Solid Basis

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Earlier in sefer Bamidbar, a chunk of the people go to Moshe, and lament that they were impure at the time the korban Pesach was offered, and request inclusion in the mitzvah in the form of Pesach Sheni.
In Parshas Korach, it is clear that Korach too seeks more inclusion. Why are they paradigms of how to and how not to perform diplomacy, when the bottom line for both was the same?

There is a concept that all negative characteristics have a positive application. Rabbeinu Yona writes how a person can be jealous of a tzaddik or talmid chacham. Jealousy is an inherently bad trait – however, the jealousy fosters aspirations, and if they are realised, the person grows from it. In this way, מתוך שלו לשמה, בה לשמה – from which it began without the correct intentions, the actions nonetheless develop into something meaningful.

However, there is a caveat to this rule, that all misguided actions are fixed in the long term – one type of action will never become לשמה – a machlokes – an divide. The Mishna in Pirkei Avos 5:17 says: כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים, סופה להתקים. ושאינה לשם שמים, אין סופה להתקים.
איזו היא מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים? זו מחלוקת הלל ושמאי. ושאינה לשם שמים? זו מחלוקת קרח וכל עדתו – Any argument for the sake of Heaven, will endure in the end. One that is not for sake of Heaven, will not endure. What is the paradigm of an argument for the sake of heaven? Hillel and Shamai. What is the paradigm of an argument not the sake of Heaven? Korah and his congregation.

What are the paradigms, exactly? That an argument in Torah will endure, and that politics will not?

R’ Yaakov Minkus explains that there is more to it than that. Adding the mitzvah of Pesach Sheni was not a problem – the Torah was not closed canon yet. Korach however, was looking to destroy (a cursory reading of Rashi illustrates this).

Hillel and Shamai were looking to build halachos, and build a fabric for life. From one’s point of view, we understand the other better. We need both to build and consolidate.
Not so with Korach. His arguments and divisions were not constructive at all. His claims and goals were baseless and without foundation – this was the midd a k’negged midd a of the earth opening up beneath him – he was not fighting for anything or against anything real. The Mishna says as much. What was the paradigm of an argument not for the sake of heaven? “Korach and his congregation.”. If the parallel to Hilel And Shamai were correct, it ought to have said Korach and Moshe. R ‘ Yaakov Minkus uses this to prove that Korach wasn’t really fighting anyone at all – it was just about causing a stir and break down the system that existed.

This is what Rashi and the Targum mean when they say that ויקח קרח – “And Korach took” – What did he take? Himself, to one side (against the other side, of Moshe.)

It was never about Moshe.

Why there is suffering in the world

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Why is there suffering in the world? More specifically, why does the Torah give the tochacha, the list of all the curses that will afflict the people if they do not keep the Torah properly?

In this world, we have a body and a soul. The Yetzer Hara – the evil inclination – exists in the soul, and the Yetzer Tov – the positive inclination – exists in the body. Ideally, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תֵּלֵכוּ וְאֶת מִצְוֹתַי תִּשְׁמְרוּ – the soul transcends the physical of the world, and the person becomes separate from the world, different, holy.

However, אִם בְּחֻקֹּתַי תִּמְאָסוּ – if the body sins, it comes to the fore, and it supersedes the soul, to the point where soul is almost strangled, as it were. If the soul were to die, the body would be no different to that of animal – lead by sense and impulse.

Suffering is an emergency safety measure that kicks in to avoid this. It minimises the physicality the body partakes in. It prevents the body from getting addicted to what will eventually destroy the soul. In this way, suffering cleanses us.

This applies to all suffering, including the Holocaust.

The victims were martyrs. Whatever they were in life, they were קדושים, holy martyrs, in death. They died על קידוש ה. The Gemara in Sanhedrin explains that in dying על קידוש ה, the victim becomes a figurative and actual korban, a sacrifice. All suffering is smaller degree of this, all suffering is in some way a קרבן לה. The Bluzhever Rebbe used to tell people to get a bracha from a Holocaust survivor for the very same reason.

All suffering reduces the domination of body over soul, of matter over mind,

People usually suffer most in their old age, toward the end of their lives. This is when they are older, and thus free from the sins of their youth. Hashem postpones suffering in the elderly in order that the person may greet his Creator in the most pure and direct way.

Parshas Behar and Bechukosai frequently appear together – Behar teaches about the Torah at Sinai, and Bechukosai is the blessings and curses. R’ Yaakov Minkus explains that they are together because they both take us to Har Sinai – Torah and suffering both.

Suffering removes the framework the Yetzer Hara operates and thrives in. It brings a person closer to Sinai and Hashem by breaking the hold his body has over his soul, purifying and cleansing him.

Women in Judaism, mitzvos, and counting Sefira

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Tosfos explain that Sefiras Ha’Omer is a rabbinical law, in memory of the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash. The reason this is so is that the pasuk says:

וּסְפַרְתֶּם לָכֶם מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת מִיּוֹם הֲבִיאֲכֶם אֶת עֹמֶר הַתְּנוּפָה שֶׁבַע שַׁבָּתוֹת תְּמִימֹת תִּהְיֶינָה – And you shall count for yourselves, from the morrow of the rest day, from the day you bring the omer as a wave offering seven weeks; they shall be complete. (23:15)

The Rambam disagrees, and says it is a commandment directly from the Torah to count today. Looking at the above pasuk, it seems difficult to suggest this, as we don’t bring a Korban Omer – so how can we say there is a mitzva today to count the Sefira?

R’ Yaakov Minkus explains that there are two reasons for counting Sefira.

Tosfos say that the Sefira marks the beginning of the harvest cycle. Pesach marks the beginning, and is called ראש הקציר – the initiation of the harvest. It was marked through the Korban Omer, and allowed the consumption of new grain within the Beis HaMikdash. Shavuos marks the end, and is called חג הקציר – the celebration of the harvest. It was marked through the Shtei HaLechem, which allowed the consumption of new produce, outside the Beis HaMikdash, and everywhere.

The Sefira is the process of enabling produce. We return the first of the harvest, the beginning, to Hashem. The Korban Omer exists to show our fealty and identity with Hashem. The Sefira results from this.

The Rambam explains that the pasuk’s instruction is to count מִיּוֹם הֲבִיאֲכֶם אֶת עֹמֶר – from the day, that is to say, not from the Korban itself. So what is it we are counting from today then?

The Sefer HaChinuch teaches that counting Sefira takes us to Har Sinai. It is easy to think of Pesach as a standalone day where we celebrate our liberation – it is not so. Pesach was the sole means by which we could transition from slavery to Shavuos and receiving the Torah.

Shavuos is an annual occurrences. It occurs without the Korban Omer – this is how it can still be a mitzva to count Sefira. We count מִמָּחֳרַת הַשַּׁבָּת – from after Pesach, not the Korban itself.

When a person makes a bracha, they say אשר קדשנו במצותיו, וצונו. Women have the first part, the אשר קדשנו במצותיו, but not the second, וצונו. Har Sinai gave us the Torah and it’s 613 commandments in a general sense. The women accepted the Torah in a general sense too. Although women are exempt from many mitzvos, which is to say they don’t have to, it does not mean they cannot grow from their performance – this is קדשנו. A non-Jew who performs a mitzva does not have either part of the bracha, and cannot grow from the performance of a mitzva.

This is the difference between Pesach and Shavuos. Pesach is full of mitzvos; the Korban Pesach, circumcision, the Seder. In performing Hashem’s instructions, we became His people, subjugated to Him. This is all וצונו. However, Sinai is Torah. This gave mitzvos a קדשנו – which women are also subject to. Sefira connects the אשר קדשנו במצותיו to the וצונו.

But the Sefira is not “just” to connect Pesach to Shavuos, the mitzvos to the Torah; but also, the other way around, Shavuos to Pesach. The first of the Ten Commandments is אָנֹכִי ה’ אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר הוֹצֵאתִיךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם מִבֵּית עֲבָדִים – (to know that) “I am the Lord, your God, Who took you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage”. How can the first (or any) commandment be faith?

The first command specifies that Hashem took us out of Egypt. Egpyt and faith are inextricably linked. We were not liberated from Egypt at all – we were transferred. In the same way we recognised that Hashem had taken us out of Egypt, that same Hashem was giving us the Torah, based on a belief in Him. Sinai’s eternity is based on having been taken out of Egypt, and in this way Sefira links Shavuos and Pesach, both backwards and forwards.

Why do we bring Korbanos?

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It’s a very basic question, and there are many approaches to take. The Ramban on Vayikra 1:9 discusses various approaches we will analyse, and is widely considered one of the fundamental parts of the Ramban’s commentary on the Chumash.

The Ramban quotes the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim as the first approach. The Rambam writes there that the idea of Jews using animal sacrifice was necessary for the people as they needed a physical method of worship, having been a part of the pagan culture in Egypt and other such places. To battle and rectify the idol worship in the world, the Jews would do the same action for a sacred purpose.

The Ramban disagrees strongly with this on many facets. If we base an entire method of service to Hashem on the actions of fools and sinners, why would Hashem gain anything from it at all? Vayikra 1:9 says that the korban creates אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה – Hashem “enjoys” the fact that we bring korbanos. The implication of the Rambam is that the korbanos are more for man than Hashem, but  if the korbanos were for man, why would Hashem enjoy it? We must find a suitable explanation for bringing korbanos that also explains why Hashem instructs it of us, rather than why why we ought to do it.

The Ramban points out that if the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim is correct, that Jewish animal sacrifice only exists to battle idol worship, then we would not find instances of korbanos before an instance of idol worship. But this is not so – Adam was the first human – there were obviously no other people around to worship idols – yet he brought korbanos nonetheless, and so too with Noach; his family were the sole survivors of the Flood – so again, there could be no idol worshippers – and we find that nonetheless he did bring korbanos. How would the Rambam explain these instances where there was no idol worship to fight?

He further asks why the solution to idol worship would be to do the same thing in a different way – this seems to lend credibility to the idolatry the korbanos are trying to fight, chas v’shalom. It would seem that it would be better to just eat animals and not have sacrifices at all if we were indeed trying to fight the credibility of idol worship, as eating them shows we don’t consider them to be worthy of special attention.

R’ Yakov Minkus explains the solution to this issue. The Rambam in his magnum opus, the Mishneh Torah (Hilchos Me’ila 8:8) writes explicitly that the yesod – the distilled, fundamental, reason to bring korbanos is a חוק – there is no reason to do it other than the fact we were told to. The Moreh Nevuchim explains the inverse of this – once the mitzva exists, there is a spillover effect that we can relate to more, but the underlying reasoning remains a חוק. With this knowledge at hand, of course Noach could bring a korban, and the question about the non-existence of idol-worship falls away. Battling idol worship isn’t why there are korbanos as a starting point, rather, it helps explain it after the fact.

With this knowledge of the Rambam’s true approach to korbanos, we can suggest an answer to the question of why the countering of idol worship would take a similar form, rather than denigrating it, by simply eating all animals regularly, without any sacrifices at all.

Korbanos have their blood sprinkled on the Mizbeach, by a kohen, in the Beis Hamikdash. The Korban Pesach had none of these key functions, so why is it called a korban at all? R’ Moshe Shapiro explains that the key to understanding this issue is that idol worship is not nothing. Paganism and idol worship have a כח הטומאה – they usurp and corrupt spirituality. Eating an animal doesn’t battle the the negative of idol worship, it just nullifies it. The nullification does not require the Beis Hamikdash, or sprinkling of blood by the kohen.  This is why the Pesach could be brought publicly in Egypt. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim was saying that all korbanos have this nullifying the negative aspect to which we can relate, but we now see this isn’t the full spectrum of his opinion.

The Ramban then offers a second approach. There is an intrinsic good on man’s part in having korbanos. The idea of a korban is that a person should see the animal as being his substitute, and really, he ought to be sacrificed. The animal takes his place and atones for his sins, and this is the reason to have korbanos.

There is a mighty flaw with this approach too however. Most korbanos are donated, rather than obligated of people, so the Ramban’s approach doesn’t explain the existence of donated korbanos at all.

The Ramban offers a third solution, that is beyond the scope of this site to explain properly. The word קרבן, the root of which is the word קרב, means “closeness”. Offering a korban engenders closeness with Hashem. This is a difficult concept to explain, let alone understand, but to illustrate: we perform mitzvos to emulate Hashem’s ways, but we are not emulating Hashem by bringing korbanos – we are doing something else: we are interacting with Hashem. We are provoking a reaction in Hashem, as the pasuk says; “אשה ריח ניחוח ליהוה” – on which Rashi remarks “נחת רוח לפני, שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני”. This is difficult to illustrate, but there is a difference between doing Hashem’s will, and making it. When we bring a korban, we bring more of Hashem’s will into the world. One could suggest there is an element of creation here.

The Ramban brings a proof from Isaiah 60:7 that says: יַעֲלוּ עַל רָצוֹן מִזְבְּחִי וּבֵית תִּפְאַרְתִּי אֲפָאֵר – the Mizbeach is the expression of Hashem’s will.

So in bringing a korban, a person intentions are going to correlate to how they have extended G-d’s will in the world. This is why there is a concept of pigul, (a lengthy concept regarding what happens in the event that all the actions of a korban were carried out correctly, but someone in the porcess was thinking about something mundane, like the weather. Around 40 pages of Meseches Zevachim are devoted to this) – because the physical animal isn’t what matters – there is a transfer of spirituality here, from potential/theoretical to physical in this world. It’s a very big deal. The improper thoughts mean one can’t interact with what he’s trying to, and the korban has served it’s purpose, as the whole idea is not the physical at all.

So in answer to why we bring korbanos: there is the simple Moreh Nevuchim approach that we are counteracting paganism, the Ramban’s simple approach that we can atone our sins, and the Ramban’s esoteric Kabbalistic approach. We can suggest though, that perhaps the חוק aspect that the Rambam referred to was this third approach, and perhaps all the opinions harmonise together. Admittedly, this doesn’t answer why we bring korbanos, but it does explain what the function of the korban is.

Is there a “right” way to get to the Torah?

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Parshas Tetzaveh is an anomaly in the Torah. It is the only parsha in the narrative of the Jews of that time in which Moshe Rabbeinu’s name does not appear at all, from his birth until the end of the Torah (barring certain parts of Devarim, where he was the person speaking).

The Ba’al HaTurim comments on the first pasuk in Tetzaveh (27:20) that in Parshas Ki Sisa, after seeing the Golden Calf and subsequently Hashem’s wrath through the plague, Moshe pleaded that “ וְעַתָּה אִם תִּשָּׂא חַטָּאתָם וְאִם אַיִן מְחֵנִי נָא מִסִּפְרְךָ אֲשֶׁר כָּתָבְתָּ – And now, if You forgive their sin But if not, erase me now from Your book, which You have written.” (32:32). The Ba’al HaTurim explains that although Hashem did indeed refrain from destroying the nation, a tzaddik’s word is always fulfilled.

The parsha in which Moshe’s name does not appear is about the kehuna, the priesthood, which was given to Ahron. R’ Yakov Minkus explains that there are 2 ways for Torah (representing Heaven) and mankind (representing Earth) to intersect:

1. The first way is that the Torah descends from Heaven. Moshe embodied this, as exemplified when he brought down the luchos from the mountain to the people.
2. The second is that we elevate become elevated ourselves. Ahron embodied this, as the ultimate “people’s person”. He was אוהב שלום ורודף שלום – a lover and pursuer of peace. The entire priesthood was based on helping the people interact with Hashem through the services.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin concludes that there are two ways to settle litigation, through din emes (an actual judgement), or a pshara (a compromise). The fact that both are valid settlements shows that both are equally powerful at achieving their goal, settling a dispute.

The role of the kohen is to play the arbiter, the middle man. As a man of the people, he is meant to feel their emotions, guide them through the services in the Beis HaMikdash, and follow the path that Ahron set.

If we are to say that this way of getting to the intersection of people and Torah is equally valid, Moshe almost had to be left out, to show that here is another, equally valid way.

There are various incidents in the Torah where Ahron and Moshe are mentioned, with Ahron preceding Moshe, as opposed to the usual Moshe first, and Ahron second. This is meant to show their equality. But as pointed out in many places, Moshe was the greatest man to have ever lived, without equal, so to what ends can we suggest their equality?

Knowing what we now know, the answer is simple. Their equality was not as people, as indeed Moshe was without equal, but rather, their equality was in the validity of their approaches in how to get the Torah to the people.