Archive for the ‘Ohr Hachayim’ Category

In Moshe’s final speech to the nation, having fulfilled his duties, he informs them of what will be later. He says:

ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ הוּא עֹבֵר לְפָנֶיךָ, הוּא-יַשְׁמִיד אֶת-הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה – Hashem, your G-d; He will cross you over, He will destroy the nations before you. (31:3)

The emphasis on הוּא, that “He” will do it, seems strange, and the fact it is said twice is even stranger.

The Ohr HaChaim explains that the Jews were worried that on losing Moshe, they would further lose two abilities he had; first, that he could and would intercede on their behalf, such as with the Golden Calf, where his intercession ended the plague and prevented their destruction; and second, that he would not be leading them in the wars they would inevitably fight on entry into the Land of Israel.

Moshe addressed the first concern by telling them that הוּא עֹבֵר לְפָנֶיךָ – the same word is used to describe Hashem’s capacity to forgive – עובר על פשע. Moshe explained that in reality, it had been Hashem all along, that He had aroused the idea of praying for the Jews in Moshe, and that capacity to be forgiven would remain, since Moshe had been an instrument for Hashem’s forgiveness, and not the cause.

Regarding the second, Moshe expressed the same idea – it had never been him – הוּא-יַשְׁמִיד אֶת-הַגּוֹיִם הָאֵלֶּה – Hashem had been with them all the time, and would remain so.

The Seforno explains the whole speech as conveying this message – that they had Hashem watching over them, and it would be better for them to experience Hashem directly than via himself as a conduit.

Sometimes people are averse to recognising their own abilities, and they don’t feel capable of rising to a challenge without their teachers. Moshe was telling the Jews that after 40 years of preparing, they were finally ready to become what they left Egypt to be. We too need to recognise that eventually, the training wheels have to come off.

כב. וּבְצַלְאֵל בֶּן אוּרִי בֶן חוּר לְמַטֵּה יְהוּדָה עָשָׂה אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֶת מֹשֶׁה

‘And Bezalel, son of Uri son of Hur, of the tribe of Yehuda, did all that Hashem commanded Moshe.’ (38:22)

The Torah tells us that Bezalel built the Mishkan according to the word of Hashem. Rashi points out that the Pasuk doesn’t say that Bezalel did what Moshe had commanded him to do, rather, he did what Hashem commanded Moshe on Har Sinai. Bezalel had already figured it all out.

Moshe commanded Bezalel to first build the Kelim (vessels/ furnishings) and then build the Mishkan afterwards. Bezalel says to Moshe that the custom of the world is to first build the house and then the furnishings. Moshe responds that he was right and Hashem had commanded him to first build the Mishkan and then the Kalim. Moshe then says ‘B’zal-al’ you were in Hashem’s shadow. (Gem. Brachos 55a)

All the Achronim ask, how could Moshe forget what was supposed to be done first? Moshe had just taught the Torah in its entirety (the day before, Yom Kippur, was the day he came down with the second Luchos and taught Kol Hatorah Kulah to Klal Yisroel except for the Parsha of the Mishkan since the Mishkan couldn’t be done on Yom Kippur) and now he forgets which was supposed to come first?

One could say that Moshe forgot the Halacha, but it would be very difficult to explain that Moshe forgot such a Pashut Din. We can’t say that Hashem never taught Moshe which one to build first because Moshe says clearly, ‘indeed Hashem commanded me to first build the Mishkan’. So what in the world is going on with this Medrash?

The Or Hachayim answers this question back in Parshas Teruma. The Pasuk says, ‘like all that I show you, the form of the Mishkan and the form of its vessels; and so shall you do. They shall make the Aron etc.’ (25:9)

The Or Hachayim explains (using various Medrashim) that Hashem showed Moshe an image of the Mishkan first, and then all of its vessels afterwards. After showing Moshe the overall blueprint He then went on to explain each one individualy starting with the Aron. So it becomes a bit more understandable that  Moshe was a bit confused about which one should come first as Hashem had showed him the Mishkan first, but when showing him how to build everything, he showed him the Aron first.

What did Hashem want to be built first? Moshe wasn’t entirely clear until Bezalel explained the logic of how Man always builds the house first. With Bezalel’s answer Moshe was able to understand what Hashem wanted to be built first and thus Moshe called Bezalel ‘Bzal-al’. (When Moshe said, ‘indeed Hashem commanded me to first build the Mishan’, he meant now I understand that Hashem truly wanted the Mishkan first)

The Levush Haorah explains this episode in a different way. (First he says anyone who says Moshe didn’t know the Pshat is wrong and doesn’t know anything etc.) He says that Bezalel and all Klal Yisroel were confused in how Moshe was teaching them how to build the Mishkan. In Parshas Terumah, which Moshe taught first, Moshe started by saying the vessels are to be built first (25:9). However, in Parshas Vayakel (35:10) he first says that the Mishkan should be built first. All of Klal Yisroel were listening to Moshe and they were confused, which one did he want first?

At that time Bezalel gets up and asks, ‘Moshe which one do you want us to do first, for it makes sense to build the Mishkan first etc’. Moshe then responds by saying that Bezalel is a great Chacham, one who knew the answer before Moshe had told him. Moshe didn’t forget or was confused, he was teaching and before he taught which one was supposed to be built first Bezalel jumped up and answered. Moshe didn’t do it in a confusing way, rather he was telling Klal Yisroel that the Aron was really supposed to be first because the main reason for the existence of the Mishkan was to bring the Shechina down to this world. The Shechina began with the Aron, meaning the Torah. (This is the pashut answer. If you have time I highly recommend seeing the Maskil Ledavid (one of the 11 commentators on Rashi) and the Gur Arye for other explanations on this piece.)

In Parsha Pikudei, the phrase “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה” appears 18 times, at the end of nearly every set of instructions. It would seem obvious that the construction of the Mishkan would take place as commanded, as the preceding parshiyos make painstakingly clear; so why the additional stress on how the work was carried out?

The Beis Halevi explains that the Mishkan was only required as a tikkun for the Eigel HaZahav (Golden Calf) – it was not required prior to then. If the Mishkan was to restore the status quo, it would have to be the polar opposite of the problem it was intended to solve. The Beis Halevi explains that what caused the Eigel was the people’s own ideas about how best to serve Hashem, and this led them to the conclusion they reached, which was decidedly not as they were commanded. As such, at every suitable juncture, the Torah sees fit to emphasise “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה“, – the reason the people did everything they did was for no reason whatsoever – other than that Hashem had instructed them.

The Ohr HaChayim asks a similar question to the Beis Halevi – the pasuk says “כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה” – rather than the regular “כַּאֲשֶׁר” in the other psukim – in three contexts ie 38:22, 39:42 and 40:16. What is the significance of this specific phrase, that the Torah differentiates between the standard “כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה“?

He explains that the people’s spontaneous actions at the Eigel, there were three problematic issues: the thought, speech, and actions, without which the incident would not have occurred. In transgressing just one of the three, a person was responsible for denying the entire Torah, let alone all three. The antidote to the Eigel would have to be a fusion of thought, speech and action together, which the Mishkan was.

If I may be so bold, I would like to suggest a thought I had after learning the Ohr HaChayim’s pshat.

The phrase כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה appears in three contexts – with regard to the planners, the workers, and Moshe:

-וּבְצַלְאֵל בֶּן אוּרִי בֶן חוּר לְמַטֵּה יְהוּדָה עָשָׂה אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה – Bezalel, son of Uri, son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah, had made all that the Lord had commanded Moshe (38:22)

-כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֶת מֹשֶׁה כֵּן עָשׂוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֵת כָּל הָעֲבֹדָה – In accordance with all that the Lord had commanded Moshe, so did the children of Israel do all the work. (39:42)

-וַיַּעַשׂ מֹשֶׁה כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ אֹתוֹ כֵּן עָשָׂה – Thus Moshe did; according to all that the Lord had commanded him, so he did. (40:16)

I was bothered by the Ohr HaChayim’s explanation that the Mishkan counteracted the thought, speech and action that led to the Eigel. The pasuk would have to reflect it, and it appears not to – all the above psukim simply refer to actions – וַיַּעַשׂ , כֵּן עָשׂוּ , עָשָׂה . This is problematic as how can we explain now that these psukim reflect a counteraction of the components of the Eigel? Where is thought and speech reflected?

The thought behind the Eigel would be atoned for by ignoring the underlying wisdom of the work done (possibly the Beis Halevi’s pshat). The plans and architecture of the Mishkan were drawn up by Bezalel – about whom Chazal attribute the ability to see the construct of the entire creation down to the Aleph-Beis that composes it. He understood the plans of the Mishkan – but he did not do it because he understood it to be correct, he did it because Hashem told Moshe.

The action behind the Eigel can also be counteracted. The wholde idea of Parshas Shekalim, as the Nesivos Shalom explains, is that in donating to the Mishkan (the Machatzis HaShekel, rare metals and precious stones), they collectively bought into the project as a whole, thus atoning for the actions behind the Eigel.

We must now somehow say that the speech that led to the Eigel would be atoned for by Moshe’s speech for this to work. If we analyse the portion of the Torah portion in which 40:16 appears, we will find:

וַיְדַבֵּר ה’ אֶל מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר – And the Lord said to Moshe, to say. (40:1)

בְּיוֹם הַחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאֶחָד לַחֹדֶשׁ תָּקִים אֶת מִשְׁכַּן אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד – “On the day of the first month, on the first of the month, you shall set up the Mishkan of the Tent of Meeting.” (40:2)

This fits beautifully. The speech of the Eigel was the speech that initiated the incident. This is counteracted by Moshe speaking to initiate the construction of the Mishkan!

ותאמר שתה אדני ותמהר ותורד כדה על ידה ותשקהו. ותכל להשקותו ותאמר גם לגמליך אשאב עד אם כלו לשתות.

“She [Rivka] said, ‘Drink, my lord,’ and quickly she lowered her jug to her hand and gave him [Eliezer] drink. When she finished giving him drink, she said, ‘I will draw water even for your camels, until they have finished drinking.’” (Chayei Sarah, 24:18, 19)

The pasuk in Devarim 11:15, says,  ונתתי עשב בשדך לבהמתך ואכלת ושבעת– “I shall provide grass in your field for your cattle, and you will eat, and you will be satisfied.” The Gemara in Brachos 40a learns from here that one must feed his animals before feeding himself.

What about drinking? Who comes first?

The Sefer Chassidim (531) learns from our pasukim in Chayei Sarah that humans come first. We see this from Rivka, who first gave Eliezer to drink, and only afterwards did she give the camels.

The Shulchan Aruch (O”C 167:6) is discussing a situation in which a person has already made a bracha on his food, and between that and eating, he discusses something that is of the interests of the meal. In such a case, one does not need to make a new bracha. One of the examples the Shulchan Aruch gives is that one asks someone else to feed his animals. This too is considered “tzaruchei seudah,” as the Gemara says, one must feed his animals before he feeds himself. The Magen Avraham (ibid 18), contrasts this with drinking. In such a situation, if one were to ask another to give his animals to drink, one might (see Machatzis HaShekel) have to make a new bracha. He bases this on the Sefer Chassidim’s limud from Rivka. According to the Sefer Chassidim, since humans come before animals regarding drinking, it would thereby not be tzarchei seudah to discuss giving them to drink first. The Mishna Brurah (ibid 40) brings this Magen Avraham as halacha l’meisah.

The Yad Ephraim (ibid) asks, surely there is a better proof to this Halacha (that regarding drinking humans come before animals), from the pasuk in Parshas Chukas (20:8),והוצאת להם מים מן הסלע והשקית את העדה ואת בעירם – “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” (It seems that his question stems from the fact that this pasuk is after Matan Torah, as opposed to the pasuk in Chayei Sarah. However, the Yad Ephraim obviously did not see the Sefer Chassidim inside, for the Sefer Chassidim does learn from that pasuk as well). He quotes the Ohr HaChaim (in Parshas Chukas and here in Chayei Sarah) who says that we cannot use either of these pasukim as proofs that man comes before animals with regard to drinking, since both are cases where man was in a situation of great thirst. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that one should give man to drink before animals. However, under normal circumstances there is no difference between food and drink; animals come first.

The Kli Chemda (Chayei Sara 4) writes that the Sefer Chassidim meant nothing different than the Ohr HaChaim, that animals always come first unless the human is specifically uncomfortable, be it hunger or thirst. He extracts this by the wording of the Sefer Chassidim: לענין צמאון אדם ובהמה יתנו לאדם תחילה ואח”כ לבהמה – “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we give to man first and afterward to animal.” The Sefer Chassidim does not say לענין שתייה – “regarding drink,” but rather “thirst.” If so, he means exactly as the Ohr HaChaim.

(According to the Kli Chemda a new halacha would appear. That is, specifically one who was not uncomfortably thirsty yet he wanted to have a drink, makes a bracha on his drink. But before taking a sip, he asks of a friend to quickly give his animals to drink. This would be considered tzarchei seuda according to the Kli Chemda’s interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim. One would thereby not be required to make a new bracha. However, for one who is thirsty, this would not be considered tzarchei seudah, and would require a new bracha. This is clearly not how the Magein Avraham and others understood the Sefer Chassidim.)

This suggestion of the Kli Chemda in interpretation of the Sefer Chassidim is difficult to accept, besides for the fact that many other Torah giants did not understand the Sefer Chassidim this way. Surely this is due to the contrast the Sefer Chassidim draws between drink and food. The Sefer Chassidim begins by saying, “Regarding [the] thirst of man and animal we must give to man first and afterward to animal,” and he continues by sourcing the pasukim in Chayei Sara and Chukas. He then contrasts this as follows: אבל באכילה הבהמה קודמת – “But as for eating, the animal is first,” and he carries on by citing the appropriate pasukim as proofs. Now, according to the Kli Chemda, why does the Sefer Chassidim contrast “thirst” with “eating”? A better contrast would have been “thirst” and “not thirsty,” or “hunger” and “not hungry.” Rather it certainly appears that clearly the Sefer Chassidim’s intention was to differentiate between food and drink, and that by “thirst” he meant “drink,” as all other Achronim understood him.

Other Achronim are bothered with the Sefer Chassidim’s halacha for a reason other than the Ohr HaChaim’s. How can we learn from Rivka who gave Eliezer before the camels if the camels were not her own. It seems clear from the Gemara in Brachos that this halacha to give to animals first is only if they are one’s own animals. There is no notion that one would have to feed every stray cat on the block before sitting down to lunch. If so, Rivka did not have any obligation whatsoever (not even tzar baalei chayim, see Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) to give the camels to drink. Naturally, she gave Eliezer first. And as part of her great altruistic characteristics, she gave the camels too. But how can one see from this story any proof to who comes first in drink between man and animal?

The Chasam Sofer (Toras Moshe, Chayei Sara) brings the Elya Raba who asks this question. The Chasam Sofer explains that really the halacha is not like the Sefer Chassidim, and that even for drink animals come first. He elucidates Rivka’s actions based on the Gemara Baba Metzia 49a, that one can be makneh a small gift just by saying so. There is no requirement for a physical transaction (maiseh kinyan). That is why she said “Drink, my lord,” and quickly gave him to drink even before mentioning giving to camels to drink. She had been makneh just enough water to him to quench his own thirst, but no more, in order to insure that he was not required to give to the camels. Had she said, “I will give you and your camels to drink,” Eliezer would have acquired from her enough water for himself and the camels, and would have had to give the camels first, despite his thirst. Rivka chose her words wisely in order to insure that Eliezer got before the camels.

The Ksav Sofer (Teshuvos, O”C 32) uses his father’s interpretation to illuminate the pasuk in Chukas. “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock, and give drink to the assembly and to their animals.” He asks, why was it necessary for Hashem to tell Moshe Rabbeinu והשקית – “give drink” to the people? Would it not suffice to say, “You shall bring forth for them water from the rock”?  Once Moshe Rabbeinu had released water from the rock, the people would have been perfectly capable in getting the water themselves. The Ksav Sofer answers that had Hashem just said that, then every individual would have attained water from Hashem and would have been required to give to their animals first. In order to insure that the people themselves would quench their thirst first, Hashem specifically said to Moshe Rabbeinu that he was to give them to drink. Meaning that as the water left the rock it was given by Hashem into Moshe’s possession. Thereby it was not considered to be given to the people directly by Hashem, but rather from Moshe specifically enough for each individual. Thereby they were not required to give their animals first. After their thirst was quenched, they were allowed to have more for their animals. Clearly, the Chasam Sofer and the Ksav Sofer did not see the necessity to learn these pasukim as the Sefer Chassidim did.

In defense of the Sefer Chassidim, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O”C 2, 52) suggests that clearly Rivka was obligated to do tzedaka towards Eliezer. Inasmuch, her requirement was to do so in the form that Eliezer himself would have needed to do. Meaning, in the same way that had Eliezer had his own water he would have had to give the camels first due to his obligation of tzedaka toward the animals (if the halacha is the same by drink as it is by food, as those who oppose the Sefer Chassidim believe), so too when Rivka was to give water to Eliezer she was to give it to him in the same way that he would have distributed it. Her mitzvah of tzedaka toward Eliezer required her to do that which held preliminary status among his obligations. That is, to give to the camels first, albeit that they were not her own. Since we see that she rather gave to Eliezer first, the Sefer Chassidim learned from here that it must be because the halacha by drinking is that man comes before animal.

A question one might ask on this is, never mind that the camels were not Rivka’s, they weren’t Eliezer’s either! They belonged to Avraham Avinu, as did Eliezer who was his slave. Inasmuch as this halacha did not apply to him, how could Rivka be fulfilling her obligation via his obligation if he didn’t have such an obligation to begin with? The answer to this seems to be, that all these halachos of feeding animals are obligatory not to the monetary owner of the animal, but rather to the one who carries out the feedings (“mizonosav alecha,” see O”C 324:11 and Mishnah Berurah 29). Often, they can be the same person. But in the case of Eliezer, although he was not the monetary owner of the camels, they were given into his care. It was thereby his requirement toward the camels, and thus Rivka’s requirement to act according to Eliezer’s, as Rav Moshe writes. This same idea can be used to redefine the pasuk in Chukas. It was Moshe Rabbeinu’s obligation to give the Jews to drink according to their very own obligation towards their animals. Thus, since he carried this out by first giving the people to drink and only then to their animals, we see that when it comes to drinking, man comes before animals.

(See the Yad Ephraim who explains  על דרך דרושwhy there should be this discrepancy between food and drink.)

ב. וְשַׁבְתָּ עַד יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְשָׁמַעְתָּ בְקֹלוֹ כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם אַתָּה וּבָנֶיךָ בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ:

2. and you will return to the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, and you will listen to His voice according to all that I am commanding you this day you and your children.
ח. וְאַתָּה תָשׁוּב וְשָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה וְעָשִׂיתָ אֶת כָּל מִצְוֹתָיו אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם
8. And you will return and listen to the voice of the Lord, and fulfill all His commandments, which I command you this day.
י. כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר מִצְוֹתָיו וְחֻקֹּתָיו הַכְּתוּבָה בְּסֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֶּה כִּי תָשׁוּב אֶל יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ:
10. when you obey the Lord, your God, to observe His commandments and His statutes written in this Torah scroll, [and] when you return to the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul.
In each of the above pesukim, as highlighted, there is the root ‘תשב’ – translating as ‘return’ or repentance. The Ohr Hachayim says that these three instances refer to three different types of תשובה.
The first one, ‘וְשַׁבְתָּ’ refers to תשובה על ידי תורה. As the pasuk says, ‘בְקֹלוֹ’.
The second one, ‘תָשׁוּב’ refers to תשובה as a מצוות עשה. As the pasuk says, ‘וְעָשִׂיתָ’.
The third and final one, ‘ כִּי תָשׁוּב’ refers to תשובה as a מצוות לא תעשה. As the pasuk says,’לִשְׁמֹר’.  Proof of this reference is, we know that when the torah has previously said זכור שבת – it is a positive commandment but when it says שמור שבת it refers to a לא תעשה.
Now that we have that clear, what are they each inferring? R’ Minkus explains that these are the three ways to serve hashem, which are the following:
1. חתן לכלה - the relationship between a bride and groom where there shud be nothing in the world to come between them besides hashem is a  ”דביקות” – cleaving to Hashem.

2. בן לאב - son to his father a role that is fulfilled through אהבה (love) and is therefore a מצוות עשה – “I go out my way for him”

3. עבד מלך - servant to his king which is a service done through יראה (fear) and is therefore a לא תעשה – “I don’t disobey him”.
When a Jew learns the torah, their נשמה - which is a חלק אלו-ה ממעל ‘a part of G-d’ - is interacting with its source of being.
In order for us to effectively and completely do תשובה, to truly ‘return’ to Hashem, we need to fulfil our responsibilities in this all important relationship. The same as the way a relationship will not survive if both partners do not fulfil their role, or if either of them become complacent, or if a son ceases to act as a son to his father or a servant rebels against his master or vice versa in each case - we cannot become complacent in our relationship with Hashem. We must be continuously re-evaluating our role and ‘returning’ to Hashem.


וְכִי תֹאמְרוּ מַה נֹּאכַל בַּשָּׁנָה הַשְּׁבִיעִת הֵן לֹא נִזְרָע וְלֹא נֶאֱסֹף אֶת תְּבוּאָתֵנוּ-  And if you should say, “What will we eat in the seventh year? We will not sow, and we will not gather in our produce!”

וְצִוִּיתִי אֶת בִּרְכָתִי לָכֶם בַּשָּׁנָה הַשִּׁשִּׁית וְעָשָׂת אֶת הַתְּבוּאָה לִשְׁלֹשׁ הַשָּׁנִים - [Know then, that] I will command My blessing for you in the sixth year, and it will produce yield for three years. (25:20-21)

There is a famous question asked by many – the way the Torah wants to placate the Children of Israel, that they will not lack any food if they leave their fields fallow is entirely legitimate, although the question and answer form found in these two pesukim is rather strange, considering this style of dialogue is not found elsewhere. Why is the dialogue style only suitable for this specific mitzvah?
(more…)

וַיָּקָם פַּרְעֹה לַיְלָה, הוּא וְכָל-עֲבָדָיו וְכָל-מִצְרַיִם, וַתְּהִי צְעָקָה גְדֹלָה, בְּמִצְרָיִם: כִּי-אֵין בַּיִת, אֲשֶׁר אֵין-שָׁם מֵת. – 30 – And Pharaoh rose up in the night, he, and all his servants, and all the Egyptians; and there was a great cry in Egypt; for there was not a house where there was not one dead.

וַיִּקְרָא לְמֹשֶׁה וּלְאַהֲרֹן לַיְלָה, וַיֹּאמֶר קוּמוּ צְּאוּ מִתּוֹךְ עַמִּי–גַּם-אַתֶּם, גַּם-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל; וּלְכוּ עִבְדוּ אֶת-ה’, כְּדַבֶּרְכֶם
- And he called for Moses and Aaron by night and said: ‘Rise up, get you forth from among my people, both ye and the children of Israel; and go, serve the Lord, as ye have said.
(12:30-31)

As made abundantly clear by the bold letters, there is a repetition of the time the sequence of events that took place in light of the imminent arrival of the 10th plague. If Paroh only wanted to tell them to “rise up and go forth from among my people”, then there was no need to repeat that this occurred at night, as obviously it is established from the previous Pasuk that this is the case. So why the repetition?

An intriguing answer by the Griz, R’ Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik (biography here) and the Ohr Hachayim, R’ Chaim ibn Attar (biography here) that shows how the various Psukim link.

The previous time that Paroh had met Moshe and Ahron, their meeting did not go well. It (10:28) concluded וַיֹּאמֶר-לוֹ פַרְעֹה, לֵךְ מֵעָלָי; הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ, אַל-תֹּסֶף רְאוֹת פָּנַי–כִּי בְּיוֹם רְאֹתְךָ פָנַי, תָּמוּת - Pharaoh said to him, “Go away from me! Beware! You shall no longer see my face, for on the day that you see my face, you shall die!”‘ Pretty bad meeting, but it got worse. After his final prophecy after this event, the Pasuk (11:8) says וַיֵּצֵא מֵעִם-פַּרְעֹה, בָּחֳרִי-אָף “And he went out from Pharaoh in hot anger.” In Zevachim 102a Resh Lakish explains that this means that Moshe slapped Paroh.

With their prior meeting fresh in his mind Moshe would understandably have been loathe to see Paroh, “for on the day that you see my face, you shall die”. If they hear him calling them, they weren’t going to come running.

Paroh understood this, and shouted “לַיְלָה“!! “It’s night-time!”. His threat had been “for on the day that you see my face, you shall die”, and perhaps was suggesting that he did not want to see them by day, but by night it was different.

So to answer our original question of why לַיְלָה is repeated, the answer is, it isn’t! If we add punctuation:

“!וַיִּקְרָא לְמֹשֶׁה וּלְאַהֲרֹן “לַיְלָה
- And he called Moshe and Ahron saying “It’s nighttime!”- {my threat isn’t relevant now!}

So in fact, the second time isn’t a description of the setting, it is actually what he said!

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