Archive for the ‘49. Ki Seitzei’ Category

The laws of a Ben Sorer Umoreh, a rebellious son, are given in this week’s parsha:

יח. כִּי יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם יט. וְתָפְשׂוּ בוֹ אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֹתוֹ אֶל זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ וְאֶל שַׁעַר מְקֹמוֹ כ. וְאָמְרוּ אֶל זִקְנֵי עִירוֹ בְּנֵנוּ זֶה סוֹרֵר וּמֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקֹלֵנוּ זוֹלֵל וְסֹבֵא כא. וּרְגָמֻהוּ כָּל אַנְשֵׁי עִירוֹ בָאֲבָנִים וָמֵת וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּ

18. If a man has a wayward and rebellious son, who does not obey his father or his mother, and they chasten him, and [he still] does not listen to them. 19. his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out to the elders of his city, and to the gate of his place. 20. And they shall say to the elders of his city, “This son of ours is wayward and rebellious; he does not obey us; [he is] a glutton and a guzzler.” 21. And all the men of his city shall pelt him to death with stones, and he shall die. So shall you clear out the evil from among you, and all Israel will listen and fear.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin 71a states that a Ben Sorer Umoreh never happened, and never will. Why is it in the Torah then? So that we will analyse it and be rewarded.

The underlying reason that a Ben Sorer Umoreh would ostensibly have a death sentence is that it is better for him to die innocent, than guilty of murder later in life. But the Torah sets an impossible condition – the parents have to be united in every regard that their son be sentenced to death -no parent would out themselves through this. Furthermore, the age at which Ben Sorer Umoreh applies is limited to the three months after his 13th birthday, he needs to have stolen a certain amount of meat, itself cooked a particular way, he needs to have drunk a certain amount of wine, all on his fathers property.

R’ Moshe Mordechai Epstein has great difficulty with the restrictions to the application of Ben Sorer Umoreh. Furthermore, the reward the Gemara discusses cannot be that we will study more Torah – that is not a reason to be in the Torah, in addition to which, even if it were left out, in a thousand years a person could not hope to complete the entire Torah – the Torah was not short on material that it needed “filler”. This compels him to conclude that the mitzvah of Ben Sorer Umoreh has a more subtle reward than the ability to just have more Torah to study.

By studying this episode, one discovers the Torah’s approach to parenting, to raise them correctly, and if they stray, how to correct them.

When a child is overindulged, it is detrimental to him and society. The Ben Sorer Umoreh is someone who is out of control from the outset of adolescence, and the Torah tells us to learn from it. This is what the pasuk means when it says ובערת הרע בקרבך, וכל ישראל ישמעו ויראו -destroy the evil in your midst, and all of Yisrael will see and fear. The Torah wants us to be balanced individuals, and not wild, carefree and selfish, and tasks us with preventing evil in our children, before it is too late. We should learn from the Ben Sorer Umoreh as the paradigm of what not to do – וכל ישראל ישמעו.

If I may, I would like to suggest that the Gemara itself hinted at this. The Gemara said that the function of Ben Sorer Umoreh was דרוש וקבל שכר – analyse it and receive reward. The Gemara did not say למוד, to study it, but דרוש, analyse it. This is itself וכל ישראל ישמעו, that we learn from the Ben Sorer Umoreh to raise balanced children.

The pasuk says דַּבֵּר אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִקְחוּ לִי תְּרוּמָה מֵאֵת כָּל אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יִדְּבֶנּוּ לִבּוֹ תִּקְחוּ אֶת תְּרוּמָתִי – Speak to the children of Israel, and have them take to Me an offering; from every person whose heart inspires him to generosity, you shall take My offering. (25:2)

The Midrash says that this pasuk is the same as the pasuk in Mishlei 4:2 כִּי לֶקַח טוֹב, נָתַתִּי לָכֶם; תּוֹרָתִי, אַל-תַּעֲזֹבוּ – For I gave you good teaching; forsake not My instruction.

The Midrash explains that this means that when we were given the Torah, Hashem was included as part of the deal, as it were. There is a parable here to which we can relate.

A powerful king had an only child, the princess. (more…)

Jewish law is often misrepresented as being focused on retribution and having an almost sadistic desire for violent punishment: nothing could be further from the truth. It does, in fact, demonstrate many ways to be acquitted as well as ways of rehabilitation for the offender. The essence of rehabilitation is clearly seen in this weeks parsha. Note the following:

כִּי-יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים, וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם; וְהִצְדִּיקוּ, אֶת-הַצַּדִּיק, וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ, אֶת-הָרָשָׁע. וְהָיָה אִם-בִּן הַכּוֹת, הָרָשָׁע–וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו, כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּראַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ, לֹא יֹסִיף:  פֶּן-יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל-אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה, וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ 

 If there is a quarrel between men, and they approach the tribunal, and they [the judges] judge them, and they acquit the innocent one and condemn the guilty one. and it shall be, if the guilty one has incurred [the penalty of] lashes, that the judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him, commensurate with his crime, in number.  He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed, lest he give him a much more severe flogging than these [forty lashes], and your brother will be degraded before your eyes.  (Deut. 25: 1-3)
For a number of reasons there are many Halachic discussions of these verses; but for now we can look at the change of name of the offender. The verses start by calling the accused הָרָשָׁע-the evil one then quite quickly use the friendly name of אָחִיךָ-your brother. The Sifri on this pasuk understands this apparent misnomer to be teaching us a moral lesson. Namely, that once the Offender has accepted punishment he is once again part of our people, connected by Ahavas Yisroel.

Practically speaking in halachah, while someone is considered a רָשָׁע they are excommunicated. That is, they are forbidden from taking part in religious ceremonies and also from civil law (for example giving testimony in court). Yet when the person has undergone the prescribed punishment his religious and civil rights and obligations are reinstated as a full member of Am Yisroel. This led to a specific enactment by the sages, known as “takkanat ha-shavim”, a rule designed to remove any obstacles to repentance.

An example of this is found in massechet Gittin (5:5): “If a beam which was acquired by robbery has been built into a building, restitution for it may be made in money so as not to put obstacles in the way of penitents.” The rule is, that in a case of robbery, the guilty party must return what he has taken to the rightful owner (Lev. 5:23). This makes obvious sense. If a thief were merely allowed to make a monetary compensation rather than return the stolen object, the law would, in effect, allow someone to acquire an object – albeit at a price – through unlawful means. That is clearly morally wrong, even to an atheist. Yet this rule was suspended for cases where returning the stolen object would cause the thief to incur a massive loss. This is the case in the Mishnah in Gittin; in order to restore the actual beam to its rightful owner the thief would have to demolish his own house. Although the sense of guilt at the original crime might induce remorse in the thief and an effort to return stolen goods; Nonetheless, if this would involve disproportionate loss the thief might decide that restitution was too dear and decide against giving the object back. “So what?”, even a fairly reasonable man might say. “Surely the thief, by breaking the law, has forfeited any claim on the courts’ clemency. What matters is the right of the original owner of the beam- not the rights of the thief”. Yet Jewish law ruled otherwise. To be sure, the owner must be compensated for his loss, for without this he would have suffered an injustice. But we must have concern for the offender too, and must remove obstacles to becoming a law-abiding person.

Our sages went further still. In Massechet Bava Kama (94b) we find a remarkable principle: “if robbers or usurers [repent, and of their own accord] are prepared to restore what they have wrongly taken, it is not right to accept it from them, and one who does so is not acting with the approval of the sages.” This does not apply to a convicted criminal – only a person who has, without any prompting other than a guilty conscience, has decided to confess and make amends. This is “brought down” by Rambam (Hilchot Gezelah 1:13): “Even though robbing someone is like taking their life…we must help [a thief who repents on his own accord] and pardon him in order to bring him to the right path.

There are other principles articulated by the sages which help an ‘offender’ to atone for his misdeeds and feel fully accepted back by Klal Yisroel (not referring to his criminal past to take one example). These teachings were ahead of their times as justice in ancient times was not tempered with mercy, but like so many of the moral truths given to our forefathers on Har Sinai, they are radical and eternal. Jewish law is concerned not only to protect the rights of those who have been wronged, but also to help the offenders rebuild their lives. Only acts are forever wicked, never a person; and we put this into practice by welcoming the penitent back as our brother and equal

י. כִּי תֵצֵא לַמִּלְחָמָה עַל אֹיְבֶיךָ וּנְתָנוֹ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּיָדֶךָ וְשָׁבִיתָ שִׁבְיוֹ

10. If you go out to war against your enemies, and the Lord, your God, will deliver him into your hands, and you take his captives
יא. וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה אֵשֶׁת יְפַת תֹּאַר וְחָשַׁקְתָּ בָהּ וְלָקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה:
11. and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her, you may take [her] for yourself as a wife. Rashi says:

 יאולקחת לך לאשה: לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע. שאם אין הקב”ה מתירה ישאנה באיסור. אבל אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה, שנאמר אחריו (פסוק טו) כי תהיין לאיש וגו’ וסופו להוליד ממנה בן סורר ומורה, לכך נסמכו פרשיות הללו -

You may take [her] for yourself as a wife: [Not that you are commanded to take this woman as a wife,] but Scripture [in permitting this marriage] is speaking only against the evil inclination [, which drives him to desire her]. For if the Holy One, blessed is He, would not permit her to him, he would take her illicitly. [The Torah teaches us, however, that] if he marries her, he will ultimately come to despise her, as it says after this,“If a man has [two wives-one beloved and the other despised]” he will ultimately father through her a wayward and rebellious son. For this reason, these passages are juxtaposed.]

The Rambam says that the pasuk’s instruction of ‘yefas to’ar‘ is a mitzva. Not just a heter (permit), Even if it is in a voluntary way ie and not milchemes mitzva.

We have two questions on the above pesukim:

Q1. The Gemara in Pesachim says ‘shluchei mitzva einam nezokin‘ – ‘people on the way to perform a mitzva are not harmed.’ So, how do we reconcile this gemara with the fact that according to the Ramban he is doing a mitzva, yet according to Rashi he will suffer  because he will hate her and that any child from this relationship is destined to become a בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה?

Q2. ‘לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע’ If it is indeed a mitzva like the ramban said, how is it connected to the yetzer hara? We know that mitzvos are for the side of the יצר טוב!

There are two answers that work together to answer the questions.

Firstly, the torah is guiding us even בשעת הירידה. It says that in a time when we are about to stumble, Hashem doesn’t leave us out in the proverbial cold – ‘we are permitted to take her for a wife.’ Note that it does not say ‘marry,’ and after 30 days of having her in the house, with a shaved head, unkempt, mourning and in sack cloth, the man will in theory realise who exactly he has in his house and will send her home after 30 days.

Secondly, כנגד יצר is in the here and now.  We have explained before that the יצר הרע is identified as impulsive and  so the torah permits this indiscretion, on the proviso that he gets rid of her after 30 days. If he marries her after the 30 days the יפת תואר‘s ‘loophole’ has expired, and he is, in fact, committing a sin and as a result, as mentioned above, he will have a ‘rebellious son.’

This dual concept is referred to in Rashi’s explanation – “אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה” – in the 30 days he is doing a mitzva, he is indeed not harmed – but after 30 days he is not a שליח מצוה. Hashem is both helping us and testing us and then telling us the consequences of failing the test.

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