלָם – his master shall bring him to the judges, and he shall bring him to the door or to the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever. (2:6)

There is a basic rule in the Gemara that the term “עֶבֶד” alone demarks a Canaanite, a slave, which is a permanent service, whereas an עֶבֶד עִבְרִי is a temporary status, which is why it must be specified.  My rebbi pointed out to me that when he begins his service (21:2), he is an עֶבֶד עִבְרִי whereas after the allotted time has passed at which he is meant to go free, should he remain to say, he has become an עֶבֶד – a slave, with no עִבְרִי – the Jew has become a Canaanite slave. Although this is not halachically accurate, this is certainly hashkafically accurate.

But what has he done that is so reprehensible, that he is pierced, a form of branding of property? (more…)

The Rambam states in that there are three distinct types of unintentional killers:

1.) One who kills b’shgagah. This is defined as the state of mind possessed by one whose act is completely unforeseen. This category is referred to states in Sh’mos 21:12: v’asher lo tzadahwho did not lie in ambush. The punishment that applies to such a person is galus, whereby he is exiled to one of the arei miklot in order to receive a kaparah for his actions and to find refuge from the goel hadam who would not be penalized for exacting vengeance.

2.) One who kills b’shgagah korov l’oness, which describes the mental state of one who could not only not foresee the death as an outcome of his actions, but the killing was a wonderment which would not have occurred in the same circumstances in the majority of cases. This person is exempt from galus and if the goel hadam were to kill him, the avenger would be sentenced to death by the beis din.

3.) One who kills b’shgagah karovah l’zadon. This pertains to a person who acted with an attitude of wanton recklessness. His sin is considered too great for galus, he is prevented from receiving a kaparah and is not afforded any protection from the goel hadam, who is permitted to exact retribution without fear of capital punishment.

There exists a fundamental condition attached to the law of the pure shogeg (category 1), as taught by the Mishnah in Makkos 6b. The general rule is that if this type of unintentional killer was travelling in a downward direction at the time when the cause of death was set in motion, he is liable to be sent to galus since such an action is deemed to have been committed b’shogeg. However, if the offender was not descending at this time, he is exempt from galus. The Mishnah exemplifies this principle with several scenarios, one of which is involves a man who was climbing down a ladder when a rung broke causing him to fall on top of the victim below, who perished as a result. This is considered to be a case of shogeg and the defendant is sentenced to galus. However, if the killer was ascending when he slipped and fell he is exempt. The Gemara explains that the reason for this distinction is the verse in Bamidbar 35, where the Torah states that an inadvertent killer who is liable for galus is one who, ‘V’yapeil alav v’yamus’And he fell on him and he died. Chazal expound this phrase to teach that the killer must be moving in a downward direction in a derech nefillah (the way of falling) in order to be liable for galus.

The Rambam provides a rationale for the Torah’s distinction between descent and ascent. He submits that the reason why the one who was ascending the ladder is exempt is because it is as if he were coerced, thus falling under category 2. Indeed, in most cases, that fatal outcome would not have occurred. Therefore, the killer’s culpability is beneath the threshold required for the punishment of galus.

In contrast, if the killer was descending the ladder at the crucial moment, the Rambam reasons that in such a case there is a greater risk of injuring others because it is a rule of nature that weight is pulled in a downward direction with rapidity. (It is interesting to note that the Rambam, writing approximately 200 years before Newton, was not that far away from the theory of gravity!) Therefore, if someone did not take proper care at the time of his descent, he will be liable to galus.

What is the correct perspective in terms of defining the culpability of one who kills b’shogeg? We have learnt that such behaviour is sufficient to deserve galus; however, galus is more of a refuge and a kaparah zone, rather than a brutal onesh. Moreover, the Rambam describes the shogeg mindset as totally blind to the outcome of his actions. Nonetheless, there appears to be some level of criminal negligence and blameworthiness associated with a shogeg. We are left with the question, what proportion of blame may be attributed to one who kills b’shogeg, requiring a kaparah, and to what extent is the death the result of Divine intervention?

Perhaps the answer can be found in Parashas Mishpatim, 21:12-13, wherein the Torah declares that, ‘makeh ish va’meis mos yumas; v’asher lo tzadah v’ho’elokim inah l’yado v’samti l’cha makom asher yanus shamah.’ – ‘One who strikes a man and he will die, he (the killer) shall be put to death; and if he did not lie in ambush and God placed it in his hand and I shall place for you a place to where he may flee’.

As Rashi interprets, the pasuk is referring to the laws pertaining to intentional and inadvertent killing; the one who murders deliberately receives the death penalty, whereas the individual who did not intend to kill is exiled. Philosophically, a most striking element within the verse is that we are being taught that Hashem arranges for such inadvertent killings to take place. Onkelos translates inah as it’m’sar, to transmit or to hand over, while Rashi writes that it is an expression akin to zaman, to invite or summon (this is an example of a word in lashon hakodesh upon which the English equivalent is based). This demonstrates that, at times, G-d deliberately causes a person’s death via human agency.

To explain this notion, Rashi cites a Medrash that depicts a saying of David HaMelech. The Medrash reports that the monarch stated that the Torah tells us ‘m’rashaim yeitzei resha’- from evil-doers comes out evil. Where does the Torah convey this? From our posuk: ‘v’ho’elokim inah l’yado’, which refers to a situation involving two people, one who killed inadvertantly and one who killed on purpose. However, in both cases there were no witnesses to enable the prosecution of either offender. Consequently, the unintentional killer was not ordered to go to galus and the murderer did not receive the death penalty. The Medrash, quoted by Rashi, continues by teaching that, in such a case, Divine intervention may arrange for these two killers to arrive at the same public house. The one who killed deliberately ends up sitting below a ladder and the inadvertent killer climbs up the ladder and subsequently falls on top of the killer beneath him with fatal consequences. Conveniently, on this occasion there were witnesses, thus enabling the beis din to send the shogeg to galus, which he was liable for anyway, while the intentional killer has already received his just deserts.

The glaring question is, how can Rashi quote the Medrash as teaching that the shogeg was climbing up the ladder (oleh ba’sulam) before he fell onto the person below. Surely it is the clear ruling of the aforementioned Mishnah in Makkos that in such a case, the individual is in fact exempt from galus. This problem is compounded by the actual reading of this Mechilta, as quoted in the Gemara in Makkos 10b. There, the text reads that the shogeg killer was descending the ladder (yored b’sulom) at the time of his fall. In that case, with what licence did Rashi not only alter the text of this Medrash, but give a misrepresentation of the correct halachah? This cannot be a simple mistake for we are dealing with Rashi, who the Meiri dubs greatest of the commentators.

The Sifsei Chachomim and the Mizrachi both opt for a rather ‘lav davka’ approach to resolve this conundrum by concluding that of course Rashi meant that when the killer fell he was moving downwards. Rashi merely refers to the fact that the shogeg went up the ladder so that it was possible for him to descend before falling. This may be true but it remains perplexing as to why Rashi so conspicuously deviates from the text of the Medrash as quoted by the Gemara and thereby risk halachically misleading the reader.

Enter the Maharal in his opus, Gur Aryeh. He contends that the sole message of the Medrash was to convey the extent of Divine intervention into human affairs. Therefore, Rashi deliberately changed the text in order to emphasize that the man’s ascent up the ladder was not the result of his own free choice, but rather, was entirely engineered by the Celestial chess player. The descent down the ladder however, was not the outcome of Divine programming and is thus irrelevant to the Medrash’s agenda. This approach not only absolves Rashi, but provides a scintillating insight into the Yad Hashem which clandestinely arranges earthly goings on in order to bring out justice and retribution.

Furthermore, this yesod assists us in our inquiry as to the correct understanding of the shogeg killer. This person is certainly subject to the Divine master plan, who leads him up the ladder. Nonetheless, the act of killing must contain an element of moral blameworthiness and G-d does not force you to sin under duress. It is within this person’s bechirah to be watchful of his actions, as it is axiomatic that he would not be exiled without deserving it. Thus, his descent must have been the result of his autonomous free will. These insights not only alert us to the penetrating truths of our holy Torah, but reveal extent of Hashem’s awesome jurisdiction over our existence.

.י: וַיֹּאמֶר יִתְרוֹ בָּרוּךְ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֲשֶׁר הִצִּיל אֶתְכֶם מִיַּד מִצְרַיִם וּמִיַּד פַּרְעֹה אֲשֶׁר הִצִּיל אֶת הָעָם מִתַּחַת יַד מִצְרָיִם  :

10. [Thereupon,] Jethro said, “Blessed is the Lord, Who has rescued you from the hands of the Egyptians and from the hand of Pharaoh, Who has rescued the people from beneath the hand of the Egyptians.

יא: עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי גָדוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה מִכָּל הָאֱ־לֹהִים כִּי בַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם:
11. Now I know that the Lord is greater than all the deities, for with the thing that they plotted, [He came] upon them.” (18:10-11)

What is it that he now knew?

There is a well-known Midrash that Pharaoh had 3 advisers during the episode of the Jews slavery in Egypt – Bilam, Iyov (Job), and Yisro. When Pharaoh sought to annihilate the Jews by drowning the Jewish boys in the river Nile, Bilam supported this and Iyov abstained, whereas Yisro advised against this and subsequently had to flee to Midyan to escape Pharaoh’s clutches.

With regard to our question, (what did Yisro ‘now’ know) I heard a fabulous explanation on a pshat level. What he now knew was Hashem’s system of hashgacha – oversight – the system of midda k’neged mida, measure for measure.

Pharaoh had sought to destroy the Jews by drowning them, and the reverse had happened to him and the entire Egyptian army.

. יא: עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי גָדוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה מִכָּל הָאֱ־לֹהִים כִּי בַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר זָדוּ עֲלֵיהֶם
11. Now I know that the Lord is greater than all the deities, for with the thing that they plotted, [He came] upon them.” (18: 11)

So now he saw that Hashem delivers justice, he realized that he was in a bad situation. Although he had fled Pharaoh when it became clear that official Egyptian policy was genocide, what had he done up until that point? The entire enslavement episode occurred whilst he was in Pharaoh’s cabinet government, and what had he advised then? Nothing in the Jews favor, as it was only when he did that he had to flee. So Yisro realized he had erred and required a tikkun, a solution, to achieve teshuva, repentance.

His solution to the bad advice he had given was to offer good advice.

‘13. It came about on the next day that Moses sat down to judge the people, and the people stood before Moses from the morning until the evening.’ (18:13) – after which he offered the solution of having elders judge as well, solving the inefficiency of the judicial system in the state it was in.

The pasuk at 4:22 says: “וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל פַּרְעֹה כֹּה אָמַר ה’ בְּנִי בְכֹרִי יִשְׂרָאֵל”- “You shall say to Pharoah, so says G-d: My firstborn son is Israel”

Rashi writes: “ומדרשו כאן חתם הקב”ה על מכירת הבכורה שלקח יעקב מעשו” - “Here G-d had agreed to the fact that Yaakov had taken the firstborn right from Esav”.

What is the connection here?

The Lev Aryeh explains with the following: The next Pasuk, (verse 23) writes that eventually a plague would come in which the firstborn of each Egyptian household would die.

If we look at Makas Bechoros (plague of the firstborn) in Parshas Bo (12:30) it says: ”כִּי אֵין בַּיִת אֲשֶׁר אֵין שָׁם מֵת” – “In every house there was a death”

Rashi asks, how could every household have a firstborn son? He goes on to explain that the Egyptian wives would commit adultery and have sons with other men, each of these sons would be the oldest to its father, hence when the Torah said that the firstborn would die, it referred to the firstborn of the father not the mother.

“דבר אחר מצריות מזנות תחת בעליהן ויולדות מרווקים פנויים, והיו להם בכורות הרבה, פעמים הם חמשה לאשה אחת, כל אחד בכור לאביו”

Now look at the Pasuk about the famous birth of Yaakov and Esav, in Parshas Toldos (25:26): “וְיָדוֹ אֹחֶזֶת בַּעֲקֵב עֵשָׂו וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יַעֲקֹב”- “His hand was holding unto the heel of Esav, and they called him Yaakov”

Rashi writes:

“נמצא עשו הנוצר באחרונה יצא ראשון, ויעקב שנוצר ראשונה יצא אחרון, ויעקב בא לעכבו שיהא ראשון ללידה כראשון ליצירה, ויפטור את רחמה, ויטול את הבכורה מן הדין” – “Yaakov was created first, but was only born second, so he claimed that he deserves the firstborn rights, because he was created first, therefore he clutched onto the heel of Esav as if to hold him back.”

Rashi explains that Yaakov was created first; i.e. he was the firstborn of his father, but Esav; who was born first, was firstborn to his mother.

So from the plague of the firstborn where we see that “firstborn” refers to the firstborn of the father, and we can bring a proof that Yaakov deserved the right of the firstborn, as he was also firstborn of his father.  That is the link with our original Rashi, showing because of Makas Bechoros, Yaakov was the true firstborn, in that Hashem passed judgment based on the formula Rashi presented at Yakov’s birth of being the father’s first son.

Amazing!

ותאמר שתה אדני ותמהר ותורד כדה על ידה ותשקהו. ותכל להשקותו ותאמר גם לגמליך אשאב עד אם כלו לשתות.

“She [Rivka] said, ‘Drink, my lord,’ and quickly she lowered her jug to her hand and gave him [Eliezer] drink. When she finished giving him drink, she said, ‘I will draw water even for your camels, until they have finished drinking.’” (Chayei Sarah, 24:18, 19)

The pasuk in Devarim 11:15, says,  ונתתי עשב בשדך לבהמתך ואכלת ושבעת– “I shall provide grass in your field for your cattle, and you will eat, and you will be satisfied.” The Gemara in Brachos 40a learns from here that one must feed his animals before feeding himself.

What about drinking? Who comes first?

The Sefer Chassidim (531) learns from our pasukim in Chayei Sarah that humans come first. We see this from Rivka, who first gave Eliezer to drink, and only afterwards did she give the camels.

The Shulchan Aruch (O”C 167:6) is discussing a situation in which a person has already made a bracha on his food, and between that and eating, he discusses something that is of the interests of the meal. In such a case, one does not need to make a new bracha. One of the examples the Shulchan Aruch gives is that one asks someone else to feed his animals. This too is considered “tzaruchei seudah,” as the Gemara says, one must feed his animals before he feeds himself. The Magen Avraham (ibid 18), contrasts this with drinking. In such a situation, if one were to ask another to give his animals to drink, one might (see Machatzis HaShekel) have to make a new bracha. He bases this on the Sefer Chassidim’s limud from Rivka. According to the Sefer Chassidim, since humans come before animals regarding drinking, it would thereby not be tzarchei seudah to discuss giving them to drink first. The Mishna Brurah (ibid 40) brings this Magen Avraham as halacha l’meisah.

The Yad Ephraim (ibid) asks, surely there is a better proof to this Halacha (that regarding drinking humans come before animals), from the pasuk in Parshas Chukas (20:8),והוצאת להם מים מן הסלע והשקית את העדה ואת בעירם – “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” (It seems that his question stems from the fact that this pasuk is after Matan Torah, as opposed to the pasuk in Chayei Sarah. However, the Yad Ephraim obviously did not see the Sefer Chassidim inside, for the Sefer Chassidim does learn from that pasuk as well). He quotes the Ohr HaChaim (in Parshas Chukas and here in Chayei Sarah) who says that we cannot use either of these pasukim as proofs that man comes before animals with regard to drinking, since both are cases where man was in a situation of great thirst. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that one should give man to drink before animals. However, under normal circumstances there is no difference between food and drink; animals come first.

The Kli Chemda (Chayei Sara 4) writes that the Sefer Chassidim meant nothing different than the Ohr HaChaim, that animals always come first unless the human is specifically uncomfortable, be it hunger or thirst. He extracts this by the wording of the Sefer Chassidim: לענין צמאון אדם ובהמה יתנו לאדם תחילה ואח”כ לבהמה – “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we give to man first and afterward to animal.” The Sefer Chassidim does not say לענין שתייה – “regarding drink,” but rather “thirst.” If so, he means exactly as the Ohr HaChaim.

(According to the Kli Chemda a new halacha would appear. That is, specifically one who was not uncomfortably thirsty yet he wanted to have a drink, makes a bracha on his drink. But before taking a sip, he asks of a friend to quickly give his animals to drink. This would be considered tzarchei seuda according to the Kli Chemda’s interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim. One would thereby not be required to make a new bracha. However, for one who is thirsty, this would not be considered tzarchei seudah, and would require a new bracha. This is clearly not how the Magein Avraham and others understood the Sefer Chassidim.)

This suggestion of the Kli Chemda in interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim is difficult to accept, besides for the fact that many other Torah giants did not understand the Sefer Chassidim this way. Surely this is due to the contrast the Sefer Chassidim draws between drink and food. The Sefer Chassidim begins by saying, “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we must give to man first and afterward to animal,” and he continues by sourcing the pasukim in Chayei Sara and Chukas. He then contrasts this as follows: אבל באכילה הבהמה קודמת – “But as for eating, the animal is first,” and he carries on by citing the appropriate pasukim as proofs. Now, according to the Kli Chemda, why does the Sefer Chassidim contrast “thirst” with “eating”? A better contrast would have been “thirst” and “not thirsty,” or “hunger” and “not hungry.” Rather it certainly appears that clearly the Sefer Chassidim’s intention was to differentiate between food and drink, and that by “thirst” he meant “drink,” as all other Achronim understood him.

Other Achronim are bothered with the Sefer Chassidim’s halacha for a reason other than the Ohr HaChaim’s. How can we learn from Rivka who gave Eliezer before the camels if the camels were not her own. It seems clear from the Gemara in Brachos that this halacha to give to animals first is only if they are one’s own animals. There is no notion that one would have to feed every stray cat on the block before sitting down to lunch. If so, Rivka did not have any obligation whatsoever (not even tzar baalei chayim, see Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) to give the camels to drink. Naturally, she gave Eliezer first. And as part of her great altruistic characteristics, she gave the camels too. But how can one see from this story any proof to who comes first in drink between man and animal?

The Chasam Sofer (Toras Moshe, Chayei Sara) brings the Elya Raba who asks this question. The Chasam Sofer explains that really the halacha is not like the Sefer Chassidim, and that even for drink animals come first. He elucidates Rivka’s actions based on the Gemara Baba Metzia 49a, that one can be makneh a small gift just by saying so. There is no requirement for a physical transaction (maiseh kinyan). That is why she said “Drink, my lord,” and quickly gave him to drink even before mentioning giving to camels to drink. She had been makneh just enough water to him to quench his own thirst, but no more, in order to insure that he was not required to give to the camels. Had she said, “I will give you and your camels to drink,” Eliezer would have acquired from her enough water for himself and the camels, and would have had to give the camels first, despite his thirst. Rivka chose her words wisely in order to insure that Eliezer got before the camels.

The Ksav Sofer (Teshuvos, O”C 32) uses his father’s interpretation to illuminate the pasuk in Chukas. “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” He asks, why was it necessary for Hashem to tell Moshe Rabbeinu והשקית – “give drink” to the people? Would it not suffice to say, “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock”?  Once Moshe Rabbeinu had released water from the rock, the people would have been perfectly capable in getting the water themselves. The Ksav Sofer answers that had Hashem just said that, then every individual would have attained water from Hashem and would have been required to give to their animals first. In order to insure that the people themselves would quench their thirst first, Hashem specifically said to Moshe Rabbeinu that he was to give them to drink. Meaning that as the water left the rock it was given by Hashem into Moshe’s possession. Thereby it was not considered to be given to the people directly by Hashem, but rather from Moshe specifically enough for each individual. Thereby they were not required to give their animals first. After their thirst was quenched, they were allowed to have more for their animals. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer and the Ksav Sofer did not see the necessity to learn these pasukim as the Sefer Chassidim did.

In defense of the Sefer Chassidim, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) suggests that clearly Rivka was obligated to do tzedaka towards Eliezer. Inasmuch, her requirement was to do so in the form that Eliezer himself would have needed to do. Meaning, in the same way that had Eliezer had his own water he would have had to give the camels first due to his obligation of tzedaka toward the animals (if the halacha is the same by drink as it is by food, as those who oppose the Sefer Chassidim believe), so too when Rivka was to give water to Eliezer she was to give it to him in the same way that he would have distributed it. Her mitzvah of tzedaka toward Eliezer required her to do that which held preliminary status among his obligations. That is, to give to the camels first, albeit that they were not her own. Since we see that she rather gave to Eliezer first, the Sefer Chassidim learned from here that it must be because the halacha by drinking is that man comes before animal.

A question one might ask on this is, never mind that the camels were not Rivka’s, they weren’t Eliezer’s either! They belonged to Avraham Avinu, as did Eliezer who was his slave. Inasmuch as this halacha did not apply to him, how could Rivka be fulfilling her obligation via his obligation if he didn’t have such an obligation to begin with? The answer to this seems to be, that all these halachos of feeding animals are obligatory not to the monetary owner of the animal, but rather to the one who carries out the feedings (“mizonosav alecha,” see O”C 324:11 and Mishnah Berurah 29). Often, they can be the same person. But in the case of Eliezer, although he was not the monetary owner of the camels, they were given into his care. It was thereby his requirement toward the camels, and thus Rivka’s requirement to act according to Eliezer’s, as Rav Moshe writes. This same idea can be used to redefine the pasuk in Chukas. It was Moshe Rabbeinu’s obligation to give the Jews to drink according to their very own obligation towards their animals. Thus, since he carried this out by first giving the people to drink and only then to their animals, we see that when it comes to drinking, man comes before animals.

(See the Yad Ephraim who explains  על דרך דרושwhy there should be this discrepancy between food and drink.)

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וימח את כל היקום אשר על פני האדמה מאדם עד בהמה עד רמש ועד עוף השמים וימחו מן הארץ וישאר אך נח ואשר אתו בתבה -7:23

“And [ה'] blotted out all existence that was on the face of the ground – from man to animals to creeping things and to the birds of the heavens; and they were blotted out from the earth. Only נח survived, and those with him in the תבה.” (Parshas Noach 7:23)

Rashi quotes the מדרש תנחומא ט that נח was once late in feeding the lion, whereby the animal bit him in the leg. The מדרש deduces this by the word usage “אך” – “only,” as in “Only נח,” which implies a limitation. The “limitation” was in נח himself, namely that a part of him was missing, having been bitten off by the lion. One who reads this ma’mar (saying) of Chazal may wonder, what is this story teaching me? What deeper meaning lies behind this account? We would like to suggest the following:

The Gemara Bava Metzia 85a states: “Whenever R’ Chanina and R’ Chiya were in a dispute, R’ Chanina said to R’ Chiya: ‘Are you disputing with me? If, Heaven forbid, the Torah were to be forgotten in Israel, I would restore it using my argumentative powers.’ R’ Chiya replied to R’ Chanina: ‘Are you disputing with me, who made sure that Torah should not be forgotten in Israel? What did I do? I went and sowed flax, made nets [from the flax], trapped deers, and I fed their meat to orphans, and prepared scrolls [from their skins], upon which I wrote the five books [of Moses]. Then I went to a town [which contained no teachers] and taught the five books to five children, and the six orders [of the Talmud] to six children. And I bade them: ‘Until I return, teach each other the Torah and the Mishna;’ and thus I preserved the Torah from being forgotten in Israel.’  This is what Rebbi [meant when he] said, ‘How great are the works of Chiya!’”

The obvious question is why was it necessary for R’ Chiya to go through all the trouble to obtain his own parchment when he could simply have gone to the marketplace and bought them ready-made. Maharsha (בבא מציעא שם) explains that in commencing something holy, one must be sure that it has a perfectly pure start. Thus, R’ Chiya intended to insure that the continuation of Torah would spread from solid foundations. There was no room for possible improper monetary transactions, or the like, leading to the emergence of the parchment in the marketplace; they needed to be guarded in holiness from the get-go.

However, this idea needs extra clarification. Why really was it so imperative to begin Torah in this fashion? Why was all this necessary? One can explain this using the Mishna in Avos 1:2 “Shimon HaTzadik was from the later members of the Kneses HaGedola. He used to say: ‘The world stands on three things: On the תורה, on the עבודה, and on גמילות חסדים. (Torah, Service [prayer], and Acts of Kindness)’” Rabbeinu Yona in his commentary explains that what the Mishna means that the world “stands” on these three things is that these are the purpose of creation; that creation of the world was to bring about these things. It is obvious then, that if one of these three things were not being perpetuated, there would thereby be no reason for this world to exist. For example, R’ Chaim of Volozhin writes (נפש החיים שער ד’ פרק י”א כ”ו) regarding the study of Torah, that if all Jews all over the globe were to stop learning for even one second, the entire universe would cease to exist. It is for this reason that R’ Chiya needed to take extreme measures to insure the future of תורה learning, for one of the three pillars of the world sure needs impeccable establishment.

With this we can explain the story of נח in the תבה. Firstly, we need to know that it is clear from the מדרש במדבר רבה י”ב י”ב  that the world only stood on one “leg” from creation until מתן תורה, namely גמילות חסדים. This is because the תורה had not yet been given, ruling out Torah, and the משכן had not yet been built (symbolizing עבודה). Now, Rashi (ו:יג) brings the גמ’ סנהדרין קח, that although the generation of the flood was rampant with all sorts of sins, it was only due to their “חמס” – theft and extortion that their fate was sealed. This is certainly a point of contention in commentaries trying to explain why specifically the demise of that generation came via חמס. But with this Midrash all is clear. Because the world at that point stood only – or was created only – for the perpetuation of חסד, therefore specifically by going to the opposite extreme, by robbing and cheating each other, did they meet their end. Without upholding the purpose of the world, there remains no purpose in its existence, as we learned from Rabbi Chaim of Veloshin.

Now we can clarify what we set out to explain. נח, along with his family who were all saved from the fate of the rest of the world, had a very particular job to accomplish in the תבה. What were they to accomplish? That very Rashi we began with tells us based a Midrash, another interpretation of the “לשוןאך : that נח was less of himself. This means that he groaned from the burden of caring for the animals. The תנחומא tells us that all twelve months in the תבה, Noach and his sons did not sleep, for they were needed to feed the animals. Some animals eat only at two hours into the night, some at three hours in, etc. The תנחומא goes on to prove that they did not sleep from the story of נח and the lion, which shows us that נח could not be late to feed an animal. Therefore, since certain animals eat at all different stages of night, we can deduce that they truly did not sleep during their time on board. This certainly needs explanation. If  ‘ה found נח to be righteous among his generation to warrant his survival as opposed to all others, why trouble נח during the duration of the flood to such an extent? Surely ה’ can do anything, and could have sustained the animals by Himself, without inconveniencing נח. So why not simply allow him to enjoy the free cruise?

To answer this we need to keep in mind the cause for the destruction of that generation. We explained that at that time there was yet but one purpose to the world: גמילות חסדים – acts of kindness, and they overturned that pillar, thereby causing their own annihilation. We would like to suggest that נח’s “job” as we described it above, was to rectify and reestablish גמילות חסדים; to rebalance the world on its shaky single leg. He could not lay back and enjoy the cruise, he had work to do. In rebalancing the world with גמילות חסדים, נח needed not only to feed one animal from time to time, but to go to great lengths, even by not sleeping for an entire year, to feed all animals all the time. All this was necessary to counter the severity of the destruction to the pillar of גמילות חסדים caused by his generation. This is congruent to the story of R’ Chiya who also exhausted great efforts in establishing the pillar of Torah.

Then, at one point נח came late. This was a great sin on his level. He was the one chosen to perpetuate גמילות חסדים, and his actions thereby needed to be on a high level of perfection. Being late was not an option. The lion sent this message to נח by biting him. In striving to rebalance the world, imperfection could not be afforded. It is implied in the תנחומא that the lion bit נח in the leg, as it says that נח left limping. The symbolism is clear; the message was that in reestablishing the “leg” of the world there must not be any blemishes. There is an old joke: “Why do flamingos stand on one leg? Because if they lift it, they’ll fall.” In causing נח to limp, he was reminded of just how delicate his world was, standing on it’s one “leg,” it’s one purpose – גמילות חסדים. It may only be one “leg” but it would sustain the world. The world needed נח’s גמילות חסדים on the תבה to be done on a perfect level. The lion bite was a תיקון for his slight infraction. The world had a leg to stand on, a purpose, in חסד.

As heard from R’ Yakov Minkus
 
ז. זְכֹר יְמוֹת עוֹלָם בִּינוּ שְׁנוֹת דּוֹר וָדוֹר שְׁאַל אָבִיךָ וְיַגֵּדְךָ זְקֵנֶיךָ וְיֹאמְרוּ לָךְ
7. Remember the days of old; reflect upon the years of [other] generations. Ask your father, and he will tell you; your elders, and they will inform you.
  
טז. יַקְנִאֻהוּ בְּזָרִים בְּתוֹעֵבֹת יַכְעִיסֻהוּ
16. They provoked His zeal with alien worship; they made Him angry with abominations deeds.

Ha’azinu is a repetition of history and everything that happened in the Torah so far for example:
 
The first letters in the first 4 psukim are:
ה = הַאֲזִינוּ
י =  יַעֲרֹף 
כ = כִּי
ה = הַצּוּר 
 
These four letter equal a gematria of 40, corresponding to the letter מ.  The 5th pasuk starts with a  שֶׁ and the sixth starts with a ‘ה’.     
מ + ש + ה = משה 
 
The Midrash Tanchuma says that an author usually writes his name at the end of his book. If we apply this here then Ha’azinu seems to be the end of the Torah, even though on first glance it seems that the parsha of V’Zos Habracha is the final parsha. However, if we look into it then we will see that in fact, V’Zos Habracha is not a halachic or historical parsha, it is ’merely’ Moshe’s farewell speech to the Jewish People and his Brachos to them.

In last week’s parsha, Nitzavim-Vayelech, it says, ‘כִּתְבוּ…הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת’.

In this weeks parsha it says, ‘הַאֲזִינוּ הַשָּׁמַיִם…וְתִשְׁמַע הָאָרֶץ’ Finally, in the beginning of the Torah, parshas Bereishis it says, ‘ א. בְּרֵאשִׁית בָּרָא אֱ־לֹהִים אֵת הַשָּׁמַיִם וְאֵת הָאָרֶץ: The Sefer Yetzira says that the end of an era, or in this case, the Torah, reflects the beginning.

There is an argument as to whether the instruction of ‘כִּתְבוּ…הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת’ is on Ha’azinu, or the whole torah. However, if we bring in the fact that the end should reflect the beginning, it is not a question, or an argument because they are inextricably linked and, essentially, one and the same.

There is a ‘יסוד’ – a ‘secret insight’ about the importance of Heaven and Earth, of שמים וארץ. In their essence, they interact through גשם – rain and the water cycle reflects this interaction, as we will now explain:

 
ג. כִּי שֵׁם יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֶקְרָא הָבוּ גֹדֶל לֵאלֹהֵינוּ
3. When I call out the name of the Lord, ascribe greatness to our God. (Devarim 32:3)
The Rambam explains, ‘כִּי שֵׁםה’ is in שמים and ’הָבוּ גֹדֶל’ is on the ארץ. Effectively, this means that we have בכירה - a free will to see the physical in this world, elevate it in our own way and aquire the ability to be spiritual. Creating our own spirituality through the pre-existing physicality of the world.
Rain, in its being, improves, fixes, nourishes and revitalises everything it ’touches’  and this is the ’שפע’ – ‘goodness’ from שמים that provides production in the world.

We, in our own way, can connect to שמים through two different mediums - תורה and תפילה.

Why do we daven for rain? For the obvious reason that we are not looking for the physical aspect – but for the recognition of Hashem’s hand and part in our day to day physical lives.
Through תפילה, we connect to שמים and bring it down to ארץ, and through תורה we elevate the world and bring it up to שמים
Rain has two states of being. One of them being the vapor state, where moisture evaporates and ‘rises’ into the sky, and it condenses and ‘descends’ to earth.

Ha’azinu is the summary of the purpose of creation - history has proven that when we acheive this function of linking שמים וארץ, life unfolds pleasantly, and when there hasn’t been a link, there has been devastation and destruction.

 
אז הוחל: (לשון חולין) לקרא את שמות האדם ואת שמות העצבים בשמו של הקב”ה לעשותן עבודה זרה ולקרותן אלהות:
Then it became common: הוּחַל, is an expression of חוּלִין – profaneness: to name people and idols with the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, to make them idols and to call them deities. (Bereishis 4:26)
During the time of the דור ענוש there was a lot of עבודה זרה. Shamayim was ‘stopped’ and as a result the seas swelled and consumed a third of the earth – thus proving that when we sin through שמים/ תפילה we get punished through the ארץ. 
 
On the other hand, during the דור המבול the Jews sinned through the land and therefore, suffered punishment through the שמים – it rained for 40 days and 40 nights. Thus proving that when we sin through ארץ  we get punished through שמים.
 
The Zohar says that the דור המבול should have received the תורה.    
 
120 years of שת’s life was taken in order for נח to be able to wait 120 years.  Then there was the 40 days of rain which was נגד הר סיני, and when הר סיני happened, people thought there would be another מבול.

‘Vatishaches ha’aretz’ - The תורה was there to be able to elevate the physical.

Hashem broke up the world into nations, and the Jews were the link בין שמים וארץ.
In the מדבר, and when we had the ananei hakavod with us, we were with hashem, and truly experienced שמים on the ארץ on our level. When we got to ארץ ישראל, we experienced an ארץ elevated closer to שמים.
If or when we lose ארץ ישראל, we lose the connection between שמים וארץ, and the other nations will have the power to overtake and dominate us.
 
To conclude, the pasuk says, ‘הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת’  and we asked, ’is it ספר תורה or תפילה?’, the answer is that it is both. When we sing it as a prayer, its שמים בארץ. When we learn it, its ארץ לשמים.

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Eikev 7:12, וְהָיָה עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן אֵת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים הָאֵלֶּה וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְשָׁמַר ה’ אֱלֹ-ךָ לְךָ אֶת הַבְּרִית וְאֶת הַחֶסֶד אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ: And it will be, because you will heed these ordinances and keep them and perform, that the Lord, your God, will keep for you the covenant and the kindness that He swore to your forefathers.

תִּשְׁמְעוּן (you will listen) is written in plural, but לְךָ (for you) is written in singular. Why does the subject of the pasuk (verse) change?

There is a famous story in Gemara Shabbos 31a. A gentile once approached Shamai and offered to convert if Shamai would teach him all of Torah while he (the gentile) was standing on one leg. Shamai threw a piece of rubble from a building at him, interpreting the gentile’s words as mockery. The gentile approached Hillel and put forward the same request. Hillel said “וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ”: you shall love your neighbor as yourself.

We need to understand the premise of the gentile’s question. Clearly, his request to learn Torah on one leg is an absurd request to ask of the greatest Rabbis alive. In addition, Hillel’s response also requires some explanation. How does his answer include all the mitzvos, such as Shabbos, tefillin, bris mila, mezuzah etc.?

Sefer Beis Shmuel quotes the Arizal, who states that every Jew must perform every single one of the 613 mitzvos, or their soul returns in another form (gilgul) to complete the missing mitzvos.

Bamidbar 22:28, וַיִּפְתַּח ה’ אֶת פִּי הָאָתוֹן וַתֹּאמֶר לְבִלְעָם מֶה עָשִׂיתִי לְךָ כִּי הִכִּיתַנִי זֶה שָׁלֹשׁ רְגָלִים: The Lord opened the mouth of the she-donkey, and she said to Bilam, “What have I done to you that you have struck me these three times?“ The key to our understanding lies in the word רְגָלִים. Although it is usually interpreted as ‘legs’, it is interpreted as ‘times’ in the verse above.

The aforementioned Arizal begs for an explanation. It is impossible to accomplish all 613 mitzvos; many are mutually exclusive (ie – specific to gender, age, kohanim (priests), levi’ites, kings, during the time of the Temple etc.). Does this mean that everyone comes back as a gilgul many, many times so that they could fulfill each and every mitzva in the Torah? No. This was precisely what the gentile was asking – teach me Torah on one רגל – in one lifetime, with no gilgul.

Shamai beat him with a part of a building as an allusion. A building has many floors. Unless it has many floors, it’s not called a building. Torah has many, many levels, and many, many mitzvos. Unless you accomplish them all, you haven’t fulfilled your role in this world. Shamai was telling the gentile that the Torah cannot be actualised in one lifetime; it is impossible to be able to fulfill each and every mitzva.

Hillel pushed the idea of achdus (literally, unity). His directive of וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ meant that once you have achdus, the rest of the Torah just details specific actions you need to carry out. By uniting into one, we become כאיש אחד בלב אחד – as one man with one heart. If one person performs a mitzva, the rest are included in his mitzva. (Just as when a man dons tefillin we don’t say that his arm or head is wearing tefillin, we say he is wearing tefilin – he is one entity.) In three simple words, Hillel explained to the gentile how to perform Torah instructions. Since we are all united, and our mitzvos are shared with the rest of Klal Yisroel, together, as a unit, we are able to fulfill all 613 mitzvos!

The pasuk says, וּשְׁמַרְתֶּם וַעֲשִׂיתֶם (keep them and perform) in the plural form, which we can understand to mean that we need to keep and perform the mitzvos in unity. וְשָׁמַר (will keep for you – singular) connotes that one cannot perform all of the mitzvos, but each person must keep what they can, and will be rewarded as such!

Sefer Divrei Shaul quotes a Gemara in Uktzin that says that the only receptacle for G-d’s blessing is peace, as it says in Tehillim 29:11, ה’ עֹז לְעַמּוֹ יִתֵּן ה’ יְבָרֵךְ אֶת-עַמּוֹ בַשָּׁלוֹם: The Lord shall grant strength to His people; the Lord shall bless His people with peace. עֹז (strength) is the Torah. We can ask our original question of how we can each person can fully perform the mitzvos of the Torah. The answer is as we said - through unity - and the only way to achieve true unity is through shalom (peace). Via shalom and achdus, we can come together and fulfill the Torah in it’s entirety.

This explains why it was necessary to be כאיש אחד בלב אחד at Har Sinai (Mount Sinai – the giving of the Torah); without the unity, there would be no point in receiving a Torah we could not fulfill.

In conclusion, we are all considered to have done all the mitzvos, but how are we rewarded? Reward for mitzvos is not given in this world, so where do we see this manifested? The only reward we get is according to the exertion that was put into performing the mitzva.

According to what we now know, we have a great answer. עֵקֶב תִּשְׁמְעוּן is plural, as performance of mitzvos is collective when we are united. The subject changes to singular - לְךָ – to refer to the reward that is personal, based on the effort and exertion you personally put in when fulfilling mitzvos.

Rav Dessler refers to beis Shamai (lit. house of Shamai – his school of thought) as din (judgement), and beis Hillel as rachamim (mercy).  Rav Zevin refers to them as potential vs actual, while others bring the idea of shomayim (heaven) and oretz (earth). Most of the machlokes (disputes) between Hillel and Shammai are along a fixed criterion. Shammai ruled on how things ought to be l’chatchila (in Heavenly ideal), and Hillel ruled based on metzius (what we have before us). Shamai was saying that l’chatchila, each of us must perform all 613 mitzvos, and return numerous times in a gilgul. Hillel said that one can get around this l’chatchila with the b’dieved of achdus!

Disclaimer – this is not a license to do as we please with the mindset of,  ’we love Jews, so therefore we have achdus so I can do what I like and technically be fulfilling all the mitzvos still!’ This is wrong. This concept only applies to mitzvos that are impossible for us to fulfill personally (mutual exclusivity as opposed to “I don’t feel like it”).

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Rashi says that we don’t want Bilam‘s blessing, as we don’t want the bee’s sting or it’s honey. Rashi asks where the leap is from realizing it would be fruitless to curse them, to actually wanting to bless them.  The question makes it difficult to understand the parable; if you don’t get stung, of course you want the honey!
R’ Yosef Shwartz (the Giznei Yosef) explains that the reason behind the fact that Rivka’s family had blessed her, and she became barren. From here its clear that an evil person’s blessings are not fulfilled and in this case, it was, to the degree that the blessing was, in effect, a curse.
This was Bilam‘s intention. He would NOT be miskayem (fulfilling) the blessing, as was the case with Rivka! Clearly this blessing (honey) has the sting in the tail! Therefore, Rashi’s nimshal (explanation of the connection of the story to the matter at hand) is very apt indeed!
The difference is that Rivka’s family blessed her and this is the source that an evil person’s blessing is not mekuyam (fulfilled), to the degree that she became barren. But the Jews were already blessed by Hashem, so Bilam‘s “blessing” couldn’t not be  fulfilled as it was after the fact they were chosen and blessed! That’s why it says, “I (God) have blessed them” – so your “blessing” can’t have an effect one way or another!

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The Torah seems to make a big deal about the Ananei Hakavod (clouds of glory) and commands us to commemorate them with the holiday of Succos. There seems to be no big deal about the manna or Be’er  Miriam (well of Miriam). Why are the Ananei Hakavod given more ‘attention’ than the manna or Be’er Miriam, which were also great miracles?
There are three answers given to the above question:

1. Food and water are the barest of necessities for survival. Hashem took us out to a desert; of course He would feed us! Shelter is not crucial for survival and could therefore be classified as ‘lifnim meshuras hadin’ (above and beyond the measure of the law).

2. The clouds were exclusive. They were a special gift from Hashem to His Chosen nation, but only those who were worthy, benefitted. (The Erev Rav and people inflicted with tzora’as (leprosy)did not benefit)

3. The clouds, the manna, and the water from Be’er Miriam were all given as free gifts. The Jews complained and made requests regarding the water and food (ie-slav) but they never complained about the clouds. The clouds were the perfect gift.

The Chida says that these three answers are hinted to in Parshas Emor 23:43: לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי הֹ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם:  In order that your ensuing generations should know that I had the children of Israel live in booths when I took them out of the land of Egypt. I am the Lord, your God.

לְמַעַן יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתי – I, (Hashem) gave it to you as a gift.
אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל- I gave it to the Jews (not the Erev Rav).
בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם אֲנִי ה’ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם- I took you out of Egypt, so I was obligated to feed you.

Based on a shiur by R’ Yehoshua Hartman

זִכָּרוֹן לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִקְרַב אִישׁ זָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן הוּא לְהַקְטִיר קְטֹרֶת לִפְנֵי הֹ’ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה כְקֹרַח וְכַעֲדָתוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר ה’ בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה לוֹ – As a reminder for the children of Israel, so that no outsider, who is not of the seed of Aaron, shall approach to burn incense before the Lord, so as not to be like Korach and his company, as the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe. (17:5)

Rashi says: כאשר דבר ה’ ביד משה לו: ומהו ביד משה ולא כתב אל משה, רמז לחולקים על הכהונה שלוקין בצרעת, כמו שלקה משה בידו שנאמר (שמות ד, ו) ויוציאה והנה ידו מצורעת כשלג, ועל כן לקה עוזיה בצרעת – As the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe: So what is the meaning of “by the hand of Moshe”? Why not just simply “to Moshe”? It alludes to those who rebel against the kehunah. They are stricken with tzara’as , as it says, “and he took it out, and behold, his hand was ‘leprous,’ like snow” (Exod. 4:6). For this reason, Uzziah was stricken with tzara’as. — [Midrash Tanchuma Tzav 11]

Hashem said to put pans on the altar to remind us not to be like Korach. Hashem instructs ‘by the hand of Moshe’. Rashi points that this is literal – one who argues with kehuna suffers tzara’as like Moshe did on his hand, and he adds that Uzziah Hamelech offered up spices and got tzara’as too.

Why did Moshe get it? He had spoken Loshon Hora and said the Jews wouldn’t listen. But what’s the comparison? He didn’t get it for rebelling against the kehuna… So why is Moshe’s example mentioned here?… It should have been compared to Miriam’s tzara’as which was the sidra before Korach, not to Moshe’s instance that occurred in Shemos.

So where’s the Midah Kneged Midah?

Rashi (17:1) says on וַיִּקַּח קֹרַח that he seperated himself to argue. The Maharal asks why doesn’t it say וַיִּקַּח at every argument then, if this is it’s actual meaning?

The Maharal says a regular machlokes is one man against another man, but they are equal, are there is no distinct separation between the two. But kehuna, the priesthood, has the entire nation reliant on it. The kehuna do our korbanos, birchas Kohanim, so if one goes against them, they’re really seperating themselves from the nation, as the nation be definition identify with the priesthood.

TheMaharal explains that the method for dealing with tzara’as is to be sent chutz lamachaneh – excommunication. The afflicted is on one side, everyone else on the other (in the camp). Moshe didn’t get tzaraas for arguing against kehuna, but for complaining about the entire Jewish nation and therefore this is the same formula as one who argues against the priesthood! So Moshe is a good source for tzara’as as a punishment for arguing against kehuna!

But what about Uzziah Hamelech, who got tzara’as on his forehead (see Divrei Hayamim). Where’s the midah kneged midah there?

The Maharal says that if all the Jews were one body, the king would be the heart, Sanhedrin the eyes, and the kehuna would be the forehead that has the brain behind it, the Tzitz on it, and soul on it. He brought incense when it wasn’t his place to, thereby challenging the authority of the kohanim – and he got tzara’as, the punishment for this sin, and the place was afflicted was his forehead – the part of the body that correlates to the kehuna!

In Kodshim (the entire topic of spirituality, sacrifices, priesthood etc) there is a concept called “avodoson mechanchosom”, – that an item’s initial use in a service makes it holy and fit to use for that very service.

The First Temple had the shemen Hamishcha – anointing oil – to use on the instruments, thereby making them holy, and subsequently fit for service.

The Second Temple however, did not have the shemen Hamishcha, so the Gemara in Menachos queries how exactly they used items in the service if they hadn’t been sanctified by the oil, and it answers that avodoson mechanchosom – that their use as holy items intrinsically made them holy.

In our sidra, Ahron, Korach and his cohorts (inc. 250 of the greatest Jews of the generation) are commanded to take brand new pans, put on the same ketores - incense – and Hashem would choose which to accept. Ahron’s was accepted, and Korach, Dasan and Aviram are sucked into the earth on which they stood, and the 250 men are consumed by a fire. And what of the pans used? Korach and co.’s were sucked into the earth, as all their possessions went down with their owners. But the pans of the 250 great men, who did not have evil intentions, but wanted all Jews to have access to the spirituality of the service:
(more…)

Towards the end of the sedra (11:25-29), we find a puzzling story. The elders are prophesying when the ‘spirit of Hashem rests on them’. Two men in particular continue to prophesy after the others stop. A lad (Gershom, according to the commentaries) runs to Moshe to tell him that ‘אלדד ומידד מתנבאים במחנה‘ – ‘Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp’. Yehoshua speaks up and says to Moshe – ‘imprison them!’ Moshe retorts that he wishes everyone would be a prophet like that. End of episode.

Leaving aside the issue of the significance of it’s being in the middle of the quail story, why the big deal about Eldad and Medad? Indeed, Moshe’s reply is a no-brainer, is it not? What is wrong with prophesying? And why the extra word במחנה - where else would they be?

Rashi furnishes us with the first part of the answer, by quoting the Gemara in Sanhedrin that they were saying משה מת,יהושע מכניס – Moshe will die and Yehoshua will take them into Israel. At this point, Yehoshua – quite rightly – takes great umbrage at this outrageous statement. Moshe calms him by pointing out the prophetic nature of their words.

But where does the Gemara get the idea that these were the words of Eldad and Medad?

A beautiful idea is brought down by the Maharil Diskin which hints at the source. Let’s take a look at Moshe’s beginning to find a hint at the potential end of his life. When Moshe is born Pharaoh’s daughter names him as Moshe – ‘כי מן המים משיתהו‘ – for I drew him out of the water. Surely to get the name משה, it wasn’t specific on the water, but rather on the fact that she drew from water in general. In other words, it could have said ממים משיתהו – ‘I drew him out from water’. We have an extra נ and ה as a result.

Looking again at our parsha, we see that Eldad and Medad were prophesying במחנה - meaning ‘with מח נה‘ or ‘rub out the נה‘. “So what?” you may ask. But if we leave out those two letters, we are left with ממים…which stands for משה מת יהושע מכניס

[N.B. - I just wonder whether it may also explain the refence to Yehoshua in our parsha as 'serving Moshe from his youth' - i.e. the fact that he got this very message!]

Based on a shiur by R’ Yehoshua Hartman

Avraham is blessed by Hashem after the Akeida at Mt. Moriah:
כִּי בָרֵךְ אֲבָרֶכְךָ וְהַרְבָּה אַרְבֶּה אֶת זַרְעֲךָ כְּכוֹכְבֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם וְכַחוֹל אֲשֶׁר עַל שְׂפַת הַיָּם וְיִרַשׁ זַרְעֲךָ אֵת שַׁעַר אֹיְבָיו - That I will surely bless you, and I will greatly multiply your seed as the stars of the heavens and as the sand that is on the seashore, and your descendants will inherit the cities of their enemies. (Bereishis 22:17)

Lavan blesses Rivka as she leaves to marry Yitzchak:

וַיְבָרֲכוּ אֶת רִבְקָה וַיֹּאמְרוּ לָהּ אֲחֹתֵנוּ אַתְּ הֲיִי לְאַלְפֵי רְבָבָה וְיִירַשׁ זַרְעֵךְ אֵת שַׁעַר שֹׂנְאָיו – And they blessed Rebecca and said to her, “Our sister, may you become thousands of myriads, and may your seed inherit the cities of those who hate you.” (24:60)

Rashi informs us that Lavan is paraphrasing Avraham’s bracha.

If Lavan is paraphrasing, why is the terminology different, and if there is a difference between the two blessings, what is the difference between אֹיְבָיו/enemies and שֹׂנְאָיו/those who hate you?

Our parsha says:

וַיְהִי בִּנְסֹעַ הָאָרֹן וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה קוּמָה ה’ וְיָפֻצוּ אֹיְבֶיךָ וְיָנֻסוּ מְשַׂנְאֶיךָ מִפָּנֶיךָ – So it was, whenever the ark set out, Moses would say, Arise, O Lord, may Your enemies be scattered and may those who hate You flee from You.

Rashi says: ויפוצו אויביך: המכונסין – May Your enemies be scattered: Those [enemies] who are assembled [for battle].

וינסו משנאיך: אלו הרודפים - (may) Those who hate You flee:  These are pursuers.

We can draw a distinction between an enemy and one who hates you now. The word אויב is is similar in root to the word אוהב - to love. Both verbs are a result of being together.  A שונא however, is someone who hates someone even when they are nowhere near them, and will pursue them.

This is hinted to by Rashi, where he writes אלו - these, ie they are close enough to be pointed out.

Eisav is referred to as Soneh Yisrael, and Yishmael is referred to as Oyev Yisrael.

Our situation with the Arabs reflects this – if we’d been in Uganda, there would be no problems, and vice versa – the situation is a result of being together. Conversely, Hitler and the Nazis had little or nothing to with Jews, and yet they hated us, and hunted us down across the globe, truly the definition of a רודף – but the terminology used in the Torah reflects the sad reality of our situation today.

To be really Geshmack: we asked why Rivka and Avraham received different brachos. At Mt. Moriah, the bracha was to Avraham, so the bracha was for Yitzchak, regarding his other son Yishmael – and Yishmael is an אויב, therefore the pasuk says שַׁעַר אֹיְבָיו. In contrast, Rivka received a bracha that was for Yakov regarding Esav, and Esav is a שונא, and therefore the pasuk says שַׁעַר שֹׂנְאָיו!

Interestingly:

-Ramban points out that at Avrahams bracha that was the first time there was a promise of Moshiach

-Baal Haturimpoints out that the final mention of Yishmael is עַל פְּנֵי כָל אֶחָיו נָפָל – right at the end of Chayei Sara (25:18). The following pasuk is the beginning of Toldos - וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת יִצְחָק בֶּן אַבְרָהָם - Baal Haturim writes that the ultimate rise of Moshiach is tied to the fall of Yishmael.

A very short Dvar Torah for Parshas Naso:

וְלָקַח הַכֹּהֵן מַיִם קְדֹשִׁים בִּכְלִי חָרֶשׂ וּמִן הֶעָפָר אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בְּקַרְקַע הַמִּשְׁכָּן יִקַּח הַכֹּהֵן וְנָתַן אֶל הַמָּיִם - The kohen shall take holy water in an earthen vessel, and some earth from the Mishkan floor, the kohen shall take and put it into the water. (5:17)

וְכָתַב אֶת הָאָלֹת הָאֵלֶּה הַכֹּהֵן בַּסֵּפֶר וּמָחָה אֶל מֵי הַמָּרִים – Then the kohen shall write these curses (containing G-d’s name) on a scroll and erase it in the bitter water. (5:23)

The ingredients to the concoction the Sotah is made to drink are: 1. Water, 2. Earth, 3. G-d’s name (- Rashi points out that the paper with G-d’s name is inserted into the water so it dissolves in the water is so that since she may confess before needing to drink it, we should wait until the last moment to avoid erasing G-d’s name in vain). What is the meaning and significance of these three ingredients?

The Mishna in Avos (3:1) says: עקביה בן מהללאל אומר, הסתכל בשלושה דברים, ואין אתה בא לידי עבירה–דע מאיין באת, ולאיין אתה הולך, ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון:  מאיין באת, מליחה סרוחה.  ולאיין אתה הולך, למקום רימה ותולעה.  ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון, לפני מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא – Akavia the son of Mahalalel would say: Reflect upon three things and you will not come to the hands of transgression. Know from where you came, where you are going, and before whom you are destined to give a judgement and accounting. From where you came–from a putrid drop of liquid (correlates to water); where you are going–to a place of dust, maggots and worms (correlates to earth); and before whom you are destined to give a judgement and accounting–before the supreme King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be He. (G-d’s name).

Timeless lesson – never forget the mishna!

Geshmack short Dvar Torah or what? :)

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