Archive for the ‘Lomdus’ Category

To keep giving charity

The pasuk tells us with a double statement that:

עשר תעשר – you shall tithe (14:22)

Gemara in Taanis 9a derives from this pasuk that עשר בשביל שתתעשר – one who gives ma’aser, the tithes, will become wealthier. This applies to all other forms of tzedaka, charity, too.

The Vilna Gaon explains that this highly unusual affirmation from the Gemara is due to a difficulty. The standard explanation of a double statement is that it means “to surely” do it, an unlimited amount of times. The difficulty is that the Gemara in Kesubos 50a states that a person is not allowed to give away more than 20% of his income. This would seem to indicate a flaw that a double statement cannot mean to do something with no limit, as it does not apply here – a person is not allowed to give an unlimited amount of money away.

The Vilna Gaon therefore teaches us that this still applies, even to giving charity, wherein a person will have more than he did prior to giving tzedaka, that he will be able to keep giving more, and never give an amount that he wasn’t allowed to. The reward for giving charity is the ability to give more, and it won’t hinder the giver, because we learn that עשר בשביל שתתעשר – a person will be able to keep giving charity.

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Inheritance of the Daughters

The daughters of Tzlafchad came to Moshe and said:

לָמָּה יִגָּרַע שֵׁם אָבִינוּ מִתּוֹךְ מִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ כִּי אֵין לוֹ בֵּן תְּנָה לָּנוּ אֲחֻזָּה בְּתוֹךְ אֲחֵי אָבִינוּ – Why should our father’s name be eliminated from his family because he had no son? Give us a portion along with our father’s brothers. (27:4)

Rashi explains that this was not an emotional request, rather, a halachic one. אנו במקום בן עומדות, ואם אין הנקבות חשובות זרע, תתיבם אמנו ליבם – We stand in the place a son ought to be, if we do not inherit our father, then let our mother perform yibum – levirate marriage.

A woman does not perform yibum if she has children from her deceased husband – as the children carry on the name of their father. The daughters of Tzlafchad made the association between yibum and inheritance – if they were זרע, progeny enough for yibum, then they ought to inherit, and if they weren’t to inherit, then their mother ought to perform yibum.

Rashi further points out that הא אם היה לו בן לא היו תובעות כלום. מגיד שחכמניות היו – If there had been a brother, they would not have made a claim (and left the inheritance to him). This displayed their intelligence. 

What exactly is the intelligence they displayed?

R’ Yehoshua Hartman explains that they demonstrated their understanding of the function of inheritance. The conventional wisdom is that when the owner dies, his assets are passed on. It is a default process – assets cannot lie unclaimed.

The genuine, Torah, understanding of inheritance is that whatever Hashem blesses someone with becomes a part of who they are. A person’s name takes root in his house – that’s what ownership really is. That is not to say that this goes to the extent of society today where people are defined by how much money they have at the bank. But property does have a certain relationship with the owner, a sort of extension.

When the person dies, the re-allocation of his assets is only to perpetuate the name of the deceased, which his property bears the name of. The people who are the continuation of his legacy will, inherit, which is why children usually inherit, as they are the continuation of their father’s legacy.

The daughters said if we weren’t continuations of their father’s lineage regarding inheritance, then they ought not to be for yibum. They understood what the function of both is to continue the lineage of their father.

The association was so correct, that Hashem told Moshe that they were right, teaching a previously unknown halacha.

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I’ve got to break free

With korbanos, the sacrifices, there is a concept within certain categories of korban called olah v’yored – where the animal offered will vary, dependent on the person’s status. For example, Parshas Tazria deals with a woman who gives birth – olah v’yored applies, and as such, a woman from a wealthy family offers a חטאת and עולה of sheep, and a woman from a poor family offers a חטאת and עולה of doves.

But what if a poor person decides to save up, and instead of bringing the doves, he chooses to offer a wealthy man’s offering of sheep/cows? In other words; are people confined to their social status?

The halacha according to all is that if a wealthy man were to bring a poor man’s offering of doves, he has definitely not fulfilled his obligation. So the, olah v’yored applies to the animals, and it applies to the supplicant if he attempts to downgrade his responsibility. So the question becomes: can a person upgrade their responsibility?

The Sefer Hachinuch says that a poor person who upgrades his sacrifice from the birds to the cows has not fulfilled his obligation. The Rambam disputes this, and says that he has.

What is the basis of the dispute?

There is a story told about R’ Meir Schapira, at a gathering of all the pre-war Gedolim. He presented this very question, and asked how the Sefer HaChinuch could suggest he hadn’t fulfilled his obligation, possibly contradicting various Gemaras.

Present at the gathering, was the Imrei Emes, the Gerrer Rebbe. He simply muttered, “there is a missing korban”. Those gathered were puzzled what the Rebbe had meant. Among his attending disciples was R’ Menachem Zemba of Warsaw, a renowned genius, who took the floor. “Let us analyse where the Sefer HaChinuch says his halacha. There are 6 applications of the concept of olah v’yored:”

1. A ritually impure person who enters the area of the Beis haMikdash

2. A ritually impure person who eats kodshim (produce set aside for kohanim)

4. A person who falsely swears he did not witness an event, thereby avoiding needing to testify

5. A woman who gives birth

6. A person stricken with tzara’as (a metzora)

“5+6 are different. The wealthy person brings one animal, as does the poor person. Not so in 1-4, delineated in Parshas Vayikra, wherein the wealthy person only bring the חטאת , and no עולה , thereby only needing one animal. The Gemara that the Sefer HaChinuch seemed to go against, that a poor person who brings a rich mans offering has indeed fulfilled his obligation, was regarding 5+6, where there were two animals, brought by both the rich and poor.”

“However, in Parshas Vayikra, where the pasuk discusses cases 1-4, it is insufficient for a poor person to bring a wealthy man’s offering – he’s missing an animal!”

“The Ibn Ezra discusses the possible causes for the discrepancy in how many animals a person would bring, based on his social standing.”

“1. A poor man would by definition be unhappy with his standing in life, and he would bear a grudge against Heaven for his misfortune. This necessitates an additional animal.”

“2. A wealthy person’s offering has a large enough portion to burn on the Mizbeach by itself, a cow is a very large animal. Not so with a bird, with a woefully small portion to burn. It is disrespectful to offer such a miniscule portion, and this necessitates a whole new animal to satisfice the demands of the Mizbeach.”

The genius continued; “So the Sefer HaChinuch would agree with the first possibility. It doesn’t help for a poor person, who must bring the second to atone for his grudge against Heaven, to bring one animal. He has not addressed this feeling within, and as the Rebbe said, there is a korban missing.”

However, the Rambam would hold with the second option, that the second animal is not brought because of the person, but rather, by the nature of the animal being offered. If he were to bring a cow, there would be no need for a second animal, and he would indeed have fulfilled his responsibility!

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Why do we bring Korbanos?

It’s a very basic question, and there are many approaches to take. The Ramban on Vayikra 1:9 discusses various approaches we will analyse, and is widely considered one of the fundamental parts of the Ramban’s commentary on the Chumash.

The Ramban quotes the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim as the first approach. The Rambam writes there that the idea of Jews using animal sacrifice was necessary for the people as they needed a physical method of worship, having been a part of the pagan culture in Egypt and other such places. To battle and rectify the idol worship in the world, the Jews would do the same action for a sacred purpose.

The Ramban disagrees strongly with this on many facets. If we base an entire method of service to Hashem on the actions of fools and sinners, why would Hashem gain anything from it at all? Vayikra 1:9 says that the korban creates אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה – Hashem “enjoys” the fact that we bring korbanos. The implication of the Rambam is that the korbanos are more for man than Hashem, but  if the korbanos were for man, why would Hashem enjoy it? We must find a suitable explanation for bringing korbanos that also explains why Hashem instructs it of us, rather than why why we ought to do it.

The Ramban points out that if the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is correct, that Jewish animal sacrifice only exists to battle idol worship, then we would not find instances of korbanos before an instance of idol worship. But this is not so – Adam was the first human – there were obviously no other people around to worship idols – yet he brought korbanos nonetheless, and so too with Noach; his family were the sole survivors of the Flood – so again, there could be no idol worshippers – and we find that nonetheless he did bring korbanos. How would the Rambam explain these instances where there was no idol worship to fight?

He further asks why the solution to idol worship would be to do the same thing in a different way – this seems to lend credibility to the idolatry the korbanos are trying to fight, chas v’shalom. It would seem that it would be better to just eat animals and not have sacrifices at all if we were indeed trying to fight the credibility of idol worship, as eating them shows we don’t consider them to be worthy of special attention.

R’ Yakov Minkus explains the solution to this issue. The Rambam in his magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Me’ila 8:8) writes explicitly that the yesod – the distilled, fundamental, reason to bring korbanos is a חוק – there is no reason to do it other than the fact we were told to. The Moreh Nevuchim explains the inverse of this – once the mitzva exists, there is a spillover effect that we can relate to more, but the underlying reasoning remains a חוק. With this knowledge at hand, of course Noach could bring a korban, and the question about the non-existence of idol-worship falls away. Battling idol worship isn’t why there are korbanos as a starting point, rather, it helps explain it after the fact.

With this knowledge of the Rambam’s true approach to korbanos, we can suggest an answer to the question of why the countering of idol worship would take a similar form, rather than denigrating it, by simply eating all animals regularly, without any sacrifices at all.

Korbanos have their blood sprinkled on the Mizbeach, by a kohen, in the Beis Hamikdash. The Korban Pesach had none of these key functions, so why is it called a korban at all? R’ Moshe Shapiro explains that the key to understanding this issue is that idol worship is not nothing. Paganism and idol worship have a כח הטומאה – they usurp and corrupt spirituality. Eating an animal doesn’t battle the the negative of idol worship, it just nullifies it. The nullification does not require the Beis Hamikdash, or sprinkling of blood by the kohen.  This is why the Pesach could be brought publicly in Egypt. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim was saying that all korbanos have this nullifying the negative aspect to which we can relate, but we now see this isn’t the full spectrum of his opinion.

The Ramban then offers a second approach. There is an intrinsic good on man’s part in having korbanos. The idea of a korban is that a person should see the animal as being his substitute, and really, he ought to be sacrificed. The animal takes his place and atones for his sins, and this is the reason to have korbanos.

There is a mighty flaw with this approach too however. Most korbanos are donated, rather than obligated of people, so the Ramban’s approach doesn’t explain the existence of donated korbanos at all.

The Ramban offers a third solution, that is beyond the scope of this site to explain properly. The word קרבן, the root of which is the word קרב, means “closeness”. Offering a korban engenders closeness with Hashem. This is a difficult concept to explain, let alone understand, but to illustrate: we perform mitzvos to emulate Hashem’s ways, but we are not emulating Hashem by bringing korbanos – we are doing something else: we are interacting with Hashem. We are provoking a reaction in Hashem, as the pasuk says; “אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה” – on which Rashi remarks “נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני”. This is difficult to illustrate, but there is a difference between doing Hashem’s will, and making it. When we bring a korban, we bring more of Hashem’s will into the world. One could suggest there is an element of creation here.

The Ramban brings a proof from Isaiah 60:7 that says: יַעֲלוּ עַל רָצוֹן מִזְבְּחִי וּבֵית תִּפְאַרְתִּי אֲפָאֵר – the Mizbeach is the expression of Hashem’s will.

So in bringing a korban, a person intentions are going to correlate to how they have extended G-d’s will in the world. This is why there is a concept of pigul, (a lengthy concept regarding what happens in the event that all the actions of a korban were carried out correctly, but someone in the porcess was thinking about something mundane, like the weather. Around 40 pages of Meseches Zevachim are devoted to this) – because the physical animal isn’t what matters – there is a transfer of spirituality here, from potential/theoretical to physical in this world. It’s a very big deal. The improper thoughts mean one can’t interact with what he’s trying to, and the korban has served it’s purpose, as the whole idea is not the physical at all.

So in answer to why we bring korbanos: there is the simple Moreh Nevuchim approach that we are counteracting paganism, the Ramban’s simple approach that we can atone our sins, and the Ramban’s esoteric Kabbalistic approach. We can suggest though, that perhaps the חוק aspect that the Rambam referred to was this third approach, and perhaps all the opinions harmonise together. Admittedly, this doesn’t answer why we bring korbanos, but it does explain what the function of the korban is.

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To be an individual or a single entity

The opening pasuk in Parshas Vayakhel reads: “וַיַּקְהֵל מֹשֶׁה אֶת כָּל עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וַיֹּאמֶר אֲלֵהֶם אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם’ – Moses gathered the whole community of the children of Israel to assemble, and he said to them: “These are the things that the Lord commanded to do” (35:1)

The Nesivos Shalom asks three questions.

This is the sole instance of וַיַּקְהֵל – an instruction to gather all the people together – in the entire Torah, where וַיַּקְהֵל is the first thing mentioned in the episode. What is so exceptional about this instruction of וַיַּקְהֵל, that makes it unique?

Secondly, the opening statement was “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do – the instructions are not to light fire, and not to work. How is not doing something called “לַעֲשֹׂת אֹתָם” – to do?

Furthermore, this episode occurred directly after the Eigel (Golden Calf), as Rashi explains that Parshas Vayakhel occurred the morning after Yom Kippur, when Moshe returned with the second luchos. It seems obvious that his first public appearance upon his return would be a notable message to the people regarding the bridge between G-d’s wrath and appeasement. What was it that atoned for the sin of the Eigel? (more…)

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The True Firstborn

The pasuk at 4:22 says: “וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל פַּרְעֹה כֹּה אָמַר ה’ בְּנִי בְכֹרִי יִשְׂרָאֵל”- “You shall say to Pharoah, so says G-d: My firstborn son is Israel”

Rashi writes: “ומדרשו כאן חתם הקב”ה על מכירת הבכורה שלקח יעקב מעשו” - “Here G-d had agreed to the fact that Yaakov had taken the firstborn right from Esav”.

What is the connection here?

The Lev Aryeh explains with the following: The next Pasuk, (verse 23) writes that eventually a plague would come in which the firstborn of each Egyptian household would die.

If we look at Makas Bechoros (plague of the firstborn) in Parshas Bo (12:30) it says: ”כִּי אֵין בַּיִת אֲשֶׁר אֵין שָׁם מֵת” – “In every house there was a death”

Rashi asks, how could every household have a firstborn son? He goes on to explain that the Egyptian wives would commit adultery and have sons with other men, each of these sons would be the oldest to its father, hence when the Torah said that the firstborn would die, it referred to the firstborn of the father not the mother.

“דבר אחר מצריות מזנות תחת בעליהן ויולדות מרווקים פנויים, והיו להם בכורות הרבה, פעמים הם חמשה לאשה אחת, כל אחד בכור לאביו”

Now look at the Pasuk about the famous birth of Yaakov and Esav, in Parshas Toldos (25:26): “וְיָדוֹ אֹחֶזֶת בַּעֲקֵב עֵשָׂו וַיִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ יַעֲקֹב”- “His hand was holding unto the heel of Esav, and they called him Yaakov”

Rashi writes:

“נמצא עשו הנוצר באחרונה יצא ראשון, ויעקב שנוצר ראשונה יצא אחרון, ויעקב בא לעכבו שיהא ראשון ללידה כראשון ליצירה, ויפטור את רחמה, ויטול את הבכורה מן הדין” – “Yaakov was created first, but was only born second, so he claimed that he deserves the firstborn rights, because he was created first, therefore he clutched onto the heel of Esav as if to hold him back.”

Rashi explains that Yaakov was created first; i.e. he was the firstborn of his father, but Esav; who was born first, was firstborn to his mother.

So from the plague of the firstborn where we see that “firstborn” refers to the firstborn of the father, and we can bring a proof that Yaakov deserved the right of the firstborn, as he was also firstborn of his father.  That is the link with our original Rashi, showing because of Makas Bechoros, Yaakov was the true firstborn, in that Hashem passed judgment based on the formula Rashi presented at Yakov’s birth of being the father’s first son.

Amazing!

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Optimum Kindness

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וימח את כל היקום אשר על פני האדמה מאדם עד בהמה עד רמש ועד עוף השמים וימחו מן הארץ וישאר אך נח ואשר אתו בתבה -7:23

“And [ה'] blotted out all existence that was on the face of the ground – from man to animals to creeping things and to the birds of the heavens; and they were blotted out from the earth. Only נח survived, and those with him in the תבה.” (Parshas Noach 7:23)

Rashi quotes the מדרש תנחומא ט that נח was once late in feeding the lion, whereby the animal bit him in the leg. The מדרש deduces this by the word usage “אך” – “only,” as in “Only נח,” which implies a limitation. The “limitation” was in נח himself, namely that a part of him was missing, having been bitten off by the lion. One who reads this ma’mar (saying) of Chazal may wonder, what is this story teaching me? What deeper meaning lies behind this account? We would like to suggest the following:

The Gemara Bava Metzia 85a states: “Whenever R’ Chanina and R’ Chiya were in a dispute, R’ Chanina said to R’ Chiya: ‘Are you disputing with me? If, Heaven forbid, the Torah were to be forgotten in Israel, I would restore it using my argumentative powers.’ R’ Chiya replied to R’ Chanina: ‘Are you disputing with me, who made sure that Torah should not be forgotten in Israel? What did I do? I went and sowed flax, made nets [from the flax], trapped deers, and I fed their meat to orphans, and prepared scrolls [from their skins], upon which I wrote the five books [of Moses]. Then I went to a town [which contained no teachers] and taught the five books to five children, and the six orders [of the Talmud] to six children. And I bade them: ‘Until I return, teach each other the Torah and the Mishna;’ and thus I preserved the Torah from being forgotten in Israel.’  This is what Rebbi [meant when he] said, ‘How great are the works of Chiya!’”

The obvious question is why was it necessary for R’ Chiya to go through all the trouble to obtain his own parchment when he could simply have gone to the marketplace and bought them ready-made. Maharsha (בבא מציעא שם) explains that in commencing something holy, one must be sure that it has a perfectly pure start. Thus, R’ Chiya intended to insure that the continuation of Torah would spread from solid foundations. There was no room for possible improper monetary transactions, or the like, leading to the emergence of the parchment in the marketplace; they needed to be guarded in holiness from the get-go.

However, this idea needs extra clarification. Why really was it so imperative to begin Torah in this fashion? Why was all this necessary? One can explain this using the Mishna in Avos 1:2 “Shimon HaTzadik was from the later members of the Kneses HaGedola. He used to say: ‘The world stands on three things: On the תורה, on the עבודה, and on גמילות חסדים. (Torah, Service [prayer], and Acts of Kindness)’” Rabbeinu Yona in his commentary explains that what the Mishna means that the world “stands” on these three things is that these are the purpose of creation; that creation of the world was to bring about these things. It is obvious then, that if one of these three things were not being perpetuated, there would thereby be no reason for this world to exist. For example, R’ Chaim of Volozhin writes (נפש החיים שער ד’ פרק י”א כ”ו) regarding the study of Torah, that if all Jews all over the globe were to stop learning for even one second, the entire universe would cease to exist. It is for this reason that R’ Chiya needed to take extreme measures to insure the future of תורה learning, for one of the three pillars of the world sure needs impeccable establishment.

With this we can explain the story of נח in the תבה. Firstly, we need to know that it is clear from the מדרש במדבר רבה י”ב י”ב  that the world only stood on one “leg” from creation until מתן תורה, namely גמילות חסדים. This is because the תורה had not yet been given, ruling out Torah, and the משכן had not yet been built (symbolizing עבודה). Now, Rashi (ו:יג) brings the גמ’ סנהדרין קח, that although the generation of the flood was rampant with all sorts of sins, it was only due to their “חמס” – theft and extortion that their fate was sealed. This is certainly a point of contention in commentaries trying to explain why specifically the demise of that generation came via חמס. But with this Midrash all is clear. Because the world at that point stood only – or was created only – for the perpetuation of חסד, therefore specifically by going to the opposite extreme, by robbing and cheating each other, did they meet their end. Without upholding the purpose of the world, there remains no purpose in its existence, as we learned from Rabbi Chaim of Veloshin.

Now we can clarify what we set out to explain. נח, along with his family who were all saved from the fate of the rest of the world, had a very particular job to accomplish in the תבה. What were they to accomplish? That very Rashi we began with tells us based a Midrash, another interpretation of the “לשון “אך : that נח was less of himself. This means that he groaned from the burden of caring for the animals. The תנחומא tells us that all twelve months in the תבה, Noach and his sons did not sleep, for they were needed to feed the animals. Some animals eat only at two hours into the night, some at three hours in, etc. The תנחומא goes on to prove that they did not sleep from the story of נח and the lion, which shows us that נח could not be late to feed an animal. Therefore, since certain animals eat at all different stages of night, we can deduce that they truly did not sleep during their time on board. This certainly needs explanation. If  ‘ה found נח to be righteous among his generation to warrant his survival as opposed to all others, why trouble נח during the duration of the flood to such an extent? Surely ה’ can do anything, and could have sustained the animals by Himself, without inconveniencing נח. So why not simply allow him to enjoy the free cruise?

To answer this we need to keep in mind the cause for the destruction of that generation. We explained that at that time there was yet but one purpose to the world: גמילות חסדים – acts of kindness, and they overturned that pillar, thereby causing their own annihilation. We would like to suggest that נח’s “job” as we described it above, was to rectify and reestablish גמילות חסדים; to rebalance the world on its shaky single leg. He could not lay back and enjoy the cruise, he had work to do. In rebalancing the world with גמילות חסדים, נח needed not only to feed one animal from time to time, but to go to great lengths, even by not sleeping for an entire year, to feed all animals all the time. All this was necessary to counter the severity of the destruction to the pillar of גמילות חסדים caused by his generation. This is congruent to the story of R’ Chiya who also exhausted great efforts in establishing the pillar of Torah.

Then, at one point נח came late. This was a great sin on his level. He was the one chosen to perpetuate גמילות חסדים, and his actions thereby needed to be on a high level of perfection. Being late was not an option. The lion sent this message to נח by biting him. In striving to rebalance the world, imperfection could not be afforded. It is implied in the תנחומא that the lion bit נח in the leg, as it says that נח left limping. The symbolism is clear; the message was that in reestablishing the “leg” of the world there must not be any blemishes. There is an old joke: “Why do flamingos stand on one leg? Because if they lift it, they’ll fall.” In causing נח to limp, he was reminded of just how delicate his world was, standing on it’s one “leg,” it’s one purpose – גמילות חסדים. It may only be one “leg” but it would sustain the world. The world needed נח’s גמילות חסדים on the תבה to be done on a perfect level. The lion bite was a תיקון for his slight infraction. The world had a leg to stand on, a purpose, in חסד.

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Torah and Rehab

Jewish law is often misrepresented as being focused on retribution and having an almost sadistic desire for violent punishment: nothing could be further from the truth. It does, in fact, demonstrate many ways to be acquitted as well as ways of rehabilitation for the offender. The essence of rehabilitation is clearly seen in this weeks parsha. Note the following:

כִּי-יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים, וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם; וְהִצְדִּיקוּ, אֶת-הַצַּדִּיק, וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ, אֶת-הָרָשָׁע. וְהָיָה אִם-בִּן הַכּוֹת, הָרָשָׁע–וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו, כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּראַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ, לֹא יֹסִיף:  פֶּן-יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל-אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה, וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ 

 If there is a quarrel between men, and they approach the tribunal, and they [the judges] judge them, and they acquit the innocent one and condemn the guilty one. and it shall be, if the guilty one has incurred [the penalty of] lashes, that the judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him, commensurate with his crime, in number.  He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed, lest he give him a much more severe flogging than these [forty lashes], and your brother will be degraded before your eyes.  (Deut. 25: 1-3)
For a number of reasons there are many Halachic discussions of these verses; but for now we can look at the change of name of the offender. The verses start by calling the accused הָרָשָׁע-the evil one then quite quickly use the friendly name of אָחִיךָ-your brother. The Sifri on this pasuk understands this apparent misnomer to be teaching us a moral lesson. Namely, that once the Offender has accepted punishment he is once again part of our people, connected by Ahavas Yisroel.

Practically speaking in halachah, while someone is considered a רָשָׁע they are excommunicated. That is, they are forbidden from taking part in religious ceremonies and also from civil law (for example giving testimony in court). Yet when the person has undergone the prescribed punishment his religious and civil rights and obligations are reinstated as a full member of Am Yisroel. This led to a specific enactment by the sages, known as “takkanat ha-shavim”, a rule designed to remove any obstacles to repentance.

An example of this is found in massechet Gittin (5:5): “If a beam which was acquired by robbery has been built into a building, restitution for it may be made in money so as not to put obstacles in the way of penitents.” The rule is, that in a case of robbery, the guilty party must return what he has taken to the rightful owner (Lev. 5:23). This makes obvious sense. If a thief were merely allowed to make a monetary compensation rather than return the stolen object, the law would, in effect, allow someone to acquire an object – albeit at a price – through unlawful means. That is clearly morally wrong, even to an atheist. Yet this rule was suspended for cases where returning the stolen object would cause the thief to incur a massive loss. This is the case in the Mishnah in Gittin; in order to restore the actual beam to its rightful owner the thief would have to demolish his own house. Although the sense of guilt at the original crime might induce remorse in the thief and an effort to return stolen goods; Nonetheless, if this would involve disproportionate loss the thief might decide that restitution was too dear and decide against giving the object back. “So what?”, even a fairly reasonable man might say. “Surely the thief, by breaking the law, has forfeited any claim on the courts’ clemency. What matters is the right of the original owner of the beam- not the rights of the thief”. Yet Jewish law ruled otherwise. To be sure, the owner must be compensated for his loss, for without this he would have suffered an injustice. But we must have concern for the offender too, and must remove obstacles to becoming a law-abiding person.

Our sages went further still. In Massechet Bava Kama (94b) we find a remarkable principle: “if robbers or usurers [repent, and of their own accord] are prepared to restore what they have wrongly taken, it is not right to accept it from them, and one who does so is not acting with the approval of the sages.” This does not apply to a convicted criminal – only a person who has, without any prompting other than a guilty conscience, has decided to confess and make amends. This is “brought down” by Rambam (Hilchot Gezelah 1:13): “Even though robbing someone is like taking their life…we must help [a thief who repents on his own accord] and pardon him in order to bring him to the right path.

There are other principles articulated by the sages which help an ‘offender’ to atone for his misdeeds and feel fully accepted back by Klal Yisroel (not referring to his criminal past to take one example). These teachings were ahead of their times as justice in ancient times was not tempered with mercy, but like so many of the moral truths given to our forefathers on Har Sinai, they are radical and eternal. Jewish law is concerned not only to protect the rights of those who have been wronged, but also to help the offenders rebuild their lives. Only acts are forever wicked, never a person; and we put this into practice by welcoming the penitent back as our brother and equal

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Arguing with the priest – not the best idea

Based on a shiur by R’ Yehoshua Hartman

זִכָּרוֹן לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר לֹא יִקְרַב אִישׁ זָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזֶּרַע אַהֲרֹן הוּא לְהַקְטִיר קְטֹרֶת לִפְנֵי הֹ’ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה כְקֹרַח וְכַעֲדָתוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר ה’ בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה לוֹ – As a reminder for the children of Israel, so that no outsider, who is not of the seed of Aaron, shall approach to burn incense before the Lord, so as not to be like Korach and his company, as the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe. (17:5)

Rashi says: כאשר דבר ה’ ביד משה לו: ומהו ביד משה ולא כתב אל משה, רמז לחולקים על הכהונה שלוקין בצרעת, כמו שלקה משה בידו שנאמר (שמות ד, ו) ויוציאה והנה ידו מצורעת כשלג, ועל כן לקה עוזיה בצרעת – As the Lord spoke regarding him through the hand of Moshe: So what is the meaning of “by the hand of Moshe”? Why not just simply “to Moshe”? It alludes to those who rebel against the kehunah. They are stricken with tzara’as , as it says, “and he took it out, and behold, his hand was ‘leprous,’ like snow” (Exod. 4:6). For this reason, Uzziah was stricken with tzara’as. — [Midrash Tanchuma Tzav 11]

Hashem said to put pans on the altar to remind us not to be like Korach. Hashem instructs ‘by the hand of Moshe’. Rashi points that this is literal – one who argues with kehuna suffers tzara’as like Moshe did on his hand, and he adds that Uzziah Hamelech offered up spices and got tzara’as too.

Why did Moshe get it? He had spoken Loshon Hora and said the Jews wouldn’t listen. But what’s the comparison? He didn’t get it for rebelling against the kehuna… So why is Moshe’s example mentioned here?… It should have been compared to Miriam’s tzara’as which was the sidra before Korach, not to Moshe’s instance that occurred in Shemos.

So where’s the Midah Kneged Midah?

Rashi (17:1) says on וַיִּקַּח קֹרַח that he seperated himself to argue. The Maharal asks why doesn’t it say וַיִּקַּח at every argument then, if this is it’s actual meaning?

The Maharal says a regular machlokes is one man against another man, but they are equal, are there is no distinct separation between the two. But kehuna, the priesthood, has the entire nation reliant on it. The kehuna do our korbanos, birchas Kohanim, so if one goes against them, they’re really seperating themselves from the nation, as the nation be definition identify with the priesthood.

TheMaharal explains that the method for dealing with tzara’as is to be sent chutz lamachaneh – excommunication. The afflicted is on one side, everyone else on the other (in the camp). Moshe didn’t get tzaraas for arguing against kehuna, but for complaining about the entire Jewish nation and therefore this is the same formula as one who argues against the priesthood! So Moshe is a good source for tzara’as as a punishment for arguing against kehuna!

But what about Uzziah Hamelech, who got tzara’as on his forehead (see Divrei Hayamim). Where’s the midah kneged midah there?

The Maharal says that if all the Jews were one body, the king would be the heart, Sanhedrin the eyes, and the kehuna would be the forehead that has the brain behind it, the Tzitz on it, and soul on it. He brought incense when it wasn’t his place to, thereby challenging the authority of the kohanim – and he got tzara’as, the punishment for this sin, and the place was afflicted was his forehead – the part of the body that correlates to the kehuna!

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Using something inaugurates it

In Kodshim (the entire topic of spirituality, sacrifices, priesthood etc) there is a concept called “avodoson mechanchosom”, – that an item’s initial use in a service makes it holy and fit to use for that very service.

The First Temple had the shemen Hamishcha – anointing oil – to use on the instruments, thereby making them holy, and subsequently fit for service.

The Second Temple however, did not have the shemen Hamishcha, so the Gemara in Menachos queries how exactly they used items in the service if they hadn’t been sanctified by the oil, and it answers that avodoson mechanchosom – that their use as holy items intrinsically made them holy.

In our sidra, Ahron, Korach and his cohorts (inc. 250 of the greatest Jews of the generation) are commanded to take brand new pans, put on the same ketores - incense – and Hashem would choose which to accept. Ahron’s was accepted, and Korach, Dasan and Aviram are sucked into the earth on which they stood, and the 250 men are consumed by a fire. And what of the pans used? Korach and co.’s were sucked into the earth, as all their possessions went down with their owners. But the pans of the 250 great men, who did not have evil intentions, but wanted all Jews to have access to the spirituality of the service:
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No one can steal your spiritual spotlight

After the story of Korach, God commanded Moshe to take all the pans that were used to bring the incense and use them as a cover for the altar.  The Torah finishes off with a statement: ‘velo yihye kekorach veadosoi’ (and you should not be like Korach and his congregation). Rashi learns that this should be a reminder to us not to be involved in a machloikes (argument).  However, other Rishonim say it’s a lav (a negative commandment in the Torah) that commands us not to have conflict amongst klal yisroel. The Yereim mentions this mitzva in the category of ra lamokom veaino ra labriyos, which means it’s evil to God, but not to mankind. We know however, that machloikes is definitely under the criteria of animosity between man and his friend, so how can we reconcile these two, seemingly opposing ideas?

The Chinuch brings down that a levi that does the avoida (work) of a kohen in the Beis Hamikdash is chayav misah (deserves to be punished by death). The Sefer HaChinuch adds that if a kohen does the avoida of a levi, which is of a lower sanctity then a priests work, the kohen is punishable by death. Moreover, if a levi who’s been designated to guard the gates leaves his post and starts doing the singing which is also part of a levi’s services, he is also punished by death since this wasn’t his designated service.
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Beha’alosecha – Drawing conclusions

Towards the end of the sedra (11:25-29), we find a puzzling story. The elders are prophesying when the ‘spirit of Hashem rests on them’. Two men in particular continue to prophesy after the others stop. A lad (Gershom, according to the commentaries) runs to Moshe to tell him that ‘אלדד ומידד מתנבאים במחנה‘ – ‘Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp’. Yehoshua speaks up and says to Moshe – ‘imprison them!’ Moshe retorts that he wishes everyone would be a prophet like that. End of episode.

Leaving aside the issue of the significance of it’s being in the middle of the quail story, why the big deal about Eldad and Medad? Indeed, Moshe’s reply is a no-brainer, is it not? What is wrong with prophesying? And why the extra word במחנה - where else would they be?

Rashi furnishes us with the first part of the answer, by quoting the Gemara in Sanhedrin that they were saying משה מת,יהושע מכניס – Moshe will die and Yehoshua will take them into Israel. At this point, Yehoshua – quite rightly – takes great umbrage at this outrageous statement. Moshe calms him by pointing out the prophetic nature of their words.

But where does the Gemara get the idea that these were the words of Eldad and Medad?

A beautiful idea is brought down by the Maharil Diskin which hints at the source. Let’s take a look at Moshe’s beginning to find a hint at the potential end of his life. When Moshe is born Pharaoh’s daughter names him as Moshe – ‘כי מן המים משיתהו‘ – for I drew him out of the water. Surely to get the name משה, it wasn’t specific on the water, but rather on the fact that she drew from water in general. In other words, it could have said ממים משיתהו – ‘I drew him out from water’. We have an extra נ and ה as a result.

Looking again at our parsha, we see that Eldad and Medad were prophesying במחנה - meaning ‘with מח נה‘ or ‘rub out the נה‘. “So what?” you may ask. But if we leave out those two letters, we are left with ממים…which stands for משה מת יהושע מכניס…

[N.B. - I just wonder whether it may also explain the refence to Yehoshua in our parsha as 'serving Moshe from his youth' - i.e. the fact that he got this very message!]
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Toras Cohanim

The pasuk writes:

כִּי אִם לִשְׁאֵרוֹ הַקָּרֹב אֵלָיו לְאִמּוֹ וּלְאָבִיו וְלִבְנוֹ וּלְבִתּוֹ וּלְאָחִיו - except for his relative who is close to him, his mother, his father, his son, his daughter, his brother (21:2)

This is written regarding a cohen hediot (junior) to teach us that he may impurify himself if one of his close relatives were to die. Notice that the mother is mentioned before the father. On this the Ramban explains that in that era it was more prevalent for the mother to die before the father because she was weaker, therefore she is mentioned first in the pasuk, because the cohen hediot would have to become impure for her first.

However, later in  the pasuk writes:

וְעַל כָּל נַפְשֹׁת מֵת לֹא יָבֹא לְאָבִיו וּלְאִמּוֹ לֹא יִטַּמָּא – And he shall not come upon any dad bodies; he shall not defile himself for is father or his mother. (21:11)

This is written regarding a cohen gadol, to teach us that he may not impurify himself if one of his close relatives were to die. However, why is the father mentioned before the mother here? What happened to the explanation of the Ramban?
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Day vs Night

The pasuk says regarding Yom Kippur:
שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן הוּא לָכֶם וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם בְּתִשְׁעָה לַחֹדֶשׁ בָּעֶרֶב מֵעֶרֶב עַד עֶרֶב תִּשְׁבְּתוּ שַׁבַּתְּכֶם -      It is a complete day of rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves. On the ninth of the month in the evening, from evening to evening, you shall observe your rest day (23:32).
The Gemara in Pesachim 68b wonders since when do we fast on the 9th; we only fast on the 10th? The Gemara answers that it’s a mitzva to eat on the 9th. The Torah views someone who eats on the 9th as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth.
There is a famous question asked by many: what is the Gemara’s diyuk (problem and solution)? We have this style of date in the Torah previously (i.e.בָּרִאשֹׁן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם לַחֹדֶשׁ בָּעֶרֶב תֹּאכְלוּ מַצֹּת עַד יוֹם הָאֶחָד וְעֶשְׂרִים לַחֹדֶשׁ בָּעָרֶב – In the first [month], on the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat matzos, until the twenty first day of the month in the evening. (Exodus 12:18) ), and the Gemara did not see fit to question why it says that we should eat matzos on the 14th if we really eat them from the 15th. So why only by Yom Kippur?

Rabbi Shlomo Gantzfried (author of the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, biography here) answers with another famous question: how could the Patriarchs keep the whole Torah if they were still technically non-Jews, and there is a halacha that a non-Jew may not keep Shabbos?

One of the more accepted answers is by R’ Pinchas Halevi Horowitz (biography here) in Kiddushin 37b. He explains that there are two types of time spans: the Jewish calendar, where the night precedes the day, and the secular calendar, where the day precedes the night. The issur for a non-Jew to keep Shabbos, as explained in Sanhedrin 56b, is keeping Shabbos for a full 24 hours (not even necessarily on Saturday; it may even be a Monday). However, the pasuk in which this issur is mentioned is from Genesis 8:22 וְיוֹם וָלַיְלָה לֹא יִשְׁבֹּתוּ - “day and night shall not recede”. We see that their calendar starts from the morning. Therefore, the Patriarchs kept Shabbos as we Jews keep it-Friday night and Saturday day. However, on Motzaei Shabbos, they did a melocho, when it is still considered Shabbos for a non-Jew, as his Shabbos would only start in the morning. Thus, they never fully kept a Shabbos of a non-Jew.
With this wonderful concept, R’ Gantzfried explains how we can understand why the Gemara is specifically bothered with Yom Kippur and not with Pesach.  Pesach was mentioned before Matan Torah (the pesukim about Pesach are whilst the Jews were still in Egypt); therefore, 14th at night means the night that actually comes after the day. However, when the Torah commands us about Yom Kippur, we are already in the Jewish calendar mode, thus 9th at night really means a full 24 hours before Yom Kippur.

Therefore, the question from the Gemara is entirely legitimate!

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Exemptions from being Respectful

אִישׁ אִמּוֹ וְאָבִיו תִּירָאוּ וְאֶת שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ אֲנִי ה’ אֱלֹהֵיכֶם - Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall observe My Sabbaths. I am the Lord, your God. (19:3)

Here are two Rashis:

איש אמו ואביו תיראו: כל אחד מכם תיראו אביו ואמו, זהו פשוטו. ומדרשו אין לי אלא איש, אשה מנין, כשהוא אומר תיראו, הרי כאן שנים אם כן למה נאמר איש, שהאיש סיפק בידו לעשות, אבל אשה רשות אחרים עליה – Every man shall fear his mother and father: Every one of you shall fear his father and his mother. This is its simple meaning. Its Midrashic explanation, however, [is as follows]. Since the verse literally means, “Every man shall fear…,”] we know only [that this law applies to] a man; how do we know [that it applies to] a woman [as well]? When Scripture says, תִּירָאוּ [you shall fear, using the plural form], two are included [in the verse, namely, men and women]. But if this is so, why does the verse say, “Every man…?” Because a man has the ability to fulfill this [commandment without restriction, since he is independent and thus obliged to fear his parents], whereas a woman is [sometimes] under the authority of others [namely her husband]. — [Kid. 30b; Torath Kohanim 19:3]

אני ה’ אלהיכם:[....] איזהו מורא, לא ישב במקומו ולא ידבר במקומו ולא יסתור את דבריו. ואיזהו כבוד, מאכיל ומשקה, מלביש ומנעיל, מכניס ומוציא – I am the Lord, your God: [....] Now, what constitutes “fear” (morah)? One must not sit in his place, speak in his stead [when it is his father’s turn to speak] or contradict him. And what constitutes “honor” (kavod)? One must give [the father and mother] food and drink, clothe them and put on their shoes, and accompany them when they enter or leave. — [Torath Kohanim 19:3; Kid. 31b]

There would appear to be a contradiction in the sources Rashi brings. How can we say woman is exempt from morah, based on the premise she doesn’t have time? This means that she can argue with parents and be disrespectful doesn’t have the time to be do what she’s asked. Clearly this premise is absurd. If it’s not time consuming then she does have to keep the mitzva of morah!
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