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Esrog vs Sefer Torah

מ. וּלְקַחְתֶּם לָכֶם בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן פְּרִי עֵץ הָדָר כַּפֹּת תְּמָרִים וַעֲנַף עֵץ עָבֹת וְעַרְבֵי נָחַל וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים:

40. And you shall take for yourselves on the first day, the fruit of the Hadar tree, date palm fronds, a branch of a braided tree, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God for a seven day period. (Vayikra 23:40)

This pasuk, in parshas Emor, contains the commandment for each Jewish Man to use his own Esrog on Succos – specifying ‘לָכֶם’, ‘for yourselves’.

. יט. וְעַתָּה כִּתְבוּ לָכֶם אֶת הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת וְלַמְּדָהּ אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שִׂימָהּ בְּפִיהֶם לְמַעַן תִּהְיֶה לִּי הַשִּׁירָה הַזֹּאת לְעֵד בִּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

19: And now, write for yourselves this song, and teach it to the Children of Israel. Place it into their mouths, in order that this song will be for Me as a witness for the children of Israel.   (Devarim 31:19)

This next pasuk, in Parshas Vayelech, commands every Jewish man to write a Sefer Torah using the same specification  ‘לָכֶם’, ‘for yourselves’. However,the Halacha for the second usage of “לָכֶם” is not the same as the one for ‘פְּרִי עֵץ הָדָר’ – the Esrog. When performing the Mitzvah of writing a Sefer Torah, people can write them בשוטפות – in a group. A group of people share the writing of one Sefer Torah and each person is considered to have fulfilled their individual obligation to write a Sefer Torah.

How do we explain the difference between “לָכֶם” by the מצוה of esrog and “לָכֶם” by the מצוה of Sefer Torah? How do we justify the commonly accepted custom of sharing the great financial commitment of the writing of a Sefer Torah?

R Ahron Leib Shteinman explains in reference to the מצוה of esrog:  “לָכֶם” (in Gemara Succos 35a) is used to teach that financial ownership (בעלת ממון) of an esrog is not enough to fulfil the mitzva. There needs to be the possibility of extracting maximum productivity ie a היתר אכילה – the ability to eat it and use it up (destroy it). With shared ownership, a partner has the right to use the asset, but not deplete or destroy it; as this would deprive the co-owners of their rights. , In this case they require recompense. So in the case of the Esrog, if it cannot be used to the fullest extent ie eating it,then there is a deficiency in “לָכֶם” Thus it is clear that since a jointly owned esrog cannot be fully used by an individual partner, one cannot perform the mitzva with it.

However, with the mitzvah of Sefer Torah, the fullest use of the shared item consists of reading it and learning from it. This does not depreciate the asset nor detract from another owner’s share at all. If one partner were to read and learn from it, he is certainly using it to its fullest extent, so there is no deficiency in “לָכֶם”, and all of the participants can fulfill their full obligation even with only a partial share. Indeed, all can use it together to the same extent as it is used individually – so the “לָכֶם” aspect is equal both individually and collectively.

This then answers both our questions, showing that many people can share equally in the great Mitzvah of writing a Sefer Torah but each man must purchase his own individual esrog.

ב. וְשַׁבְתָּ עַד יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְשָׁמַעְתָּ בְקֹלוֹ כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם אַתָּה וּבָנֶיךָ בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ:

2. and you will return to the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, and you will listen to His voice according to all that I am commanding you this day you and your children.
ח. וְאַתָּה תָשׁוּב וְשָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה וְעָשִׂיתָ אֶת כָּל מִצְוֹתָיו אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם
8. And you will return and listen to the voice of the Lord, and fulfill all His commandments, which I command you this day.
י. כִּי תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר מִצְוֹתָיו וְחֻקֹּתָיו הַכְּתוּבָה בְּסֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה הַזֶּה כִּי תָשׁוּב אֶל יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּכָל לְבָבְךָ וּבְכָל נַפְשֶׁךָ:
10. when you obey the Lord, your God, to observe His commandments and His statutes written in this Torah scroll, [and] when you return to the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul.
In each of the above pesukim, as highlighted, there is the root ‘תשב’ – translating as ‘return’ or repentance. The Ohr Hachayim says that these three instances refer to three different types of תשובה.
The first one, ‘וְשַׁבְתָּ’ refers to תשובה על ידי תורה. As the pasuk says, ‘בְקֹלוֹ’.
The second one, ‘תָשׁוּב’ refers to תשובה as a מצוות עשה. As the pasuk says, ‘וְעָשִׂיתָ’.
The third and final one, ‘ כִּי תָשׁוּב’ refers to תשובה as a מצוות לא תעשה. As the pasuk says,’לִשְׁמֹר’.  Proof of this reference is, we know that when the torah has previously said זכור שבת – it is a positive commandment but when it says שמור שבת it refers to a לא תעשה.
Now that we have that clear, what are they each inferring? R’ Minkus explains that these are the three ways to serve hashem, which are the following:
1. חתן לכלה - the relationship between a bride and groom where there shud be nothing in the world to come between them besides hashem is a  ”דביקות” – cleaving to Hashem.

2. בן לאב - son to his father a role that is fulfilled through אהבה (love) and is therefore a מצוות עשה – “I go out my way for him”

3. עבד מלך - servant to his king which is a service done through יראה (fear) and is therefore a לא תעשה – “I don’t disobey him”.
When a Jew learns the torah, their נשמה - which is a חלק אלו-ה ממעל ‘a part of G-d’ - is interacting with its source of being.
In order for us to effectively and completely do תשובה, to truly ‘return’ to Hashem, we need to fulfil our responsibilities in this all important relationship. The same as the way a relationship will not survive if both partners do not fulfil their role, or if either of them become complacent, or if a son ceases to act as a son to his father or a servant rebels against his master or vice versa in each case - we cannot become complacent in our relationship with Hashem. We must be continuously re-evaluating our role and ‘returning’ to Hashem.

Creation based on Faith

In Parshas Ki Savo, the mitzvah and inyan of Bikkurim is discussed.

The first רשי in the Torah refers to this mitzva (in בראשית א:א). He explains that one of the reasons the world was created is for this particular מצוה.

The question that we have is: What is the significance of this deed/commandment that makes it worth the entire creation of the world?

The answer is: The depth of this מצוה lies in the fact that when one owns a plot of land, and begins doing all the physical labour and the phenomenal amount of work that is involved in producing fruit, one has to till the ground, sow the seeds, plough the earth, prune the weeds and give constant care. After this extraordinary amount of physical backbreaking labour the Torah commands us that one has to take the first fruit that sprouts and bring it to Jerusalem. During the procedure of presenting it to the כהן one says ‘Thank you Hashem for the land and fruit that you gave me’

These lines are a statement of intent. In essence it is a lesson in אמונה that however much a person invests in bringing home his livelihood he still has to understand and remember that nothing is entirely dependent upon him and that ultimately everything is decreed from Above.

We know that אמונה – true faith in Hashem – is the ultimate trait that one can acquire in this world. When one has reached that stage, through the humility required in bringing the first fruits to the כהן and effectively admitting the knowledge that it wasn’t merely through one’s own effort but was only possible through the help of Hashem; then this is one of the reasons to justify the entire creation of the world by Hashem.

All about appreciation

As heard from R Yakov Minkus

5. And you shall call out and say before the Lord, your God, “An Aramean [sought to] destroy my forefather, and he went down to Egypt and sojourned there with a small number of people, and there, he became a great, mighty, and numerous nation.   ה. וְעָנִיתָ וְאָמַרְתָּ לִפְנֵי יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲרַמִּי אֹבֵד אָבִי וַיֵּרֶד מִצְרַיְמָה וַיָּגָר שָׁם בִּמְתֵי מְעָט וַיְהִי שָׁם לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל עָצוּם וָרָב:
6. And the Egyptians treated us cruelly and afflicted us, and they imposed hard labor upon us.   ו. וַיָּרֵעוּ אֹתָנוּ הַמִּצְרִים וַיְעַנּוּנוּ וַיִּתְּנוּ עָלֵינוּ עֲבֹדָה קָשָׁה:

7. So we cried out to the Lord, God of our fathers, and the Lord heard our voice and saw our affliction, our toil, and our oppression.   ז. וַנִּצְעַק אֶל יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֵי אֲבֹתֵינוּ וַיִּשְׁמַע יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֶת קֹלֵנוּ וַיַּרְא אֶת עָנְיֵנוּ וְאֶת עֲמָלֵנוּ וְאֶת לַחֲצֵנוּ:
8. And the Lord brought us out from Egypt with a strong hand and with an outstretched arm, with great awe, and with signs and wonders.   ח. וַיּוֹצִאֵנוּ יְ־הֹוָ־ה מִמִּצְרַיִם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה וּבְמֹרָא גָּדֹל וּבְאֹתוֹת וּבְמֹפְתִים:

In the Haggada on Seder night, when we say the above pesukim in the second half of maggid, we are reviewing the תורה from the point where the Jews were going out of Egypt.

The question is: Why do we not review the actual events in their place in the parshas of Shemos, Va’eira, Bo and Bshalach i.e. in chronological order? This portion over here is:
a) Out of place, as this parsha reviews the commandments to bring bikurim, and
b) Not in any way linked to the rest of the story of יציאת מצריים.
However, it is a focal point, so why is it considered more important than the story in its proper place?

The Sefer HaChinuch explains that the whole avoda of יציאת מצריים is not just telling the story of יציאת מצריים  for its own sake, but rather to tell the story with a Hakoras Hatov angle which the פרשיות of Shemos etc do not have.

The מצוה of  Bikkurim is based on a gratitude for having Eretz Yisrael, which in turn is part of the gratitude for having been taken out of Egypt. So, in reality, this particular portion about יציאת מצריים fits very well in this פרשה – it is about Hakoras Hatov! This is the answer to our two questions as to why the psukim in the Haggada are from this פרשה of  Bikkurim and the proof that Sefer HaChinuch is right.

But, now we ask, what is proper Hakoras Hatov?
There are 4 prescribed events for which we are instructed to make a point of thanks – formerly as a קרבן תודעה (literally as Thanksgiving) but today as ברכת הגומל. These 4 events are:
1. recovery from illness,
2. release from jail,
3. travelling overseas, and
4. travelling through a desert.

The ‘root mitzvah’, the קרבן תודעה, had a special particular Halacha that along with the animal offering, one had to bring 40 loaves of bread.  Because they  are included in the קרבן , these loaves are  equally subject to the laws of Noser, whereby Korbanos left overnight must be destroyed. Unlike many other קרבנות only little portions are removed for the מזבח, Kohanim etc.

How does one eat most of an animal with 40 loaves of bread and avoid Noser?! The answer is simple. One would invite many guests to join the celebration! The whole idea of being Makir Tov is to publicise it and the קרבן פסח is identical – an entire roast animal that is to be consumed after a full meal, in a tiny amount of time, before midnight. Therefore, in order to avoid noser problems you must invite many Seder guests to tell them about יציאת מצריים!

Furthermore the קרבן פסח is a National קרבן תודעה for all four reasons above!
1. We were in bondage and released (Egypt),
2. We went through the sea,
3. We went through the desert, and (as the Midrash in Parshas Yisro says)
4. When the Jews heard Hashem’s Voice, they were cured from all ailments!

In addition, the קרבן פסח is just like the קרבן תודעה, in that the matza is a part of the Korban itself – the Afikoman is intended as Matza and קרבן פסח. Meseches Bikkurim says that when someone brought a single pomegranate as Bikkurim, every street he went along had to shutdown and accompany him to the Beis Hamikdash as part of the publicity. This is just more proof that these psukim are very apt as Pesach is innately affiliated to Hakoras Hatov.

Now, after talking extensively about Hakaras Hatov, how do we go about thanking hashem?
The final pasuk in Parshas Bikkurim וְשָׂמַחְתָּ בְכָל הַטּוֹב אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לְךָ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וּלְבֵיתֶךָ – you should rejoice in all Hashem does for you – not just one blanket ‘thank you’, but thank Him for each thing individually! We would do well to bear this in mind and itemise each thing for which we ought to thank Hashem on this Rosh Hashana

39 vs 40

 ב. וְהָיָה אִם בִּן הַכּוֹת הָרָשָׁע וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּר . 

‘and it shall be, if the guilty one has incurred [the penalty of] lashes, that the judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him, commensurate with his crime, in number.’

ג. אַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ לֹא יֹסִיף פֶּן יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ

‘He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed, lest he give him a much more severe flogging than these [forty lashes], and your brother will be degraded before your eyes.’ 

This is the famous parsha of malkos (flogging or lashes).

The  Gemara in Makkos 22a asks “How many times do we flog the receiver? – Because the passuk writes, “be’mispar arboim” (in the number 40) and so we understand that  the number must be close to 40 – therefore we give him 39 strokes.  However, R’Yehuda follows the line of the pasuk and says that he receives 40 strokes for a complete flogging.
When the Chiddushei Ha’rim was young, a man asked him the following question: Is there a chance that one day a person will receive the same amount of lashes according to both R’Yehuda and the Chachomim ?

 The young bochur gave a brilliant answer: A Shliach Beis Din  (someone who works for the Beis Din and carries out the punishments)  transgressed 39 issurim in the Torah and therefore deserved 39 floggings. However, before receiving his punishments, he was still doing his job in Beis Din and was flogging someone else. He gave the person 40 strokes. Now, according to R’Yehuda, who says that a person receives 39 strokes, this Shliach Beis Din has given too many, therefore he has transgressed the issur of  “Lo Yosif Le’hakoso”(in passuk 3), and he now must receive a further set on top of the 39 he deserves already. So, altogether, he is obligated to receive 40 sets of 39 strokes.

According to the Chachomim, who says that a person receives 40 strokes, this Shliach Beis Din has not given too many, and therefore, he is obligated to receive his original 39 floggings, each consisting of 40 strokes. When calculated it works out that 39 floggings times 40 strokes = 40 floggings times 39 strokes; so according to both R’Yehuda and the Chachomim, he receives the same amount.

 Upon hearing this answer, the man was so impressed with the sheer genius of the young man that he took the Chiddushei Harim to be his son-in-law.

On that note – Good Shabbos! 

Torah and Rehab

Jewish law is often misrepresented as being focused on retribution and having an almost sadistic desire for violent punishment: nothing could be further from the truth. It does, in fact, demonstrate many ways to be acquitted as well as ways of rehabilitation for the offender. The essence of rehabilitation is clearly seen in this weeks parsha. Note the following:

כִּי-יִהְיֶה רִיב בֵּין אֲנָשִׁים, וְנִגְּשׁוּ אֶל-הַמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׁפָטוּם; וְהִצְדִּיקוּ, אֶת-הַצַּדִּיק, וְהִרְשִׁיעוּ, אֶת-הָרָשָׁע. וְהָיָה אִם-בִּן הַכּוֹת, הָרָשָׁע–וְהִפִּילוֹ הַשֹּׁפֵט וְהִכָּהוּ לְפָנָיו, כְּדֵי רִשְׁעָתוֹ בְּמִסְפָּראַרְבָּעִים יַכֶּנּוּ, לֹא יֹסִיף:  פֶּן-יֹסִיף לְהַכֹּתוֹ עַל-אֵלֶּה מַכָּה רַבָּה, וְנִקְלָה אָחִיךָ לְעֵינֶיךָ 

 If there is a quarrel between men, and they approach the tribunal, and they [the judges] judge them, and they acquit the innocent one and condemn the guilty one. and it shall be, if the guilty one has incurred [the penalty of] lashes, that the judge shall make him lean over and flog him in front of him, commensurate with his crime, in number.  He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed, lest he give him a much more severe flogging than these [forty lashes], and your brother will be degraded before your eyes.  (Deut. 25: 1-3)
For a number of reasons there are many Halachic discussions of these verses; but for now we can look at the change of name of the offender. The verses start by calling the accused הָרָשָׁע-the evil one then quite quickly use the friendly name of אָחִיךָ-your brother. The Sifri on this pasuk understands this apparent misnomer to be teaching us a moral lesson. Namely, that once the Offender has accepted punishment he is once again part of our people, connected by Ahavas Yisroel.

Practically speaking in halachah, while someone is considered a רָשָׁע they are excommunicated. That is, they are forbidden from taking part in religious ceremonies and also from civil law (for example giving testimony in court). Yet when the person has undergone the prescribed punishment his religious and civil rights and obligations are reinstated as a full member of Am Yisroel. This led to a specific enactment by the sages, known as “takkanat ha-shavim”, a rule designed to remove any obstacles to repentance.

An example of this is found in massechet Gittin (5:5): “If a beam which was acquired by robbery has been built into a building, restitution for it may be made in money so as not to put obstacles in the way of penitents.” The rule is, that in a case of robbery, the guilty party must return what he has taken to the rightful owner (Lev. 5:23). This makes obvious sense. If a thief were merely allowed to make a monetary compensation rather than return the stolen object, the law would, in effect, allow someone to acquire an object – albeit at a price – through unlawful means. That is clearly morally wrong, even to an atheist. Yet this rule was suspended for cases where returning the stolen object would cause the thief to incur a massive loss. This is the case in the Mishnah in Gittin; in order to restore the actual beam to its rightful owner the thief would have to demolish his own house. Although the sense of guilt at the original crime might induce remorse in the thief and an effort to return stolen goods; Nonetheless, if this would involve disproportionate loss the thief might decide that restitution was too dear and decide against giving the object back. “So what?”, even a fairly reasonable man might say. “Surely the thief, by breaking the law, has forfeited any claim on the courts’ clemency. What matters is the right of the original owner of the beam- not the rights of the thief”. Yet Jewish law ruled otherwise. To be sure, the owner must be compensated for his loss, for without this he would have suffered an injustice. But we must have concern for the offender too, and must remove obstacles to becoming a law-abiding person.

Our sages went further still. In Massechet Bava Kama (94b) we find a remarkable principle: “if robbers or usurers [repent, and of their own accord] are prepared to restore what they have wrongly taken, it is not right to accept it from them, and one who does so is not acting with the approval of the sages.” This does not apply to a convicted criminal – only a person who has, without any prompting other than a guilty conscience, has decided to confess and make amends. This is “brought down” by Rambam (Hilchot Gezelah 1:13): “Even though robbing someone is like taking their life…we must help [a thief who repents on his own accord] and pardon him in order to bring him to the right path.

There are other principles articulated by the sages which help an ‘offender’ to atone for his misdeeds and feel fully accepted back by Klal Yisroel (not referring to his criminal past to take one example). These teachings were ahead of their times as justice in ancient times was not tempered with mercy, but like so many of the moral truths given to our forefathers on Har Sinai, they are radical and eternal. Jewish law is concerned not only to protect the rights of those who have been wronged, but also to help the offenders rebuild their lives. Only acts are forever wicked, never a person; and we put this into practice by welcoming the penitent back as our brother and equal

Tests and Consequences

From a shiur by R Yakov Minkus

י. כִּי תֵצֵא לַמִּלְחָמָה עַל אֹיְבֶיךָ וּנְתָנוֹ יְ־הֹוָ־ה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּיָדֶךָ וְשָׁבִיתָ שִׁבְיוֹ
10. If you go out to war against your enemies, and the Lord, your God, will deliver him into your hands, and you take his captives
יא. וְרָאִיתָ בַּשִּׁבְיָה אֵשֶׁת יְפַת תֹּאַר וְחָשַׁקְתָּ בָהּ וְלָקַחְתָּ לְךָ לְאִשָּׁה:
11. and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her, you may take [her] for yourself as a wife.

Rashi יא:

ולקחת לך לאשה: לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע. שאם אין הקב”ה מתירה ישאנה באיסור. אבל אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה, שנאמר אחריו (פסוק טו) כי תהיין לאיש וגו’ וסופו להוליד ממנה בן סורר ומורה, לכך נסמכו פרשיות הללו –
You may take [her] for yourself as a wife: [Not that you are commanded to take this woman as a wife,] but Scripture [in permitting this marriage] is speaking only against the evil inclination [, which drives him to desire her]. For if the Holy One, blessed is He, would not permit her to him, he would take her illicitly. [The Torah teaches us, however, that] if he marries her, he will ultimately come to despise her, as it says after this,“If a man has [two wives-one beloved and the other despised]” he will ultimately father through her a wayward and rebellious son. For this reason, these passages are juxtaposed.]

The Rambam says that the pasuk’s instruction of ‘yefas to’ar‘ is a mitzva. Not just a heter (permit), Even if it is in a voluntary way ie and not milchemes mitzva.

We have two questions on the above pesukim:

Q1. The Gemara in Pesachim says ‘shluchei mitzva einam nezokin‘ – ‘people on the way to perform a mitzva are not harmed.’ So, how do we reconcile this gemara with the fact that according to the Ramban he is doing a mitzva, yet according to Rashi he will suffer  because he will hate her and that any child from this relationship is destined to become a בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה?

Q2. ‘לא דברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע’ If it is indeed a mitzva like the ramban said, how is it connected to the yetzer hara? We know that mitzvos are for the side of the יצר טוב!

There are two answers that work together to answer the questions.

Firstly, the torah is guiding us even בשעת הירידה. It says that in a time when we are about to stumble, Hashem doesn’t leave us out in the proverbial cold – ‘we are permitted to take her for a wife.’ Note that it does not say ‘marry,’ and after 30 days of having her in the house, with a shaved head, unkempt, mourning and in sack cloth, the man will in theory realise who exactly he has in his house and will send her home after 30 days.

Secondly, כנגד יצר is in the here and now.  We have explained before that the יצר הרע is identified as impulsive and  so the torah permits this indiscretion, on the proviso that he gets rid of her after 30 days. If he marries her after the 30 days the יפת תואר‘s ‘loophole’ has expired, and he is, in fact, committing a sin and as a result, as mentioned above, he will have a ‘rebellious son.’

This dual concept is referred to in Rashi’s explanation – “אם נשאה, סופו להיות שונאה” – in the 30 days he is doing a mitzva, he is indeed not harmed – but after 30 days he is not a שליח מצוה. Hashem is both helping us and testing us and then telling us the consequences of failing the test.

Brothers

(וַעֲשִׂיתֶם לוֹ כַּאֲשֶׁר זָמַם לַעֲשׂוֹת לְאָחִיו וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִקִּרְבֶּךָ’ (דברים יט:יט

‘And you shall do to him like he plotted to do to his brother’.

 Rashi explains this pasuk by saying ‘The pasuk says ‘like he plotted’ and not if he actually did [to his brother].’ The Mishna in Makos 5b learns this דין from the word ‘brother’ since ‘brotherhood’ only refers to live siblings.

The Ritva asks, ‘When it talks about יבום in דברים כ’ה:ז we find a reference to brotherhood despite the brother having deceased, thus contradicting the Mishna above. For example, despite their tragic death, Nadav and Avihu are also referred to as ‘brothers’.

 R’ Ezriel Hildesheimer answers with a most wonderful idea. He explains the difference between a blood brother and a friendship style brother. A blood brother will remain a brother even after he has deceased, hence the relevance of Yibum where the pasuk refers to them as brothers. Nadav, Avihu, Mishael and Elitzafon were blood cousins which hold the same importance, in their case only, as brothers. However, here we are discussing witnesses where they may not have any blood relativity at all. In this pasuk, the reason they are addressed as brothers is simply because they are ‘brothers in arms,’ I.e. they are both keeping the mitzvos. As is proven in Bava Kama 88a, ‘A Canaanite servant is a brother to us in mitzvos.’

This question over whether it is truly a blood brother or just a brother through mitzvos is only relevant if the ‘brother’ is still alive. We have already established that it refers to ‘brothers in mitzvos.’  However, once they are deceased they are free from the mitzvos so there is nothing binding them as brothers.

In conclusion, the posuk is cryptically trying to show us that, indeed, the victim in question is still alive and was not affected / killed by the ‘plot’ against him.

Good Shabbos

Torah’s Coming Home!

It all starts with the sedra, and the relatively innocuous pasuk (17:1) ‘do not offer up to HaShem your God an ox or sheep which has a blemish, (or) anything bad, for it is an abomination (to) HaShem your God.’ As the various commentators reveal, there are two different issues in this pasuk. Firstly, the pasuk is telling us that we are not to offer up any animal which has a physical defect (a mum – pronounced in a Mancunian accent).[1] Secondly, the pasuk is banning pigul.[2] Pigul is basically the illegal declaration (whether verbally or in one’s mind)[3] during any of the processes related to the korban, that the korban is to be eaten outside the permitted timeframe or place. Given that these two prohibitions are in the same pasuk, they should be connected What is the connection between a mum and pigul?

Let’s begin our answer with an insightful comment of the Ksav Sofer.[3b] The Gemarra writes that sometime in the future, HaShem will plonk Klal Yisrael in the sports stadiums and theatres of nations of the world and teach us Torah there. And it’s no coincidence that in March 2005, 20,000 Jews celebrated the daf yomi siyum ha’shas in Madison Square Garden. The Ksav Sofer asks the obvious question here. Mir Yeshiva houses about five thousand people, Ponovetz another thousand, and add that to the various other yeshivas and shuls around; there is ample space to have Klal Yisrael being taught Torah in their home grounds. Are there not enough yeshivas and shuls in the world that HaShem needs to use the Garden, Wembley Stadium, or Broadway – why not use a yeshiva? The Ksav Sofer answers with something remarkable. He writes that the reason sports stadiums will be chosen by HaShem as the venue is in order to imbue us with this same sense of excitement for Torah as is experienced at a sports game. If you can appreciate that a piece of advice from the Talmud, an explanation of one of the Rishonim, a psychological insight of one of the Mussar greats, or an ingenious bit of analysis from one of the pillars of Brisk is no less exciting than a guy wearing a vest jumping for a slam-dunk or a 30-yard piledriver then you have realised something important. HaShem puts us in those same stadiums where people got excited over things that do not really matter so much in the grand scale of things, so that we realise that Torah is just as exciting and far more relevant to our lives than 22 players chasing a round piece of leather.

Indeed, it’s remarkable to note that there is an abnormal amount of buzz and excitement in the realms of sport and entertainment. People can cry at football matches if their team loses, and it can destroy their entire week (or four years) if a shot hit the post as opposed to going over the line. True, people are suffering needlessly in various parts of the world due to war, illness, and famine (etc.), but what really makes (certain) people have emunah questions is ‘why did that referee not see that the ball went over the line?!’ It’s remarkable that there were riots in Bangladesh when there was a power cut during the opening game of the World Cup. Similarly, the students of the main university in Bangladesh went on strike when they found out that lectures which clashed with World Cup games would not be cancelled. Oh, and I do not need to tell you that Bangladesh did not even make it to the World Cup. And let’s face it, many more Englishmen would turn out for a referendum on whether the England manager should be sacked than for the national election. After all, what does the mere matter of education policy rate in comparison to which twenty-year olds will put on the England kit to disappoint you in the next major tournament!? And it’s not only football; people camp out for the night for tickets to Wimbledon, and I cannot imagine how much money is wasted on outfits (and hats) for the Grand National. That’s sport. What about entertainment? Well, many years ago when Star Wars Episode One came out there were people camping outside the first cinema in New York to be screening the film for days to make sure they got the first tickets. There was one person who camped out there for three weeks before the screening. In fact, he was so excited that he stayed up the entire night before the showing and when he finally did get into the cinema he fell asleep during the film (he confirmed this in an interview afterwards)! Similarly, the three sets of slippers that Dorothy wore in the Wizard of Oz went for tens of thousands of dollars in auction, and one solitary sheet of John Lennon’s music went for $100,000. Think about it – I know many needy families who could live for at least two years off that sum of money, and I know many charities who are desperate for such donations, but this wealthy bidder was more than happy to forgo such an exorbitant sum just so he could say ‘I have a handwritten copy of John Lennon’s music.’ Shkoyach.

The Ksav Sofer’s answer tells us that this excitement for sports and entertainment should (at the very least) be matched by the excitement one has for Torah; excitement that comes from the realisation that Torah is real, true, and will actually help one live their life. In fact, have you ever wondered why people get so excited about sport; what is it that pulls someone to say ‘my team won’ even though you are the fellow they have managed to get to fork out money for tickets, the kit, etc? the Vilna Ga’on[4] writes that in order to counteract the enjoyment of learning Torah, HaShem put a powerful presence of leitzanus (lit. scoffing) into the world. As the Ohr Hachaim writes, if we only realised how enjoyable for our souls the study of Torah was, our whole body and soul would be affected by it to the extent that we’d naturally learn Torah as often as possible. So HaShem put the pull and excitement of leitzanus into the world in order to create a challenge for us to want to learn Torah. And as Rav Tzvi Kushulevski said, since leitzanus means attaching importance to something that’s objectively unimportant in reality, sport is one area of leitzanus here. This is the underlying reason why sport and entertainment are so attractive; HaShem purposefully made it that way to balance the spiritual thrill of Torah learning. And this is why it is so important that we learn Torah with a degree of excitement, zest and zeal, in order that we prioritise what really matters in life, as well as redressing this balance.

But let’s get a tiny bit more practical. Who cares if I perform mitzvos and learn Torah with enthusiasm or not; what difference does it make? There are several answers here, ranging from the more spiritual to the more pragmatic.

Firstly, the reward for a mitzvah done with zeal is far greater than for one done with an approach of coldness and dryness.[5] Similarly, the Eglei Tal[6] and Rav Avraham min Ha’har[7] both stress that joy is an integral and central part of learning Torah. Moreover, this is one reason why the Gra insisted that one should learn whichever part of Torah one feels a natural attraction to – for that way one’s learning will be be’simcha. Secondly, and perhaps more essentially, the key to good chinuch and ensuring that the next generation remains committed to Judaism is this idea of fervour and excitement in Judaism. If one does not impart a love and enjoyment for Torah and mitzvos to one’s children, then when they grow up and find that something (everything) else is more exciting than this ‘boring ritual-based religion’ they will simply drop religion. I have seen this many times in chinuch as well; boys who related to Torah and mitzvos as intellectual challenges ended up being less committed than boys who developed an excitement and thrill for Judaism. This is one reason why girls compare so much better to boys in terms of keeping up their religious commitment, despite the fact that girls tend to spend one year in Sem, whilst the average boy (at least where I come from) tends to spend two years in Yeshiva. Why does the girl tend to fare better in the long-run? The Sem girl has been imbued with this excitement and emotional connection with Judaism (girls are more emotionally-driven, remember – hope my wife does not read this) which thus holds them in good stead over and above the boys’ general intellectual approach. This is why learning Mussar is so important – for it rams home this emotional connection to Torah and mitzvos that keeps one steady and committed.

Obviously, this centrality of excitement in mitzvos is not my own idea. The Gemarra[8] notes that the only mitzvos which are constantly kept strong by Klal Yisrael are those mitzvos which we originally accepted with joy (hence so many Jews having a bris milah); for this joy is the key to imparting our tradition to the next generation. The following story tells it all. A new immigrant to America once came to Rav Moshe Feinstein, complaining that his son had started disregarding Shabbos. ‘When I came to America I sacrificed everything to keep Shabbos,’ he wept. ‘I could only hold on to a job for one week, for they’d fire me when I took Shabbos off, and we just about managed to put food on the table. And this is the reward I get – my son breaks Shabbos?’ the man exclaimed. Rav Moshe empathised with the man and simply said ‘when Shabbos arrived each week what was your attitude – what did you say at the Shabbos table?’ ‘Simple,’ said the immigrant ‘I told my kids how much I’d sacrificed for Shabbos and about my worries of finding a new job next week.’ ‘Well,’ said Rav Moshe, ‘had you told them instead about how happy you were that you are able to keep Shabbos and how holy the Shabbos day is then your children would have followed suit. How do you expect your children to keep Shabbos when all they heard from you was how hard it is to keep Shabbos and how much worry and suffering it brings?’

Let’s now move back to our question; what do a mum and pigul have to do with each other? For they are teaching two points about excitement in mitzvos. The prohibition against a mum teaches us that mitzvos must be performed with excitement and fervour – we are to bring the best, korban possible; one with no blemishes. However, as the Chazon Ish stressed,[9] one’s excitement cannot override halacha. One’s excitement must be kept within the framework of halacha, otherwise it’s not constructive excitement. Thus, the prohibition of pigul in a korban tells us our excitement must be framed; the various halachos of when and where to eat the korban must be kept in order to ensure that the mitzvah is still tapping in to HaShem’s spiritual system as opposed to merely being a way for you to gain a thrill.

In summary, be excited!

Have a super Shabbos!!!!!!

[1] Ibn Ezra and Ohr Hachaim 17:1, and Rambam hilchos Issurei Mizbeyach 1:5

[2] Rashi and Ramban 17:1

[3] Whether there needs to be speech for pigul (or thought alone suffices) seems to be a machlokes between Tosafos Bava Metzia 43b ‘hachoshev’ and the Rambam hilchos Psulei Hamukdashim 13:1

[3b] Igros Sofrim, letters of the K’sav Sofer, #18

[4] Gra, Mishlei 1:23

[5] The Shem Mishmuel writes that there is a special cold place of Gehinnom (Scotland, perhaps?) to correct mitzvos that are done without any happiness or excitement. Obviously it’s better to do a mitzvah with no excitement than not to do it at all.

[6] Introduction to Eglei Tal

[7] Rav Avraham min Hahar, Nedarim 48a

[8] Gemarra Shabbos

[9] Chazon Ish, Emunah u’Bitachon perek 3

Grab the opportunity

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רְאֵה אָנכִי נתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם בְּרָכָה וּקְלָלָה - Behold, I am giving before you today a blessing and a curse. (11:26)

Q1. Why does the posuk start singular (רְאֵה) and turn plural (לִפְנֵיכֶם)?

Q2. Why does posuk say אָנכִי - ‘I’. Who else would be speaking?

Q3. Why does it say נתֵן - ‘giving’, should say נתתֵיֵ - ‘I have given’?

Q4. Why does it say לִפְנֵיכֶם - ‘before you’, and not לכֶםִ - ‘to you’?

Q5. What is the word הַיּוֹם, today, doing in the posuk?

The Gra explains that this posuk refers to a person trying to do teshuva and repent for past actions, all the while being tormented by his yetzer hara. The yetzer hara is that niggling doubt at the back of your head when doing something. It tells you ‘How can you fix that? You’ve done it for so long, its natural, you’re used to it! How are you possibly going to choose the correct path and to teshuva?’ Hashem assures us that נתן, He is ‘giving’ us the choice so that whenever we decide to repent, Hashem is right there offering you the opportunity. Effectively, it’s never too late.

Another tactic our yetzer hara uses to scare us off doing teshuva is to remind you of all your past misdeeds and flaunts them, taunting ‘Look what you’ve done! Look how much you’ve done! What hope do you have?’ So Hashem tells us that once you do teshuva it will change – הַיּוֹם - ‘today’. A Baal Teshuva is like a newborn child, everything in the past is gone, and all that he is being accounted for is the present, the ‘today’.

After being accustomed to the yetzer hara, a man will say ‘But how can I change and not sin any more? It is beyond my ability to battle and beat the yetzer hara, hence I am forced to listen to it blindly’ Hashem tells us, אָנכִי - ‘I’ am giving you the opportunity to conquer your yetzer hara. In essence Hashem is saying ‘I am with you; you need not be afraid of anyone or anything else.’ And this parallels what Chazal say:Yitzro Shel Adam Misgaber Alav Bechol Yom Veilmalai Hakadosh Baruch Hu Ozer Lo, Aino Yuchal Lo – “The evil inclination of a man strengthens himself upon a man each day and desires to destroy him, and if G-d wouldn’t help him he would not be able to defeat him”

A further dilemma one may have is with regard to choice: ‘Perhaps the yetzer tov isn’t so good, so why follow the unknown?’ The posuk tells us, אָנכִי נתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם, Hashem wont help us make the choice, it is up to us to exercise our בחירה – (free will). The way to distinguish between the yetzer hara from yetzer tov is to act as a businessman with a large stock of commodities to sell. Will he take the first offer that comes his way? or will he survey the market, get quotes, and deliberate what price to sell at and which clients to sell to? An impulsive action will be detrimental in his case and ours too. If we wait a few days and on review, we still think something is a good idea, then it’s a positive sign that this is the yetzer tov’s instruction.

The final and most frequent dilemma a person seeking to do teshuva faces is ‘How can I break the trend on my own? I look around and everyone around me does as they please, is it possible for me to swim against the current?’ The posuk tells us ‘רְאֵה‘, in the singular. You judge yourself on an individual level with the framework I (Hashem) have given you alone, and don’t make a cheshbon for everyone else.

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