Archive for the ‘Korbanos’ Category

Social context

The book of Bamidbar is known as Sefer Pikudim, the Book of Numbers. It would seem odd that the book takes its name of numbers, given that the numbers of the census, the countings of the people, appear only in Parshas Bamidbar and Pinchas.

Sefer Vayikra, called Toras Kohanim, or Leviticus, deals with kohanim, their roles and duties throughout. Sefer Shemos, or Exodus, deals with the Exodus and what followed.

So what are the Pikudim after which the Sefer is named?

Bamidbar is not the Torah of numbers, of countings; rather, it is the Torah of logistics, or context. All the parshiyos discuss the formation and development of a society, the Machane, the encampment.

Parshas Naso begins with the Levi’im, Gershon, Kehas and Merari, and their respective roles. There are four interceding parshiyos until the logical continuation of forming the camp, wherein the nesi’im of each tribe bring the Korbanos for their tribe. The interceding mitzvos are about (1) how a tzarua and zav (certain types of zzzz) must leave the camp, (2) A convert who dies with no family, his possessions go to the kohanim, (3) Sotah and (4) Nazir.

What are these four mitzvos that they interrupt the establishment of society?

In truth, they aren’t. The laws of the tzarua and zav aren’t in Parshas Metzora, as in essence, the laws here aren’t regarding him, so much as they are ourselves, society. Our society, the Machane, is lacking while he is a part of it, and that is why he must leave.

Regarding the convert with no relatives, he poses a difficulty to a normal person. Jews have a serious community setup, on top of which, on a large enough family tree, everyone is interrelated. The convert has no one. His possessions are bequeathed to the kohen. But regarding our society, the setup would seem to be incomplete – he is foreign, how do we deal with him? – but he is still integrated, and this completes society.

The Sotah has deviated from soicety’s setup, for obvious reasons.

The Nazir, whilst admirable for his commitment, has deviated from what is normal too. Drinking wine and cutting hair are normal things to do. Not doing them is abnormal.

All these people are not normal. But the Torah tells us that they are all part of the setup, and the nesi’im were offering korbanos for them too, an imperfect but complete society.

Regarding the Korbanos, the question begs to be asked, why does the Torah repeat each nasi’s korban, given that they were all identical?

The of numbers in Sefer Bamidbar is that being part of a number generates a speciality.

Each set of korbanos ends with zeh. zeh has the numerical value of 12, the number of tribes. Elsewhere, a number is impersonal; but here, the underlying theme is that speciality lies in being a part of the number, so much so that deviating from it is bad. zeh is the klal. We are all part of the klal. The Torah tells us the total number of korbanos brought, but this seems unnecessary. Can’t we add up the figures ourselves? The answer is the same – the Torah  appreciates the community, wherein there total has greater speciality than the number of individuals.

There is a story told about a person taking an exam in a crowded classroom.The invigilator calls for time, and the exams end, and the invigilator collects a large stack of papers. The student refuses to hand his paper in, and remains behind and continues to write. After a while passes, the other students having long gone, the lone student left writing furiously, whilst the invigilator is at his desk working his way through a stack of papers, marking them. The student gets up nonchalantly, and strolls casually to the front to hand in his paper.

Looking up, noticing the student approaching, the invigilator exclaims, “You can’t hand that in now, the exam was over nearly an hour ago!”.

Leaning over the invigilators table, the student asks, with fervor, “Do you have any idea who I am?”

“No, and I could not care less!” replied the invigilator.

The student smiled, and says “Good!”, upon which, he thrusts his paper in the middle of the stack of unmarked papers. 

We see from this week’s parsha that the way to express individuality is from within the klal.

The same is true of Birchas Kohanim, also in this week’s parsha – the bracha is not originating from the kohen; it’s from Hashem. It is for the whole klal, but personalised.

The halacha is before the kohanim start they should clench their fists, and once they start they open. When the fists are clenched, they fist is flat – it is the same. But when the fingers protrude, they are all different, much as we all are.

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Why there is suffering in the world

Why is there suffering in the world? More specifically, why does the Torah give the tochacha, the list of all the curses that will afflict the people if they do not keep the Torah properly?

In this world, we have a body and a soul. The Yetzer Hara – the evil inclination – exists in the soul, and the Yetzer Tov – the positive inclination – exists in the body. Ideally, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ וְאֶת מִצְוֹתַי תִּשְׁמְרוּ – the soul transcends the physical of the world, and the person becomes separate from the world, different, holy.

However, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תִּמְאָסוּ – if the body sins, it comes to the fore, and it supersedes the soul, to the point where soul is almost strangled, as it were. If the soul were to die, the body would be no different to that of animal – lead by sense and impulse.

Suffering is an emergency safety measure that kicks in to avoid this. It minimises the physicality the body partakes in. It prevents the body from getting addicted to what will eventually destroy the soul. In this way, suffering cleanses us.

This applies to all suffering, including the Holocaust.

The victims were martyrs. Whatever they were in life, they were קדושים, holy martyrs, in death. They died על קידוש ה. The Gemara in Sanhedrin explains that in dying על קידוש ה, the victim becomes a figurative and actual korban, a sacrifice. All suffering is smaller degree of this, all suffering is in some way a קרבן לה. The Bluzhever Rebbe used to tell people to get a bracha from a Holocaust survivor for the very same reason.

All suffering reduces the domination of body over soul, of matter over mind,

People usually suffer most in their old age, toward the end of their lives. This is when they are older, and thus free from the sins of their youth. Hashem postpones suffering in the elderly in order that the person may greet his Creator in the most pure and direct way.

Parshas Behar and Bechukosai frequently appear together – Behar teaches about the Torah at Sinai, and Bechukosai is the blessings and curses. R’ Yaakov Minkus explains that they are together because they both take us to Har Sinai – Torah and suffering both.

Suffering removes the framework the Yetzer Hara operates and thrives in. It brings a person closer to Sinai and Hashem by breaking the hold his body has over his soul, purifying and cleansing him.

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I’ve got to break free

With korbanos, the sacrifices, there is a concept within certain categories of korban called olah v’yored – where the animal offered will vary, dependent on the person’s status. For example, Parshas Tazria deals with a woman who gives birth – olah v’yored applies, and as such, a woman from a wealthy family offers a חטאת and עולה of sheep, and a woman from a poor family offers a חטאת and עולה of doves.

But what if a poor person decides to save up, and instead of bringing the doves, he chooses to offer a wealthy man’s offering of sheep/cows? In other words; are people confined to their social status?

The halacha according to all is that if a wealthy man were to bring a poor man’s offering of doves, he has definitely not fulfilled his obligation. So the, olah v’yored applies to the animals, and it applies to the supplicant if he attempts to downgrade his responsibility. So the question becomes: can a person upgrade their responsibility?

The Sefer Hachinuch says that a poor person who upgrades his sacrifice from the birds to the cows has not fulfilled his obligation. The Rambam disputes this, and says that he has.

What is the basis of the dispute?

There is a story told about R’ Meir Schapira, at a gathering of all the pre-war Gedolim. He presented this very question, and asked how the Sefer HaChinuch could suggest he hadn’t fulfilled his obligation, possibly contradicting various Gemaras.

Present at the gathering, was the Imrei Emes, the Gerrer Rebbe. He simply muttered, “there is a missing korban”. Those gathered were puzzled what the Rebbe had meant. Among his attending disciples was R’ Menachem Zemba of Warsaw, a renowned genius, who took the floor. “Let us analyse where the Sefer HaChinuch says his halacha. There are 6 applications of the concept of olah v’yored:”

1. A ritually impure person who enters the area of the Beis haMikdash

2. A ritually impure person who eats kodshim (produce set aside for kohanim)

4. A person who falsely swears he did not witness an event, thereby avoiding needing to testify

5. A woman who gives birth

6. A person stricken with tzara’as (a metzora)

“5+6 are different. The wealthy person brings one animal, as does the poor person. Not so in 1-4, delineated in Parshas Vayikra, wherein the wealthy person only bring the חטאת , and no עולה , thereby only needing one animal. The Gemara that the Sefer HaChinuch seemed to go against, that a poor person who brings a rich mans offering has indeed fulfilled his obligation, was regarding 5+6, where there were two animals, brought by both the rich and poor.”

“However, in Parshas Vayikra, where the pasuk discusses cases 1-4, it is insufficient for a poor person to bring a wealthy man’s offering – he’s missing an animal!”

“The Ibn Ezra discusses the possible causes for the discrepancy in how many animals a person would bring, based on his social standing.”

“1. A poor man would by definition be unhappy with his standing in life, and he would bear a grudge against Heaven for his misfortune. This necessitates an additional animal.”

“2. A wealthy person’s offering has a large enough portion to burn on the Mizbeach by itself, a cow is a very large animal. Not so with a bird, with a woefully small portion to burn. It is disrespectful to offer such a miniscule portion, and this necessitates a whole new animal to satisfice the demands of the Mizbeach.”

The genius continued; “So the Sefer HaChinuch would agree with the first possibility. It doesn’t help for a poor person, who must bring the second to atone for his grudge against Heaven, to bring one animal. He has not addressed this feeling within, and as the Rebbe said, there is a korban missing.”

However, the Rambam would hold with the second option, that the second animal is not brought because of the person, but rather, by the nature of the animal being offered. If he were to bring a cow, there would be no need for a second animal, and he would indeed have fulfilled his responsibility!

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Why do we bring Korbanos?

It’s a very basic question, and there are many approaches to take. The Ramban on Vayikra 1:9 discusses various approaches we will analyse, and is widely considered one of the fundamental parts of the Ramban’s commentary on the Chumash.

The Ramban quotes the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim as the first approach. The Rambam writes there that the idea of Jews using animal sacrifice was necessary for the people as they needed a physical method of worship, having been a part of the pagan culture in Egypt and other such places. To battle and rectify the idol worship in the world, the Jews would do the same action for a sacred purpose.

The Ramban disagrees strongly with this on many facets. If we base an entire method of service to Hashem on the actions of fools and sinners, why would Hashem gain anything from it at all? Vayikra 1:9 says that the korban creates אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה – Hashem “enjoys” the fact that we bring korbanos. The implication of the Rambam is that the korbanos are more for man than Hashem, but  if the korbanos were for man, why would Hashem enjoy it? We must find a suitable explanation for bringing korbanos that also explains why Hashem instructs it of us, rather than why why we ought to do it.

The Ramban points out that if the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is correct, that Jewish animal sacrifice only exists to battle idol worship, then we would not find instances of korbanos before an instance of idol worship. But this is not so – Adam was the first human – there were obviously no other people around to worship idols – yet he brought korbanos nonetheless, and so too with Noach; his family were the sole survivors of the Flood – so again, there could be no idol worshippers – and we find that nonetheless he did bring korbanos. How would the Rambam explain these instances where there was no idol worship to fight?

He further asks why the solution to idol worship would be to do the same thing in a different way – this seems to lend credibility to the idolatry the korbanos are trying to fight, chas v’shalom. It would seem that it would be better to just eat animals and not have sacrifices at all if we were indeed trying to fight the credibility of idol worship, as eating them shows we don’t consider them to be worthy of special attention.

R’ Yakov Minkus explains the solution to this issue. The Rambam in his magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Me’ila 8:8) writes explicitly that the yesod – the distilled, fundamental, reason to bring korbanos is a חוק – there is no reason to do it other than the fact we were told to. The Moreh Nevuchim explains the inverse of this – once the mitzva exists, there is a spillover effect that we can relate to more, but the underlying reasoning remains a חוק. With this knowledge at hand, of course Noach could bring a korban, and the question about the non-existence of idol-worship falls away. Battling idol worship isn’t why there are korbanos as a starting point, rather, it helps explain it after the fact.

With this knowledge of the Rambam’s true approach to korbanos, we can suggest an answer to the question of why the countering of idol worship would take a similar form, rather than denigrating it, by simply eating all animals regularly, without any sacrifices at all.

Korbanos have their blood sprinkled on the Mizbeach, by a kohen, in the Beis Hamikdash. The Korban Pesach had none of these key functions, so why is it called a korban at all? R’ Moshe Shapiro explains that the key to understanding this issue is that idol worship is not nothing. Paganism and idol worship have a כח הטומאה – they usurp and corrupt spirituality. Eating an animal doesn’t battle the the negative of idol worship, it just nullifies it. The nullification does not require the Beis Hamikdash, or sprinkling of blood by the kohen.  This is why the Pesach could be brought publicly in Egypt. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim was saying that all korbanos have this nullifying the negative aspect to which we can relate, but we now see this isn’t the full spectrum of his opinion.

The Ramban then offers a second approach. There is an intrinsic good on man’s part in having korbanos. The idea of a korban is that a person should see the animal as being his substitute, and really, he ought to be sacrificed. The animal takes his place and atones for his sins, and this is the reason to have korbanos.

There is a mighty flaw with this approach too however. Most korbanos are donated, rather than obligated of people, so the Ramban’s approach doesn’t explain the existence of donated korbanos at all.

The Ramban offers a third solution, that is beyond the scope of this site to explain properly. The word קרבן, the root of which is the word קרב, means “closeness”. Offering a korban engenders closeness with Hashem. This is a difficult concept to explain, let alone understand, but to illustrate: we perform mitzvos to emulate Hashem’s ways, but we are not emulating Hashem by bringing korbanos – we are doing something else: we are interacting with Hashem. We are provoking a reaction in Hashem, as the pasuk says; “אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה” – on which Rashi remarks “נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני”. This is difficult to illustrate, but there is a difference between doing Hashem’s will, and making it. When we bring a korban, we bring more of Hashem’s will into the world. One could suggest there is an element of creation here.

The Ramban brings a proof from Isaiah 60:7 that says: יַעֲלוּ עַל רָצוֹן מִזְבְּחִי וּבֵית תִּפְאַרְתִּי אֲפָאֵר – the Mizbeach is the expression of Hashem’s will.

So in bringing a korban, a person intentions are going to correlate to how they have extended G-d’s will in the world. This is why there is a concept of pigul, (a lengthy concept regarding what happens in the event that all the actions of a korban were carried out correctly, but someone in the porcess was thinking about something mundane, like the weather. Around 40 pages of Meseches Zevachim are devoted to this) – because the physical animal isn’t what matters – there is a transfer of spirituality here, from potential/theoretical to physical in this world. It’s a very big deal. The improper thoughts mean one can’t interact with what he’s trying to, and the korban has served it’s purpose, as the whole idea is not the physical at all.

So in answer to why we bring korbanos: there is the simple Moreh Nevuchim approach that we are counteracting paganism, the Ramban’s simple approach that we can atone our sins, and the Ramban’s esoteric Kabbalistic approach. We can suggest though, that perhaps the חוק aspect that the Rambam referred to was this third approach, and perhaps all the opinions harmonise together. Admittedly, this doesn’t answer why we bring korbanos, but it does explain what the function of the korban is.

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ראש חודש ניסן

This Weeks Parsha

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